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ABSTRACT 
In 1942, the U.S. Marine Corps activated the Marine Raider battalions, the first American 
special forces units of World War II.  However, the introduction of an elite subculture 
within the ranks of the Marine Corps, which already prided itself on being the nation’s 
elite fighting force, resulted in conflicting cultures and competing identities.  Many 
Marines felt that the creation of an elite within the ranks of the elite was superfluous and 
undesirable. The preferential treatment and widespread publicity accorded to the Raiders, 
combined with the Raiders’ sense of exceptionalism and claims to superiority, garnered 
resentment among other Marines.  Ultimately, the leadership of the Corps concluded that 
the Raider battalions were a detriment to the morale and esprit of the Marine Corps.  
Such resentment, in conjunction with the changing realities of the Pacific War in 1944, 
led to the end of the Raider program in early 1944.  As an elite organization operating 
within the culture of a recognized corps d’elite, the Raiders present a unique case study in 
the nature of elitism in military cultures.  This thesis examines the unique circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the Raiders, their rise to fame, and sudden fall from grace, 
concluding that the operational necessities of the late war period converged with the on-
going cultural unrest within the elitist culture of the Corps to spell the end of the Raiders. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE RAIDER MARINES IN HISTORY 
 
In August 1942, the United States was at war with Imperial Japan. The Japanese 
opened the war by dealing the United States a stunning blow at Pearl Harbor.  
Throughout early 1942, the Japanese kept the Allies reeling from a stunning chain of 
disasters; Guam, Wake, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, and the Philippines all fell before the 
Japanese juggernaut.  The Allies appeared powerless to stop the Japanese advances 
across the Central and South Pacific, but a surprise victory at the battle of Midway in 
June 1942 evened the odds.  In an attempt to press their advantage, the Allies moved to 
interdict Japanese operations in the Solomon Islands, a vital location for maintaining 
communications with their Australian allies. In August 1942 the U.S. 1st Marine Division 
successfully landed on the island of Guadalcanal and seized the vital airfield there.  The 
Imperial Japanese Navy struck back hard, decisively defeating the Allied naval force in 
the Battle of Savo Island.  Now stranded, the Marines tenaciously held on to their airfield 
perimeter, and waited for the inevitable counterattack.  The Pacific War hung in the 
balance. 
On a Pacific island far to the north, two figures stand together on a deserted strip 
of beach on a summer evening.  The night is dark, ideal for a secluded conference 
between two of the most important men in the on-going naval struggle.  The commander-
in-chief of naval forces in the Pacific converses quietly with one of his most trusted 
admirals as they walk along the quiet beach. 
Unbeknownst to them, their midnight conference is less private than they had 
hoped.  Several hundred yards off-shore, shielded by the darkness and the sound of the 
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surf, two specially modified submarines of the U.S. Navy quietly surface.  Figures 
emerge quickly and quietly from the submarines’ hatches: U.S. Marines, faces covered in 
black, armed to the teeth with automatic weapons.  The Marines, over 200 of them, 
debark from the submarines, but not in Higgins boats or amtracks, under the protective 
barrage of a naval armada.  These men instead inflate small, rubber dinghies, powered by 
paddles and strong backs.  Silently, they move towards the shore, where the admirals 
continue their conversation. 
The rubber boats reach the shore undetected, as the surf covers any landing 
sounds.  The Marines quickly move ashore and hide their boats in the tree line.  They 
assemble without delay, efficiently and stealthily.  The marauders waste no time, and 
begin sneaking towards the figures silhouetted in the moonlit beach.  These men are not 
just any Marines – they are Marine Raiders.  Specially selected from the ranks of the 2nd 
Marine Division and hardened by months of rigorous training, they have been drilling 
specifically for this operation for several weeks now.  They have been trained to land 
unobserved on enemy-held islands, wreak havoc on unsuspecting garrisons and 
installations, and then depart as quickly as they came.  They are equipped with the best 
weapons the American arsenal can furnish and are all deadly marksmen.  The Raiders 
each carried a signature knife for silently deposing of enemy sentries – the famed Raider 
stiletto – which they wielded with deadly efficiency.  
Meanwhile, the admirals, pausing occasionally to gaze at the night sky, remain 
blissfully unaware that they are under scrutiny.  The Raiders creep ever closer, always 
ready to deliver a hail of fire on their unsuspecting targets.  The Raiders could not believe 
their good fortune: the commander of the Pacific Fleet continued to be ignorant of their 
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presence, though they closed the distance to 100 yards, 50 yards, 25 yards.  Emboldened 
by their success thus far, the Raiders continued to press the advantage.  Finally, with the 
killer Marines a mere 50 feet away, the admirals realized their peril and let out a cry of 
alarm – too late. 
Fortunately for the two naval officers, the Raiders were not out for blood on this 
summer’s eve.  Rather, the Raiders, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson, 
were merely demonstrating their prowess in amphibious raiding to an audience of the 
very highest stature:  the officers surprised this night were none other than Admiral 
Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), and Admiral 
Raymond Spruance, the hero of Midway.  The fact that both admirals had known that 
they were about to observe a Raider landing exercise and yet were still taken unaware 
only served to emphasize the Raiders’ finesse and proficiency.  Nimitz visited briefly 
with the erstwhile assassins and commended them for their performance.  Previously, he 
had commended the 2nd Raider Battalion in glowing terms as a battalion that, “by virtue 
of morale, organization, equipment, training, and development and encouragement of 
individual initiative and resourcefulness, is a striking force out of proportion to its 
numbers.”1  Their performance on this training exercise demonstrated that this was no 
exaggeration.2   
While the Raiders showcased their abilities for Nimitz, the real targets of their 
training were not idle.  The Japanese garrison on Makin Atoll in the Central Pacific took 
precautions to be ready for just such a raid.  Their preparations were of little avail.  Just a 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Oscar F. Peatross, Bless ‘Em All: The Raider Marines of World War II (Irvine, California: 
ReView Publications, 1995), 16-17. 
2 Peatross, Bless ‘Em All, 45, and John Wukovits, American Commando: Evans Carlson, His WWII Marine 
Raiders, and America’s First Special Forces Mission (New York: NAL Caliber, 2009), 86. 
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few days later, on the morning of August 17, 1942, the Raiders would surprise the 
Japanese and almost completely annihilate them in two days of fighting.  The commander 
of the garrison, Sergeant Major Kanemitsu, did not fare as well as the admirals.  In one of 
the many fantastic coincidences of the war, Kanemitsu met his untimely end at the hands 
of Raider Sam Brown from Lieutenant Oscar Peatross’ platoon – the very platoon that 
had surprised Nimitz and Spruance some weeks before.3 
The Raiders were an elite force of U.S. Marines organized in the early days of 
World War II to spearhead amphibious assaults, raid enemy installations, and operate 
deep behind enemy lines.  The Raiders performed brilliantly in the combat of the South 
Pacific from 1942 to early 1944, participating in campaigns on Guadalcanal, New 
Georgia, and Bougainville, as well as the Makin Atoll Raid.  However, despite their 
intended use and specialized training, the Raiders were rarely employed in actual raids.  
Instead, they were frequently used as “shock troops,” deployed to seize or defend key 
objectives while operating more or less as standard Marine battalions.  In light of this, the 
Raiders were ultimately disbanded, a mere two years after their inception and well before 
the end of the Pacific War.   
Perhaps because of their short experience, scholarly military historians have paid 
scant attention has been paid to the Raiders.  Generally, the Raiders are mentioned only 
as asides in military histories of larger scope, or even downplayed as the products of 
“military faddists.”4  This is unfortunate, though perhaps to be expected given the small 
                                                 
3 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 45-47, 54-55. 
4 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, rev. ed. (New York: The 
Free Press, 1991): 346.  For the standard treatment of the Raiders in Marine Corps historiography, see 
Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis: 
United States Naval Institute, 1965), 357-399 passim; J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story, rev. 
ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 254-288 passim; and Edwin Howard Simmons The United States 
Marines: A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 128-158 passim. 
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size and short lifespan of the Marine Raider battalions.  Since they were disbanded by the 
war’s end, the Raiders do not figure prominently in the literature analyzing the rise of 
elite special operations units in modern militaries.  The aim of this study, then, is twofold.  
First, it re-examines the operational history of the Raiders with reference to the existent 
scholarship on elite special operations units.  Secondly, it analyzes the dissolution of the 
Raider Battalions in January 1944.  As will be seen, there were significant pragmatic, 
operational rationales behind the abandonment of the Raider concept.  These reasons are 
readily apparent and their significance is amply appreciated in the literature on the 
Raiders.  This study sheds light on the less often-cited conflict in institutional culture that 
the Raider experiment provoked.  Simply put, the Raiders were an elite group, established 
rapidly and under secretive circumstances, within an institution that took considerable 
pride in being elite assault troops – the United States Marine Corps.  As an elite within an 
elite, the Raiders thus present a unique situation for the historian.  Their emergence as an 
elite sub-culture within the larger culture of elitism of the Corps presents an interesting 
case study of the potential conflicts of elitist cultures in military organizations. 
Noted military historian Robert Citino has aptly pointed out that military 
historiography seems to have evolved, and is currently evolving, along three general 
lines, which he classifies as operational, “new” or social, and cultural.5  These lines, 
according to Citino, are not exclusive, but complementary and frequently overlapping; 
nevertheless, they offer a convenient framework in which to consider military history.  
                                                 
5 Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” The American Historical Review 
112, no. 4 (Oct. 2007): 1070-1090.  The classification of the works discussed herein into traditional 
operational, “new” or social, and cultural histories is a useful construct for organizational purposes, but it 
should be stressed that the majority of these works do not fall neatly into a single category.  Furthermore, 
the distinctions between these genres are often vague, as Citino himself notes. “Military Histories Old and 
New,” 1089.   
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The historiography of the Marine Corps in the Pacific War follows these larger trends.6 
Operational history is the style traditionally associated with both military histories 
in general and Marine Corps history in particular.  Operational history can be considered 
military history in its most basic form:  “the detailed analysis of who did what, where, 
and to whom . . . the nuts and bolts of military history.”7  Concerned primarily with 
reconstructing the sequence of battles and the personalities and flaws of great leaders, it 
retains a broad appeal.  Many operational histories are merely “battle books” with little in 
the way of critical analysis, unfortunately leading some to overlook the value of scholarly 
operational histories.  Much sound work has been done in not only thoughtfully 
preserving the Corps’ World War II legacy, but in critically analyzing and explaining the 
Marines’ Pacific War.8 
While quality scholarship in Marine Corps operational history certainly exists, 
notable developments have been made in the area of the so-called “new” military history.  
The persistence of the title “new” is ironic, as this school has not only been integrated 
into military history at large, but has largely come to dominate the field.  Alternately 
referred to as the “war and society” approach, “new” military history broadens its scope 
                                                 
6 Jon Hoffman presents a brief survey of scholarly treatments of the Marine Corps in “The US Marine 
Corps,” in A Companion to American Military History, vol. 2, ed. James C. Bradford (Malden, 
Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 411-429.  Hoffman’s essay serves as an excellent reference on the 
state of Marine Corps history.  However, his analysis spans the entirety of Marine Corps history, thus 
abbreviating his treatment of World War II. 
7 Dennis Showalter, “A Modest Plea for Drums and Trumpets,” Military Affairs 39, no. 2 (April 1974): 71. 
8 While the complaints against popular history are often merited, to categorically dismiss the study of 
battles and warfare as irrelevant is not only unfair to the quality work that is being done in that area but it is 
to deny an important aspect of the human experience. “It would be strange indeed if a scholarly field with 
such broad interests did not make room for analysis of war and battle—surely not the least significant of 
human undertakings.” Citino, “Military Histories Old and New,” 1081. Military organizations are, after all, 
established with the purpose of doing battle, a feature that is nowhere more evident than in the Marine 
Corps, which proudly proclaims itself to be the “First to Fight.”  Dennis Showalter, one of the current deans 
of military history, makes this point very effectively in his article, “A Modest Plea.”  At risk of stating the 
obvious, Showalter holds that “Armies may be part of a broad framework, but like all institutions, they 
have a primary avowed function as well.  They exist to fight, and they justify themselves on the grounds of 
their military efficiency.”  72. 
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beyond traditional battle narratives in the quest to greater understand the complexities 
behind warfare, the people involved in it, and its effects on them.  It seeks to answer such 
questions as who went to war and why; what their experience was and how it changed 
them; how military services function as organizations; and how the military is both 
shaped by, and how it in turns shapes, society as a whole.  It is in the realm of “new” 
military history that some of the most telling dynamism of recent Marine Corps 
historiography becomes apparent. Aside from adding considerably to the story of the 
Corps’ most significant wartime experience, it also helps provide a much more complete 
picture of the Corps on both organizational and individual levels.9 
If the “new” military history is concerned with “the more humanistic side of war,” 
then cultural history is really just “war and society” history taken to its logical 
extension.10  The advent of the cultural approach to the history of war has served as fresh 
evidence of the scholarly vitality of military history.11  The examination of the Pacific 
War through various cultural lenses has given rise to some of the most exciting new 
scholarship on the Marine Corps.    Cultural history seeks to deepen understanding of 
                                                 
9 Citino notes that “the new military history is today an integral, even dominant, part of the parent field,” 
quipping that “it seems silly to keep calling it ‘new.’” “Military Histories Old and New,” 1071.  Though the 
concept of what exactly constitutes “new” military history remains somewhat elusive, it has been succinctly 
characterized as “an expansion of the subject of military history from the specifics of military organization 
and action to their widest implications, and also a broadening of the approaches to the subject.”  Peter 
Paret, quoted in John Whiteclay Chambers, “The New Military History: Myth and Reality,” The Journal of 
Military History 55, no. 3 (July 1991):  397.  For representative examples of the “new” military history as 
applied to the Marine Corps, consider Millett, Semper Fidelis, by far the best and most thorough 
institutional history of the Marine Corps; Gregory J.W. Urwin, Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake 
Island (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997); and Gregory J.W. Urwin, Victory in Defeat: The 
Wake Island Defenders in Captivity, 1941-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010). 
10 Wayne E. Lee, “Mind and Matter – Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State 
of the Field,” The Journal of American History 93, no. 4 (March, 2007): 1117. 
11 Probably the best introduction to the topic of cultural military history is John Shy, “The Cultural 
Approach to the History of War,” The Journal of Military History 57, no. 5 (October 1993): 13-26.  For a 
thorough examination of the developments within the cultural history of war since then, see Wayne Lee’s 
“Mind and Matter.”  Both Shy and Wayne provide insightful discussions of the use and application of the 
cultural approach to military history. 
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events both by situating them in the context of their times and by examining how a 
society’s culture impacts the function of its military.  Cultural history differs from the 
more traditional approaches in its openness to interdisciplinary methodologies, such as 
sociology and anthropology, and its tendency to focus on military ability and conduct as 
results of interlocking cultural factors.  Aaron O’Connell, one of the preeminent 
practitioners of Marine Corps cultural history, argues that studying culture is not only 
beneficial, but crucial, for “Not only does culture influence when and why we go to war, 
it shapes how we fight.”12  O’Connell offers a good working definition, taking “the word 
‘culture’ to mean the whole host of ways that individuals and groups differentiate 
themselves from other individuals and groups.”13  This is the definition of culture adopted 
by this study.  The Marine Corps, with its strong sense of exceptionalism and 
commitment to maintaining their own unique subculture, presents an ideal organization 
for the cultural historian’s study.  This applies even more so with the Marine Raiders.14 
                                                 
12 O’Connell offers one of the most succinct arguments in favor of adopting the cultural approach to the 
history of war:  “After a lengthy period of dismissing race, gender, and cultural theory as irrelevant to the 
study of combat, most scholars of warfare are prepared now to admit what is obvious to most:  our beliefs, 
identity narratives, and idea templates affect how we act – whether in our home lives, work lives, or, for 
military members, on the battlefield.  Not only does culture influence when and why we go to war, it 
shapes how we fight:  the tactics and tools we use, including the rhetorical tactics that help us understand, 
explain, and justify our participation in the conflict.”  Aaron O’Connell, “‘A Harsh and Spiritual Unity’:  A 
New Look at Culture and Battle in the Marine Corps’ Pacific War,” International Journal of Naval History 
7, no. 3 (December 2008):  1. 
13 O’Connell, “Harsh and Spiritual Unity,” 4.  He continues, “In short, culture is the stories people tell 
themselves and others about themselves.  And while stories usually implies a linguistic form – something 
told or written with words – I use the term and its synonym ‘narrative’ more loosely.  Rituals, traditions, 
uniform insignia and even habits of dress and posture tell stories too, even if they do so without words.”  
Ibid. 
14 For a sampling of some of the cultural history of the Pacific War, consider John Dower, War Without 
Mercy:  Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986); Gerald Linderman, The World 
Within War: America’s Combat Experience in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1997); Peter 
Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan:  American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific During World War II 
(New York:  New York University Press, 2002); John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture 
(Boulder:  Westview, 2003); Craig Cameron, American Samurai:  Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of 
Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-1951 (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1994); and 
Aaron B. O’Connell, Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012). 
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The history of Marine Raider Battalions falls within the basic structure of the 
historiography of the Pacific War, though the body of literature on the Raiders is 
considerably smaller than that available on the Marine Corps generally.  The fact that the 
Raiders were only in existence for two years and at their height only numbered four 
undersized battalions also means that there is simply less for historians to work with.  
Despite the grandiose visions for using the Raiders to alter the course of the war, in 
reality the Raiders were generally only employed locally, for tactical purposes; while 
they served key roles in important campaigns, the ultimate outcome of the war was not 
definitively shaped by the Raiders.  The Raiders as such had ceased to exist by the time 
of the defining campaigns of the late war period, which further distances them from 
historical consciousness.   
Despite their relative obscurity within the scholarly historiography of World War 
II, the Raiders have been the subject of several works, and have at least held the interest 
of those involved with Marine Corps history.  By their very nature, the Raiders make for 
exciting battle histories. Several non-scholarly or “popular” histories deal with the 
Raiders’ battle history, including Edwin Hoyt’s The Marine Raiders and George W. 
Smith’s The Do-or-Die Men.15  Such popular accounts are great reads and help draw 
attention to the Raiders’ experiences, but they are of limited analytical value.  Other 
popular histories are more relevant.  One narrative of note is George W. Smith’s 
Carlson’s Raid.16  Smith’s lively narrative evidences a good degree of research and 
                                                 
15 Edwin P. Hoyt, The Marine Raiders (New York: Pocket Books, 1989); George W. Smith, The Do-or-Die 
Men: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion at Guadalcanal (New York: Pocket Books, 2003); both are 
enjoyable, fast-paced narratives of Raider combat exploits; however, their utility to the researcher is 
limited. 
16 George W. Smith, Carlson’s Raid: The Daring Marine Assault on Makin (Novato, California: Presidio 
Press, 2001); this work is also limited in scope, as it primarily deals with the Makin Atoll Raid and covers 
little of the remainder of the 2nd Raiders’ history. 
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insightful conclusions; however, its utility to the historian is limited by the lack of 
adequate documentation of sources.  Jon Hoffman’s From Makin to Bougainville offers a 
concise, well-researched account of the Raider experience and is a valuable reference 
guide and overview of the operational history of the Raiders.17  Additionally, the Raiders 
are usually mentioned in various histories of the Southwest Pacific campaigns of 1942-
1944, most notably the battle for Guadalcanal.   
As small units caught up in a vast war, the Raider Battalions lend themselves 
easily to the “bottom-up” approach of the social history style.  However, here Raider 
historiography illustrates the futility of attempting to impose a dichotomy between 
traditional and “new” approaches, as the best histories of the Raiders blur the lines 
between the two and effortlessly incorporate elements of both.  Joseph Alexander’s 
masterful treatment of the 1st Raider Battalion, Edson’s Raiders, is one example of this.18  
Alexander’s narrative demonstrates his mastery as one of the foremost authors of Marine 
Corps history.  Edson’s Raiders is indispensable for the study of the Raiders.  However, 
though the leaders of the battalion, tactics and strategy, and Raider performance in 
combat figure prominently in his narrative, Alexander reaches beyond the standard 
boundaries of traditional campaign history to frequently feature the impressions and 
perspectives of the enlisted men of Edson’s Raiders.  He skillfully employs archival 
holdings to create poignant glimpses of life through the eyes of the “common” Raider, 
such as Lee N. Minier.  Despite the title, Alexander’s intended scope is not a biography 
of Edson but a unit history of the 1st Raiders, who bore his name even after Edson’s 
                                                 
17 Jon Hoffman, From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War (Washington, D.C.: 
Marine Corps Historical Center, 1995). 
18 Joseph H. Alexander, Edson’s Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in World War II (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 2001). 
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promotion to other duties.  Edson’s Raiders is thus the only solid unit history to trace any 
of the Raider battalions from the beginning to the end of their existence.  
In the absence of complete unit histories, Raider historiography is served well in 
several good biographies.  The original two Raider battalions, unusual among Marine 
battalions, were both informally identified by the names of their respective commanders 
– Edson’s and Carlson’s Raiders.  Thankfully, both Edson and Carlson have received 
attention from scholars.  Marine historian Jon Hoffman’s Once a Legend can legitimately 
claim to be the definitive work on Merritt Edson.  Edson played a key role in the initial 
Raider concept, personally shaped the training and ethos of the 1st Raider Battalion, and 
led them in their defining engagements during the Guadalcanal campaign.  Hoffman, 
basing his work on thorough research in the extensive Edson Papers held at the Library of 
Congress, creates a compelling portrait and analysis of the indomitable Edson.  Along the 
way, he also shares insights into the battalion that bore his name as well.19  
The standard account of Evans F. Carlson has long been Michael Blankfort’s 
1947 The Big Yankee.  Blankfort wrote this book primarily based on extensive personal 
interviews with Carlson, making The Big Yankee something of a pseudo-memoir.  
Indeed, Blankfort goes to such extremes to posthumously defend Carlson from his 
detractors that it would not be far-fetched to term this book a hagiography rather than a 
biography.  However, The Big Yankee is still an invaluable source in that Blankfort 
includes lengthy segments of Carlson’s personal diary and letters in his text.  In American 
Commando, John Wukovits uses the biography of Carlson as an effective vehicle to 
deliver a social history of the 2nd Raider Battalion and their training, ideals, and 
                                                 
19 Jon T. Hoffman, Once a Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine Raiders (1994. Reprint, Novato, 
California: Presidio Press, Inc., 2000). 
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campaigns.  Wukovits captures the essence of Carlson, undoubtedly one of the most 
unique and least understood individuals in Corps history, while simultaneously blending 
in social and campaign history of the 2nd Raider Battalion, culminating in their Long 
Patrol on Guadalcanal.  This fine biography is most valuable to the study of the 2nd 
Raider battalion. Wukovits’ tendency to accept Blankfort’s account uncritically is 
perhaps the biggest weakness in American Commando; thus, while Wukovits’ account is 
well-rounded, it tends to repeat some of the bias found in The Big Yankee.20 
Probably the best treatment available is the work of Oscar F. Peatross, himself a 
veteran of the Raiders and a career Marine officer.  Peatross’ Bless ‘Em All is unique in 
that it consists not primarily of his own memoirs.  Rather, Peatross sets his sights on a 
much larger goal: to tell the history of all the Raider battalions.  Part memoir, part 
history, Peatross relies not only on his own experiences, but draws extensively on the 
testimony of other Marines.  Thus, Bless ‘Em All is an interesting blend of historical and 
personal accounts of the Raiders, from their formation to their ultimate end.  
Additionally, though he does not provide citations or bibliographical information, it is 
clear that Peatross has consulted the documented records to no small extent.  Peatross 
does not shy away from stating his own opinion in no uncertain terms, though he does try 
to keep things in perspective.  Besides its scope as the only attempt at comprehensive 
history of the Raiders, Peatross’ narrative is extremely detailed and highly informative.  
Additionally, Peatross shows considerable talent as an author, writing in engaging prose 
style and occasionally referencing poems and other literature.  Though the lack of 
documentation of source materials hinders the claim towards definitive history of the 
                                                 
20 Michael Blankfort, The Big Yankee: The Life of Carlson of the Raiders (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947); 
Wukovits, American Commando. 
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Raiders, Bless ‘Em All remains the most complete narrative to date.21   
Aside from Peatross’ history/memoir, no work has attempted to detail the 
operational history of all four Raider battalions.  Furthermore, to the best of this author’s 
knowledge, little if any attempt has been made to contextualize the Raiders’ experience 
by linking their operational history with the existent scholarly literature on elite special 
operations units.  This study humbly seeks to remedy this by incorporating the 
perspectives offered in the treatments of military elites and special forces.  More 
importantly, this study will seek to incorporate aspects of a cultural approach by 
highlighting the inherently subjective dynamics inherent in the relationship between 
military elites and their parent institutions, specifically examining the cultural tension that 
emerged between the Marine Corps as America’s corps d’elite and the Raiders as the 
elite of the Marine Corps.  
                                                 
21 The first two Raider battalions had the longest service, and served with distinction in the epic 
Guadalcanal campaign.  It is understandable then, but still unfortunate, that most of the historical accounts 
cover primarily either the 1st or 2nd Raider Battalions.  To date, the only study specifically focused on the 
3rd and 4th Raider Battalions’ operational history that this author knows of is Davis Tyre Lovelady’s, “The 




CHAPTER 1: ELITES AND MILITARY HISTORY 
 
The U.S. Marine Corps has long cultivated its image and culture as the nation’s 
elite fighting force, a tradition that was amplified during World War II.  This shared 
culture gave the average Marine gained a sense of identity and belonging as a member of 
the nation’s recognized corps d’elite. Yet the Raiders established an elite subculture 
within the domain of this preexistent culture of Marine elitism.  They were the elite of the 
elites, commonly “regarded [as] nothing short of ‘Supermen’ in the Marine Corps.”22  
But what exactly is meant by the term “elite”?  Such terminology of superiority 
necessarily employs a large degree of subjective judgment.  Nevertheless, the question, 
“what makes any given unit elite?” is well worth consideration, and is essential to an 
understanding of the dynamics of the Raider Marines within the Corps.   
 
Defining Military Elites 
To hear a military unit described as “elite” or a “crack outfit” is not strange to 
those with even a passing knowledge of military history.  Designations of military elite 
status often seem to be axiomatic – it is simply understood that everyone knows what is 
meant by elite troops.  Authors generally employ the terminology of “elite” groups to 
emphasize the notions of superiority that inevitability accompany the concept of elitism, 
yet few take the time to explore the matter of what exactly constitutes an elite.  Why 
should some units be considered elite, as opposed to others?  The subjectivity inherent in 
                                                 
22 A.R. McKeever, “Superman Sergeant – Is Both Raider and Parachutist,” Press Release, n.d. [ca. 
February 1943], Raiders: Press Releases—Edson’s Raiders Tulagi-Guadalcanal File (hereinafter referenced 
as Press Releases – Edson’s Raiders), History Division, Reference Branch, Marine Corps University 
(hereinafter referenced as HDRB). 
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making any such judgment is sure to invite controversy, yet the attempt to qualify what 
exactly is meant by military elitism, even in relative terms, is a valuable pursuit in itself.  
These questions assume even greater import when dealing with the Raider battalions.  
They can bring clarity to the controversy which seemed to surround the Raiders from day 
one, and lend insights into the dynamic cultural forces involved in the interaction of elites 
and elitist sub-cultures. 
The idea of military elites is an ancient one.  Ancient texts frequently feature men, 
individually or in small, select groups who demonstrate their prowess on the field of 
battle and thus earn the homage of their own people and the respect and fear of those they 
vanquished.  Classical Greek literature has handed down more than its share of legendary 
figures such as Achilles and Odysseus and their wartime feats.  Some military analysts 
have even mused that the specially selected band of men hidden with Odysseus in the 
famed Trojan Horse constituted a de facto elite striking force.  Aside from the 
mythological wars of the Greeks, classical history is littered with small bands of warriors 
esteemed for their battlefield exploits.  The Persians’ Immortals and the Spartans’ 
hoplites were both legendary in their own time, and their clash at Thermopylae has 
continued to hold popular appeal to this day.23   
                                                 
23 Arthur Ferrill, “Elite Forces in the Ancient World,” in Elite Military Formations in War and Peace, eds. 
A. Hamish Ion and Keith Nelson (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996): 31-41. To cite one ancient 
example, the military exploits of the Hebrew King David are recorded in the Judeo-Christian Old 
Testament, as are those of the “mighty men” in his service. The language of comparison and implied 
elitism is used in the accounts of both David and of his “mighty men.”  David gained public notoriety at the 
expense of King Saul: “Saul hath slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands.” 1 Sam. 18:7 King 
James Version.  The author of 2 Sam. describes the hierarchy of the “mighty men” that should be familiar 
to readers of military history, as the author explains how “the thirty” earned their distinctions, but “the 
three” were set above and beyond.  Others earned great distinction for their victories as well, and yet did 
not quite measure up to the first sets: “[Benaiah] was more honourable than the thirty, but he attained not to 
the first three.” 2 Sam. 23:23 KJV.  Thus, even in ancient Hebrew scriptures, the idea of military elites is 
fully evident.  John Arquilla, introduction to From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and 
Modern Times, ed. John Arquilla (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1996), xvi. Martin 
Kitchen, “Elites in Military History,” in Ion and Nelson, Elite Military Formations, 9-10.  Jeremy Black, 
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The present day fascination with the last stand of King Leonidas and his band of 
Spartans says something about the strong appeal that continues to surround elite military 
units in the 21st century.  The current concept of elite units, historical antecedents 
notwithstanding, stems largely from the Second World War.  Indeed, some have labeled 
the Second World War the “golden age” of elite units.24  The popularity of elite units has 
exploded in first decade and a half of the 21st century, spurred ever onward by the role of 
the “Global War on Terror” in the public consciousness.   Special units performing high-
stakes missions have recently been in vogue across the spectrum of public media, 
including several popular films.  Special operations forces are standard fare for hit video 
games, which frequently feature high-intensity missions performed by a variety of elite 
special operators – including, in one case, the Marine Raiders.25   
Aside from motion picture and related media, elite military formations hold a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Elite Fighting Forces: From the Praetorian Guard to the Green Berets (New York: Thames & Hudson, 
2011), 10-15; Antonio Santosuosso, Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War: From Classical Greece to 
Republican Rome, 500—167 B.C. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1997), 42-50. 
24 John W. Gordon, “The U.S. Marine Corps and an Experiment in Military Elitism: A Reassessment of the 
Special Warfare Impetus, 1937-1943,” in Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History: 
Papers from the Third United States Naval Academy History Symposium, edited by Robert William Love, 
Jr. (New York: Garland, 1980), 362. 
25 Bernd Horn and Tony Balasevicius, Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special 
Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn, 2007), 135-136.  In recent years, the elite U.S. Navy SEALs have 
enjoyed a wave of positive publicity, with no less than four major Hollywood films with SEAL heroes hit 
the box offices between 2012 and 2014: Act of Valor (2012), Zero Dark Thirty (2012), Lone Survivor 
(2013), and American Sniper (2014).  Though it may seem strange to include video games, they are rapidly 
becoming a relevant indicator of popular culture.  This is not to say that the content of such games is 
particularly worthwhile; but it would be remiss for an observer of perceptions of the military in 
contemporary American society to ignore the fact that video games are emerging as a mass-media fully 
capable of influencing the perceptions and opinions of a sizeable portion of the population.  The 2011 
release of the third installment of Activision’s popular Modern Warfare series netted an impressive $400 
million on the first day of its sales alone.  Shane Richmond, “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 Breaks Sales 
Records,” The Telegraph, 11 November 2011 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/video-games/video-
game-news/8884726/Call-of-Duty-Modern-Warfare-3-breaks-sales-records.html.  Activision has released 
more than ten games based on fictionalized special operations missions, which continue to be among the 
best-selling games worldwide. Keith Stuart, “Best Selling Games of 2014 Revealed,” The Guardian, 16 
January 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/16/best-selling-games-of-2014-revealed-
call-of-duty-and-grand-theft-auto-dominate.  Interestingly, Activision’s only subsequent return to WWII-
based games, World at War (2008), prominently features the U.S. Marine Raiders, allowing the user to play 
through a highly-fictionalized version of the Makin Atoll Raid.  
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great deal of staying power in mass-market military history books as well.  To cite just 
one example, one line of popular military history books, under the heading of the “Elite” 
series, encompasses a bewildering array of units and groups under that umbrella, ranging 
from the Afrikakorps to the Zulus.  Books on “elite” or “special” units are much more 
likely to become best-sellers than those on, say, logistics experts or transport ships’ 
crews.  Napoleon’s army may have marched on its stomach, but the modern reader is far 
more likely to find books on his Imperial Guard than on the cooks who kept their 
stomachs full.  Leaving aside possible contentions about quality of research and analysis 
for the moment, a common deficiency of most such works is the cavalier method in 
which they employ the language of military elites.26   
In most literature dealing with military elites, vagueness and elasticity of 
definition seems to be the rule rather than an exception.  Author Michael Lee Lanning 
holds that in addition to such factors as special selection, unconventional missions, and 
rigorous training, the true elites are “those who do the dirty work, and do it well . . . . 
These blood warriors are the best at what they do.”27  But vagueness, romanticism, and 
overly broad generalizations as to what constitutes a military elite are by no means 
limited to popular narratives.  Noted military historian Jeremy Black himself bases his 
                                                 
26 The “Elite” series of books from Osprey Publishing includes titles ranging from the very specific (e.g. 
“Japanese Paratroop Forces of World War II,” or “The Guards Divisions, 1914-1945”) to the impossibly 
broad (e.g. “The Vikings,” or “American Frontier Lawmen, 1850-1930”), as well as numerous titles 
focused on specific tactics rather than units.  As stated, the target audience for this series is the general 
interest reader, not the scholar.  This is by no means the only example of such arbitrary application of the 
“elite” moniker. Books in this vein nevertheless constitute a considerable portion of the military history 
books consumed by the general public and are often found in abundance on the shelves of major book 
retailers.  Osprey Publishing, “Elite series,” https://ospreypublishing.com 
/store/military-history/series-books/elite.  Accessed June 22, 2015.  Robert Citino raises the question of the 
responsibility of the scholarly historian towards the market of popular histories:  “the sustained popularity 
of military literature places a certain demand on the entire historical profession.  Millions of people 
continue to read these books, and someone is going to be writing them.”  “Military Histories Old and 
New,” 1081. 
27 Michael Lee Lanning, Blood Warriors: American Military Elites (New York: Ballantine, 2002), 3. 
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survey of the most notable fighting elites in history on the rather subjective premise that 
“elite fighting forces” are simply “those elements of a power’s armed forces singled out 
in some way as special fighting groups for particular tasks.”28  Hallmarks of elite units, in 
his estimation, include such factors as fearlessness in face of death, spearhead roles, 
professionalism and expertise, loyalty, and adaptability.  The overly broad nature of such 
a definition quickly becomes apparent in Elite Fighting Forces.  Small, select bands such 
as the Swiss Pikemen and Rogers’ Rangers are lumped in together with considerably 
larger formations, even vague generalizations such as “The Few” (i.e. the Royal Air 
Force pilots of the Battle of Britain), the Streltsy of Ivan the Terrible, Mosby’s Rangers 
of the American Civil War, and whole Soviet “Shock” Armies.  They do make for 
interesting reading, but such broad lines do not provide an appreciably better 
understanding of what it means to be an elite military unit.  Others define elites in 
negative terms; that is, they are defined for what they are not, via comparison with non-
elite units.  Thus, elites frequently become anything different from the ordinary.  For 
example, John Arquilla offers a definition of special forces “as that class of military (or 
paramilitary) actions that fall outside the realm of conventional warfare during their 
respective time periods.”29 
Even among serious treatments of military elites and of special operations forces 
the de facto rule seems to closely mirror Justice Potter’s infamous dictum:  it “may be 
indefinable [But] I know it when I see it.”30  The difficulty in clearly explaining all the 
factors encapsulated in the term “elite” (in relation to military groups that is) is 
understandable.  Militaries are not lifeless machines, easily explained in the language of 
                                                 
28 See Black, Elite Fighting Forces, 6. 
29 Arquilla, introduction to Troy to Entebbe, xv-xvi. 
30 Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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the laboratory and of the hard sciences, but are composed of numerous individuals, of 
people.  While modern militaries tend to be highly regimented and bureaucratic, one 
cannot ignore the humanistic aspect if one expects to gain any reasonable understanding 
of their institutional dynamics.  This applies even more so when the discussion centers on 
elite units.  Even the very descriptor “elite” depends largely on subjective factors, such as 
perceptions of both those within and without the group in question, leading unavoidably 
to differences of opinion on who exactly qualifies as an “elite” force and which forces are 
more “elite” than others.  Much like Justice Potter, many authors find themselves falling 
back on intuitive but amorphous definitions.   
Clearly, to delve into a discussion of elite military units is to engage a topic at 
once over-hyped and under-analyzed.  As the esteemed military historian Dennis 
Showalter puts it, “If discussions of military elites have a common denominator, it is the 
challenge of establishing a working definition of ‘elite.’”31  While it may seem 
elementary, any serious attempt to treat an elite military unit in light of their historical 
context must “begin at the beginning” by exploring just what it means to be considered 
an elite.   
 
What Is an “Elite”?  Visions of Elitism in Social Science 
Comparison of an 18th-century French aristocrat and a 19-year old U.S. Marine on Peleliu 
in 1944 would likely reveal only one commonality:  both would consider themselves to 
be elites, distinctly superior to the masses outside of their own cultural sphere – yet they 
would also have much different conceptions of what the term “elite” itself.  The very 
                                                 




word “elite” is laden with connotations of superiority, select status, and specialty or 
scarcity.  Given its origins in the Old French, where it referred to persons specially 
elected, usually for church leadership, it may be taken as axiomatic that “elite” is 
inextricably bound up with notions of exclusivity, superiority, and – unsurprisingly – 
small size.32  Naturally, the conceptions of elitism go hand in hand with the ideas of 
aristocracy and ruling classes.  The division of mankind into social strata has been 
occurring since ancient times.  However, the credit for popularizing the language of 
elitism primarily belongs to 19th-century sociologist Vilfredo Pareto.  Based on his 
assumption that “every branch of human activity” could be more or less precisely 
measured and quantified, Pareto defined the elite as “a class of the people who have the 
highest indices in their branch of activity.”33  For his vision of de facto elite rule as a 
practical reality in ostensibly democratic societies, Pareto is commonly credited with 
originating modern elite theory.  Gaetano Mosca, another prominent contributor to 
classical elite theory, held that: “In all societies—from societies that are very meagerly 
developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most 
advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a 
class that is ruled.”34  According to Mosca, no matter the nature of a society, the real 
power would inevitably be wielded by a minority.35  
                                                 
32 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “elite” as “The choice part or flower (of society, or of any body 
or class of persons).”  Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “elite,” accessed July 10, 2015, 
http://www.oed.com/.   
33 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society [Trattato di Sociologia generale], vol. 3, Theory of Derivations, 
ed. Arthur Livingstone, trans. Arthur Livingstone and Andrew Bongiornio, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935), 
1422-1423.  Pareto’s stance was that, “The outstanding idea in the term ‘elite’ is superiority.”  Mind and 
Society, 1421n1.   
34 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1939), 50. 
35 As John Scott explains, though the concept of elitism may very well have its roots in the works of 
Gaetano Mosca, the growth of elite theory actually “owe[s] a great deal to the interest encouraged by 
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Pareto and Mosca dealt explicitly with political, economic, religious, or other 
social elites.  While not particularly concerned with the nature of military elitism (except 
insofar as prominent members of the military may become ruling elites), their works offer 
insights into the nature of elitism.  While their specific definitions of what constitutes an 
elite vary to a greater or lesser degree, “there was a substantial consensus [among Pareto, 
Mosca, and Robert Michels] on the ‘inferior’ nature of the mass.”36  Jose Ortega y Gasset 
offered a somewhat different view of elites.  Looking beyond social divisions such as 
upper and working classes, Ortega identified the elite “select man” as the one who 
“demands more of himself than the rest.”37  His elites are perceived of as those who strive 
for excellence, particularly in intellectual life.  In his binary system, they stand in stark 
contrast to the “mass-man.”  Ortega’s conception of elitism sees the elites as those 
standing in stark contrast to the rise of the “mass-man” phenomena brought about by the 
homogenization of the industrial age.38  Thus, it is apparent that even among the fathers 
of elite theory, elites are implicitly defined in negative terms – that is, the elite is that 
which is not the mass.  The logical extrapolation of elite theorists’ attempts to delineate 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parateo’s introduction of the word elite and his placing of it in a formal framework of political analysis.”  
John Scott, “Pareto and the Elite.”  In Vilfredo Pareto: Beyond Disciplinary Boundaries, edited by Joseph 
V. Femia and Alasdair J. Marshall (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2012), 9. 
36 Robert Nye, The Anti-Democratic Sources of Elite Theory: Pareto, Mosca, Michels (Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage, 1977), 8. 
37 Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W.W. Norton, 1932; repr.1960), 15:  “When 
one speaks of ‘select minorities’ it is usual for the evil-minded to twist the sense of this expression, 
pretending to be unaware that the select man is not the petulant person who thinks himself superior to the 
rest, but the man who demands more of himself than the rest, even though he may not fulfil in his person 
those higher exigencies.  For there is no doubt that the most radical division that it is possible to make of 
humanity is that which splits it into two classes of creatures: those who make great demands on themselves, 
piling up difficulties and duties; and those who demand nothing special of themselves, but for whom to live 
is to be every moment what they already are, without imposing on themselves any effort towards 
perfection; mere buoys that float on the waves….The division of society into masses and select minorities 
is, then, not a division into social classes, but into classes of men, and cannot coincide with the hierarchic 
separation of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ classes.” 
38 Ortega, Revolt, 58.  The language of Ortega y Gaset’s elite theory is often incorrectly appropriated to 
support various political positions.  John Graham notes that “Revolt of the Masses has been more often 
extolled or damned than carefully analyzed.”  The Social Thought of Ortega y Gasset: A Systematic 
Synthesis in Postmodernism and Interdisciplinarity (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 278. 
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an elite is that the only way to have “elites” is to make that which is “non-elite” out to be 
distinctly inferior.  Perceptions of elites and elitism, it seems, inherently rest upon the 
contrast, stated or implied, between superior and inferior. 
 
Elites and Military Organizations 
Most theorists and philosophers who have dealt with the nature of elitism have 
done so in terms of social, political, economic, or cultural elites.  Notwithstanding the 
connections between the study of elites in society and of those in the military, it must be 
noted that the study of military elites does differ in significant ways.  The different 
standards for determining elite status often rely on similar rationale as that of the elite 
social science theorists, but the differences are quite significant, enough so as to justify 
the separate study of military elitism as a separate phenomenon. 
Of course, in many cases there is a confluence of social, economic, and political 
elites with the dominant military elites.  The annals of military history offer any number 
of examples in which the lines between military and sociopolitical elites were blurred or 
even nonexistent.  The samurai of medieval Japan were clearly both a social and military 
elite class, while in prerevolutionary European armies the officer corps was drawn 
entirely from the aristocracy.  Military elites have also long been defined by their 
proximity to the nation’s rulers, frequently as the ruler’s bodyguard.  For this reasons, 
such units have typically valued political loyalty to the leader and often their members 
were hand-picked for that very purpose.  The Roman Praetorian Guard, one of the earliest 
units commonly described as an elite, was formed as the emperor’s bodyguard.  The 
Praetorians, now often presented as “a cliché-ridden synonym for a crack band of loyal 
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troops,” are actually presented in the works of Tacitus as ruthless makers – and murderers 
– of emperors.39  Others have claimed that the Tsarist Russian Guards played a similar 
role following the death of Peter the Great, as they “played a great role in the making and 
unmaking of emperors and empresses.”40  Numerous European militaries have at various 
times retained distinguished guards units, with probably the most illustrious of such units 
being the Guards Regiments of Great Britain.41   
However, the advent of mass armies and warfare on an industrial scale brought 
significant changes in the nature of military elitism.  As societies, and hence their 
militaries, have become more egalitarian – or at least, less aristocratic and more 
bureaucratic – the impetus behind military elites has shifted away from heritage and 
social standing.  From World War II to the present, military elite status has become 
increasingly synonymous with battlefield performance and technological proficiency.  
The increasing specialization of warfare roles and technological advances have given rise 
to many units claiming elite status.  As elite analyst and military historian Bernd Horn 
rightly states, the study of military elites from the 20th century onward must necessarily 
move beyond the traditional, sociology-centered view, which considers military elites in 
terms of political, economic and cultural factors.  “Rather,” Horn claims, the study of 
military elites must now “relate to the relationship of a given group within its own 
                                                 
39 Kitchen, “Elites in Military History,” 7. 
40 Joseph L. Wieczynski, “The Mutiny of the Semenovsky Regiment in 1820.”  Russian Review 29, no. 2 
(April 1970): 167.  Wieczynski makes the argument that the mutiny of the Semenovsky Regiment in 1820 
served to spread seeds of dissent in Russian society, and served as a foreshadowing of the Revolution to 
come. 
41 Shuzo Uyenaka, “Daimyo in the Sengoku Period, 1467-1590,” in Ion and Nelson, Elite Military 
Formations in War and Peace, 43-72; Kitchen, “Elites in Military History,” 18-19; Lawrence Keppie, The 
Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 
153-154; 187-188; Julian Paget, The Story of the Guards (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1977). 
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institution [i.e. the military establishment].”42  Thus, to gain an understanding of what it 
means to be an elite military unit in the post-World War II age, the unit in question 
should be considered in light of its relative status, conceived of broadly as its status 
within the military as a whole, or more narrowly as within its parent branch, corps, or 
even division.  For the purposes of this study, it would do little good to compare the 
Marine Raiders with the makeup of 1940s American society as a whole.  This study 
instead attempts to view the Raider Battalions specifically in relation with their parent 
institution, the U.S. Marine Corps, as it existed in the 1940s.  
Given the inevitable subjectivity which must tinge any discussion of elite units, 
there is a great deal of diversity and variety within the field of military elite studies.  
Admittedly, some of the variation is explained by the changing nature of warfare in 
different times and places.  For example, some observers continue to insist on older 
models of elitism reminiscent of the aristocratic overtones of the term.  Such approaches 
are typically focused on the higher echelon leadership of the military, and tend to equate 
rank with elite status.  This has its merits, as leadership is certainly one of the most 
important factors in determine the superiority or inferiority of a unit.  French General 
Paul Ducournau maintained that “There is [sic] no such thing as elite soldiers.  There are 
average soldiers commanded by elite leaders.”43   
While this view may have some merit when dealing with armies composed of 
mass conscription, it does not seem to be the best view of the modern, increasingly 
specialized armies of the post-World War II era.  Most authors, at least among those 
writing on military elites in the modern era, reject the personality-based definition, with 
                                                 
42 Horn, “Love ‘Em or Hate ‘Em,” 34. 
43 Quoted in Douglas Porch, “The French Foreign Legion: The Mystique of Elitism,” in Ion and Nelson, 
Elite Military Formations in War and Peace, 118; Horn, “Love ‘Em or Hate ‘Em,” 34. 
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its “Great Man” overtones, and instead emphasize some aspect of unit functionality or 
performance.  A formation’s history and battle-proven status is frequently cited as 
evidence of its elite esprit.  Before the advent of highly specialized training regimens, a 
units’ battlefield performance was nearly the only factor (beside traditional, aristocratic 
heritage) in determining a units’ claim of elitism.  In the U.S. Civil War, for example, 
units earned such descriptors as the “Stonewall Brigade” in the Army of Northern 
Virginia, or the “Iron Brigade” in the Army of the Potomac; such popular labels were 
merely recognition of those units’ perceived prowess.  In addition, apparent disregard for 
personal safety in the face of imminent death is often cited as a justification for the elite 
moniker.  Service history and willingness to stare down death and embrace high-stakes 
conditions are commonly held themes in discussion of military elite units.  These are 
admittedly essential elements; however, to rely on them alone seems insufficient for a 
discussion of the increasingly specialized militaries of recent military history.  Observers 
and commentators on elite units from World War II to the present day have increasingly 
considered such factors as selection and selectivity, rigorous and specialized training, and 
the unconventional or technically demanding nature of their assigned missions.  As a 
notable example, Roger Beaumont in his study of military elite forces emphasizes that for 
a unit to be considered a true elite, it must be composed of volunteers, have high physical 
and mental standards for acceptance, have distinct uniforms and insignia, exist relatively 
outside the norms of regular military discipline, and receive substantial publicity.44 
                                                 
44 Hans Koch marries the leadership-oriented concept of elite units with the performance record method: 
“Military elite formations emerged in the course of time, or they did not.  Indeed, one may go so far as to 
say that within an eighteenth-century context a specially trained military elite force did not exist.  What 
mattered in the end was the quality of leadership provided, and by and large the Frederician army had a 
disproportionately high quality within its officer corps.”  “The Prussian Guards in the Eighteenth Century,” 
in Ion and Nelson, Elite Military Formations in War and Peace, 109.  Horn, “Love ‘Em or Hate ‘Em,” 34.  




Elite or Special Operations?   
A brief survey of the literature on military elite units from World War II to the 
present highlights one of the inherent difficulties in discussion such units with any degree 
of precision: namely, the pronounced tendency to conflate “elite” with “special 
operations.”  This confusion, while understandable, is detrimental and is brought about 
by non-specific employment of terminology.  Andrew Hargreaves calls particular 
attention to the necessity of distinguishing between special forces and corps d’elite units.  
Hargreaves acknowledges that “most such [special operations] units can be considered 
elites, but not all elites are specialist formations.  Special forces are more than units that 
purely wage war at a high standard; they wage a unique form of warfare that separates 
them from conventionally oriented bodies.”45  Elite and special operations units are 
inevitably related, often so closely that it seems to be splitting hairs to insist on hard and 
fast lines between the two types of units.  Nevertheless, there remain significant 
differences of “status, selection, and size” separating elite formations and special forces 
units.46  No strict delineation can be drawn between elite and special operations, for 
                                                                                                                                                 
inevitable death was not the norm in the Prussian Guards: “On the whole they were trained to fight as 
effectively as they could and to defy death not to succumb to it.  This was, of course, an age in which death 
was still accepted as the ultimate fact of life, an age that had no artificial cult of youth, where the old 
mostly died within the family fold, not in senior citizens homes or hospices.”  Koch, “Prussian Guards,” 
109.  Roger Beaumont, Military Elites: Special Fighting Units in the Modern World (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1974), 2-3.  In practical application, Beaumont’s approach is of little use for the study of the Raider 
battalions, for he lumps a variety of different units together under the banner of “military elites” with little 
attempt at limiting his discussion.  His interpretation of military elites includes the U.S. Navy’s PT boat 
crews in WWII, paratroopers of sundry nationalities and conflicts, the various international contingents 
serving in the Spanish Civil War, and the Japanese kamikaze pilots. He places particular emphasis on the 
rise of the technological elites, including the RAF Pathfinders, submarine crews, and the Allies’ 
experimental tank battalion in France.   
45 Andrew L. Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), 6 (emphasis added). 
46 James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 6. 
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“some special operations can be undertaken by elements of conventional units or corps 
d’elite” and special forces have frequently “been squandered in unsuitable conventional 
missions to perform the tasks better suited to conventionally equipped or organized corps 
d’elite.”47  But as James Kiras argues, “A crucial difference between special forces and 
corps d’elite is that the former operate in small units relative to their conventional 
brethren and lack the organic support of the latter.”48   
The task of delineating exactly what qualifications a unit must meet in order to be 
justly considered a special operations unit is no mere trifle.  While many have considered 
special forces as encompassing “actions that fall outside the realm of conventional 
warfare,” there remains, as analyst James Kiras cautions, the danger that “Too broad a 
definition, however, opens the door to gross interpretation.”49  Special forces units by 
their very nature defy strict definition, as they are necessarily the exceptions, the units 
that fall outside the boundaries of their respective military services.  However, the 
attempt to add qualitative factors to the definition of special operations has produced 
laudable results.  Political scientist Eliot Cohen theorized that a combination of 
perpetually being assigned “missions that are—or seem to be—extremely hazardous,” 
requiring only a few, highly trained troops, and achievement of a “reputation—justified 
or not—for bravura and success,” qualified a unit as an elite force.50  For Cohen, 
elements such as special insignia, all-volunteer status, high selectivity, and rites of 
                                                 
47 Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 6-7. 
48 Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 7. 
49 Arquilla, Troy to Entebbe, pp. xv-xvi; Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 4.  If the loose, anything-
outside-of-ordinary type of definition is adhered to, he cautions, then such reprehensible groups such as the 
SS Einsatzgruppen execution squads would be qualified as special operations; or as Bernd Horn puts it, 
“simply put, being different and/or performing a unique task is far from being a de facto elite.”  “Love ‘em 
or Hate ‘em,” 36. 
50 Eliot Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies (Cambridge: 
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 17. 
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passage are other indicators or manifestations of elitism.  Analyst Colin Gray suggests 
that “Special operations have as their core identity the overt or covert conduct of a 
desperately dangerous raid by a relatively few elite fighting men for high operational or 
strategic stakes.”51  James Kiras also emphasizes the unorthodoxy of special forces, 
asserting that “special operations fill a military void that is unachievable conventionally 
and there is an elevated political or military risk associate with their failure.”52 
Conversely, Bernd Horn downplays the specialized missions aspect, maintaining that 
“elite status entails rigorous selection process, special training and equipment, as well as 
the bestowing of special privileges (i.e. higher pay, special dress, badges and insignia).”53  
In his study of British special forces units in the North African campaign, John Gordon 
proposes a straightforward and effective classification of special operations: “uniformed 
soldiers specifically organized to carry out the high-risk functions of raiding, harassing, 
and intelligence gathering on the flanks or behind enemy lines.”54  While not as detailed 
as some of the other parameters suggested, Gordon’s definition appears to be the best 
balance between simplicity and precision.  This study will follow Hargreaves’ lead in 
adopting Gordon’s parameters for defining World War II-era special operations units.55 
The distinction between special operations and elites is admittedly vague, but it is 
necessary to gain a more thorough understanding of the U.S. Marine Raiders of World 
War II.  The Raiders were clearly a special operations unit from their earliest days.  As 
will be demonstrated, the Raiders qualified as a special force by any definition used.  
                                                 
51 Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), 144. 
52 James Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 5. 
53 Horn, “Love ‘em or Hate ‘em,” 36 
54 John Gordon, The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North Africa, 1940-1943 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1987), xvii. 
55 Hargreaves, Special Operations in WWII, 9. 
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They fit Gordon’s description of special operations units perfectly.  But the Raider 
experiment was unique in that the Raiders were a special operations unit carved out of an 
establishment of military elites – the U.S. Marine Corps.  This makes them unique to 
among World War II-era special forces.  The Raiders in essence were the elite special 
operations force of a corps d’elite.  The cultural tension between the competing claims of 
elitism would prove to be a constant factor throughout the Raiders’ history.   
The Raiders’ parent institution, the U.S. Marine Corps, had a preexisting 
reputation as a corps d’elite.  However, categorizing the whole of the Marine Corps as 
special forces would be to stretch the meaning of that term beyond reasonable limits.  
Even the small, prewar Corps could not strictly be considered a special operations outfit.  
Yet the Marines were a specialized force filling an important and rather neglected niche 
in the American military: they were amphibious assault specialists.56  The Marine Corps 
of the mid-20th century featured many of the trappings of an elite force, including 
rigorous selection, all-volunteer status, and distinctive uniforms and insignia.  More 
precisely, the Marine Corps of World War II fits squarely within the Cohen’s concept of 
an elite force.  They were organized for the express purpose of “missions that are—or 
seem to be—extremely hazardous,” namely amphibious landings against hostile shores, a 
particularly deadly exercise.57  Furthermore, they had clearly achieved the “reputation—
justified or not—for bravura and success,” they accepted a relatively small percentage of 
those who wished to join, and they had “an exclusive camaraderie in which the 
                                                 
56 “For about two decades before the outbreak of the Second World War the marines had been establishing 
themselves as specialists in amphibious warfare.”  Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines 
and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Practice in the Pacific (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1951; 
repr.1965), 3.   
57 Cohen notes that “for this reason airborne units have long been considered elite since parachuting is a 
particularly dangerous way of going into battle.”  Commandos and Politicians, 17.  The same applies to 
amphibious landings in WWII.   
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newcomer can only take part after an exacting rite of passage.”58  The World War II-era 
Marine Corps was thus not a special force strictly defined, but they served as America’s 
most prominent corps d’elite of the 1940s.59  
Claims that that Marine Corps constituted a corps d’elite in America’s World War 
II military are often made anecdotally.  It was axiomatic – the Marines of World War II 
were America’s best, the “First to Fight.”  Observers frequently noted that “The Marines 
simply assumed that they were the world’s best fighting men.”60  Historian Allan Millett 
points out that the Marine Corps has long maintained an elitist image, largely as a result 
of its small size.  Later experience in the First World War “fused the elitist strains of size 
(which implied selectivity), military discipline, and combat performance. Subsequent 
wars reinforced this elitist tradition.”61  One of the best attempts to define the processes 
by which the Marine Corps earned its claims to elitism in the crucible of Pacific combat 
is by Dennis Showalter.  Showalter’s approach is helpful in this regard.  Showalter 
recognizes that specialization is an inherent aspect of military elites, but his focus is 
primarily on corps d’elite rather than special operations.  His cogent analysis provides a 
tripartite view of what it means to be an elite unit, and illustrates that World War II was 
the crucial period for the Corps’ evolution into a recognized military elite.62   
Showalter suggests that military elites can be loosely categorized as Guardsmen, 
Technicians, and Warriors.  Guardsmen, the most traditional type of elite unit, are 
distinguished largely by their selective recruiting, volunteer status, and a general sense of 
                                                 
58 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, 17- 18. 
59 Horn, “Love ‘em or Hate ‘em,” 36; and Beaumont, Military Elites, 2-3. 
60 Robert Sherrod, Tarawa: The Story of a Battle (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), 35 
61 Allan Millett, Semper Fidelis, xvii.  
62 Dennis Showalter, “The Evolution of the U.S. Marine Corps as a Military Elite,” Marine Corps Gazette 
63, no. 11 (November 1979): 44-58.  Showalter gives an expanded and slightly modified view of the nature 
of military elites in his essay, “German Army Elites”; however, the present study adopts his method as 
applied to the Marine Corps directly. 
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being set apart.  Technicians gain recognition as an elite via honing a special set of skills 
beyond the pale of ordinary service.  Showalter’s Warrior elites combine the 
selectiveness of the Guardsmen and the specialized mission of the Technicians, but place 
primary importance on proven combat ability; once their reputation as Warriors is earned, 
these elite units frequently serve as shock troops employed in dire situations.  The Corps’ 
status as an all-volunteer force through most of the First World War, combined with 
highly effective public relations coverage and legendary successes in France, helped to 
evolve the Corps into a their role as Guardsmen.  The development and perfection of 
amphibious warfare doctrines during the interwar period and World War II– a strategy 
that many military minds believed impossible – demonstrated their ability as Technicians.  
But it was their emphasis on the role of the individual Marine as a rifleman of highest 
quality – “the men who set the standards of performance on the battlefield”63 – that 
established their presence as Warrior elites.  Showalter thus lays out a convincing case 
that the Marine Corps can indeed be considered a military elite force, one that fully 
cemented its legacy as such during World War II.64    
This tripartite approach presents a unique perspective with which to analyze the 
history of the Marine Raider battalions.  Viewed through the prism of Showalter’s 
evolution of elites, the operational history of the Raiders illustrates their evolution along a 
parallel path towards becoming a sort of small-scale corps d’elite unto themselves.  The 
Raiders’ subculture promoted perceptions of not just specialized troops but as a Warrior 
elite all of their own – a Warrior elite frequently misunderstood by and sometimes at 
odds with their parent institution, the Marine Corps.  The growth of a parallel subculture, 
                                                 
63 Showalter, “Evolution of the Marine Corps,” 54.   
64 Showalter, “Evolution of the Marine Corps,” 45-46. Showalter also identifies several “pseudo-elites,” 
including “media” and “performance” elites. 
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one which was frequently perceived as competing for the loyalties of its members in a 
Corps that valued cohesion and loyalty as virtues of the highest order, created no small 
tension within the Marine Corps’ institutional culture.  In many ways the Raiders’ 
experience of cultural tension was similar to that of other elite special operations units.  
But their parallel evolution as Warrior elites within a larger group of Warrior elites added 
a distinct edge to the friction.  The animosity towards the existence of the “elite within 
the elite” was a significant factor in their downfall, yet it remains underexplored in the 
existing literature on the Raiders.  It is hoped that a consideration of the above factors as 
Raiders’ operational history is re-examined will illuminate some of the cultural factors 




CHAPTER 2: THE RAIDER EXPERIMENT 
 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, violently thrust the 
United States into the Second World War.  While war with Japan had certainly been 
foreseen by military planners, actual military capability to wage war against the Axis 
powers in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific was woefully inadequate.  The events of 
December 1941 and the early months of 1942 brought this home to the American people, 
as news of defeat and disaster for America and its allies flowed in continually: Pearl 
Harbor, Guam, Wake Island, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines – all fell 
before the juggernaut of Imperial Japan.  The “chronic unpreparedness” of the U.S. 
military became, in the words of one historian, the “midwife of the birth of the 
Raiders.”65  Desperate for a solution, a way to strike back at the everywhere victorious 
Axis powers both to boost flagging morale on the home front and to demonstrate 
American resiliency in the face of hardships, the American military turned to special 
operations endeavors.  This trend affected the Marine Corps as well.  America’s first 
special operations units were manned with U.S. Marines.66  The Marine Corps’ 
establishment of Raider battalions was by no means simple or inevitable. In fact, the 
impetus for their creation came from the timely convergence of several widely disparate 
threads.  How each of these threads came together is rarely examined in entirety.   
 
Merritt A. Edson and the 1st Separate Battalion  
During the interwar period, the Marine Corps had seized upon the development 
                                                 
65 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 4. 
66 Gordon, “An Experiment in Military Elitism,” 362. 
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and perfection of amphibious warfare doctrine as its primary mission.  Despite assertions 
to the contrary, visionaries in the Corps insisted that “an assault of defended beaches was 
feasible and that, indeed, future wars would demand the execution of such operations.”67  
The Marine Corps Schools at Quantico pioneered this effort, resulting in publication of 
the Tentative Landing Operations Manual in 1935. The theories set forth in this 
document were put to the test in a series of Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEXs) held 
annually from 1935 to 1941, which provided much-needed field testing of interwar 
amphibious doctrine.  Marine Major General Holland M. Smith, then commander of the 
1st Marine Brigade (later 1st Marine Division), played a prominent role in these exercises. 
The efficiency of the ship-to-shore movement and cooperation between Navy and Marine 
units increased with practice, but the FLEXs also brought to light certain shortcomings in 
amphibious practice which could prove disastrous to landing in the face of a powerful 
enemy.  Foremost of the problems encountered was the shortage of craft specifically 
designed for carrying troops to shore.  In the absence of suitable landing craft in 
sufficient numbers, the first wave of Marines ashore would find themselves in a 
precarious situation until the landing craft could return to the ships and bring the second 
wave ashore.68 
To remedy this tactical dilemma, Smith began considering supplements to the 
                                                 
67 Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps 
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landing force.  One potentially useful solution involved “special, highly mobile troops for 
use as an amphibious spearhead.”69  In summer 1941, Smith oversaw a series of joint 
training exercises, landing on the coast near the Marine Corps base at New River, North 
Carolina.  During the earlier FLEX 6 and 7, Smith had experimented with landing 
company-sized forces of Marines in advance of the main assault. These companies were 
transported close to shore on fast destroyer-transports (APDs), and made shore landings 
via rubber boats.  In the summer 1941 exercises, Smith embarked the entire 1st Battalion, 
5th Marines (1/5),70 on APDs and utilized them to make a surprise landing in the “enemy” 
rear area.  Smith’s intentions for 1/5 became apparent when they were exempted from the 
1st Marine Division’s movement to New River.  Instead, they remained at Quantico for a 
special mission, operating outside of the 1st Marine Division chain of command and 
reporting directly to Smith himself.71 
In June 1941, shortly before the landing exercises, Smith had personally selected 
Colonel Merritt A. Edson to command 1/5.  Edson was a veteran officer, who had earned 
                                                 
69 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 13. 
70 The standard Marine regiment at that time consisted of a headquarters-and-service company, a weapons 
company, and two or three battalions. From the early 1930s onward, the term “regiment” was understood in 
the regimental designation; e.g. the 5th Marine Regiment was known as simply the 5th Marines.  Battalions 
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followed in this paper; hence, 1/5 is read as the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.  See Gordon L. Rottman, U.S. 
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(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 2002), 15-17. 
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Guadalcanal, ed. Neil Carey (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1996), 40, 93.  For more on the APDs, see 
Hoffman, From Makin to Bougainville, 4; Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 13-17; and Curt Clark, The Four 
Stack APDs: The Famed Green Dragons; The APD Destroyer Sailors of World War Two (Paducah, 




a reputation as an expert in counter-guerrilla warfare during the Corps’ campaigns in 
Nicaragua during the 1920s, as well as a permanent nickname – “Red Mike” – a 
reference to his reddish beard grown while in the field there.  His Coco River Patrol of 
1928 remains one of the legendary exploits of the Corps.  Edson played a major role in 
the formulation of the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940, and was well-known as 
a small arms expert par excellence. Most importantly, he was “a proven leader who could 
get the most out of men when the going was rough.”72  Although not an imposing figure 
by typical standards, Edson impressed all who worked with and under him for his 
meticulous attention to details and planning, his almost superhuman dedication to his 
mission and his Corps, and his utter fearlessness in the face of danger.73   
Under Edson’s leadership, 1/5 began evolving along a unique path, separate from 
their fellow 5th Marines battalions.  Edson realized that 1/5 needed much reorganization if 
it was to continually be embarked on the APDs.  While the APDs provided a fast 
transport capable of fire support for the landing parties, their troop capacity was smaller 
than the typical transport.  Use of the standard infantry battalion organization during the 
New River exercises resulted in splitting of units, much confusion, and “extremely 
unsatisfactory” results.74  Knowing that “the organization must be made to fit the capacity 
of the carrying ship,” Edson restructured the entire battalion around the APDs.75  Each 
company would have a maximum of 130 enlisted men and 5 officers, thereby allowing 
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the entire company to fit in a single APD.  This would grant 1/5 considerable tactical 
flexibility, as the battalion could quickly and efficiently be deployed at a platoon or 
company level with a minimum of confusion. Under the new organization, heavy 
weapons which would hinder mobility were exchanged for lighter versions.  Edson 
further began intensive training of the battalion, with heavy emphasis on two of his 
hallmarks:  individual marksmanship and physical conditioning.  His experience in 
Nicaragua had ingrained in Edson the importance of being self-sufficient in the field, a 
belief he brought to the 1st Battalion with his heavy emphasis on “field work, physical 
fitness, map reading and terrain appreciation, combat marksmanship, and night 
operations.”76  In the words of one Marine, “Edson’s training soon began to separate the 
men from the boys.  Each day became tougher than the last and each march longer than 
the last, usually with added equipment.”77  
It was clear that Edson’s 1st Battalion was gearing up for some specialized 
purpose, but exactly what that purpose would be remained somewhat unclear.  What was 
clear, however, was that 1/5, known informally as the “APD battalion,” was only 
nominally a part of the 1st Marine Division.  Divisional staff officers grumbled that 
Edson’s battalion was “the playthings of Corps Headquarters.”78  As the Corps’ efforts to 
prepare for war acquired new urgency in December 1941, Smith officially recognized 
this reality by detaching 1/5 from the 1st Marine Division entirely.  On January 6, 1942, 
Edson’s battalion was designated the 1st Separate Battalion; it would be attached directly 
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to the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.  However, the evolution from the 1st Separate 
Battalion to the Marine Raider Battalions was by no means inevitable.  In fact, but for the 
convergence of several other forces, from within and without the Corps, on the 
Commander-in-Chief, Edson’s Separate Battalion might have remained little more than a 
footnote in the history of the Corps.79 
 
Evans F. Carlson 
One of the impulses behind the creation of the Raider battalions was Evans 
Fordyce Carlson.  In a Corps that takes pride in the lively characters populating its 
history, Carlson stands out as one of the most colorful, most controversial, and definitely 
the most enigmatic.  After serving as an Army officer in France in the First World War, 
Carlson found himself disenchanted with civilian life.  He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 
1922, saying “I’d rather be a buck private in the Marines than a Captain [sic] of 
industry,” though he quickly earned an officer’s commission.80  He had his first taste of 
China when he was stationed in Shanghai from 1927 to 1929.  China and the turbulent 
events there would come to be the defining influences in Carlson’s life.  Like Edson, 
Carlson learned the nature of guerrilla warfare first-hand in Nicaragua, serving a tour of 
duty there in 1930 and earning a Navy Cross for his bravery in the face of Nicaraguan 
bandits.  His experiences in Nicaragua taught him the utmost necessity for securing the 
support of the local populace in order to effectively combat guerrillas; he also discovered 
first-hand that if a leader “took an unusual interest in their [his troops’] welfare, and had 
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80 Quoted in Blankfort, The Big Yankee, 121. 
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proved himself to be valiant in battle, his men would follow him with unwavering 
devotion.”81  In 1935, after a second tour in China, then-Captain Carlson was assigned to 
serve on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Marine guard detachment at Warm Springs, 
Georgia.  The President struck up a friendship with Carlson, a friendship which would 
last the rest of their lives.  The young captain seems to have developed a case of hero-
worship of the charismatic President.  Carlson remained “devoted to him not only as our 
President, but also (and primarily) because of the things he stands for as a man.”82  An 
associate of Carlson’s would later recall that “Carlson was prouder of his relationship 
with President Roosevelt than of anything else that had ever happened to him.”83  
Carlson returned to China in 1937 for his third tour, one which would indelibly 
shape the rest of his life.  In addition to his official duties as a U.S. Marine officer, 
Carlson also served, strictly off the record, as a sort of personal scout for the President.  
Roosevelt had approached Carlson before he left for China, asking him to “do something 
for me while you’re there.  I want you to drop me a line now and then – direct to the 
White House.  Let me know how you’re doing.  Tell me what’s going on.”84  And write 
Carlson did: he sent no less than nineteen letters direct to President Roosevelt from 
March 1937 to October 1938, describing in detail the conditions in war-torn China.85 
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Carlson’s sympathy for the Chinese struggles had been steadily growing for some 
time, boarding even on the obsessive.  His third tour there proved definitive for 
coalescing his philosophy of leadership.  Carlson struck up friendship with journalists 
Edgar and Helen Snow, and met with leaders of the Communist Chinese army, including 
Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung.  Mao and Chu Teh were legendary in 1930s China, famous 
for leading the Long March to escape from the Nationalists.  Following the Japanese 
invasions of coastal cities (including the infamous “Rape of Nanking”), the Communist 
Red Army ostensibly allied themselves with the Nationalist government against the 
Japanese.  Under the new moniker of the 8th Route Army, Mao’s forces waged guerrilla 
warfare against the Japanese in occupied northern China, relying on quick strikes and the 
support of the populace to help frustrate the militarily superior Japanese.  The rumors of 
the 8th Route Army’s unorthodox emphasis on political training to “inculcate in their 
‘initiates’ the spirit of willing service,” and their ability “to win victories over the 
Japanese when no other armies in China can do so,” compelled Carlson to go see the 
Chinese Communist guerrillas in action.86  As he explained it, “I must see how these 
ideas and theories actually work out in practice . . . . No knowledge can equal that which 
is derived from personal observation.”87 
After securing permission to join the 8th Route Army as a naval intelligence 
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observer, Carlson accompanied them on a guerrilla campaign across Japanese-occupied 
territory, a campaign that would cover nearly one thousand miles traveling by foot or 
horseback – “the toughest bit of marching I have done in my twenty odd years of 
campaigning.”88  He found that the Japanese counter-guerrilla efforts were frustrated 
because “the 8th Route Army is like an eel; it squirms in and out between the Japanese 
units.  Perhaps it would be better to compare it to a swarm of hornets harassing an 
elephant; they strike and disappear, cut lines of communication, attack repeatedly during 
the night so that the opponents cannot sleep.  I can well believe the Japanese officer who 
remarked in his diary: ‘The 8th Route Army gives me a headache.’”89  Carlson’s ideas of 
guerrilla warfare, initially formed in the battle against Sandino in Nicaragua, came to 
maturity with the Chinese guerrillas.   
Carlson was convinced that the most significant contribution of the Chinese 
Communists was their commitment to what he called “ethical indoctrination.”90  The 8th 
Route Army was as dedicated to its brand of socio-political principles as it was to its war 
against the Japanese.  In the pursuit of equality, traditional distinctions between officers 
and enlisted men were abolished.  Emphasis was placed on educating everyone, from the 
peasants to the lowliest foot-soldier, in the reasons for the on-going struggle.  Meetings 
were regularly held in which the soldiers were informed in great detail not only the battle 
plan, but the rationale that lay behind implementing it (“Men who know most fight best,” 
as Chu Teh explained).91  At the regular after-action meetings, all ranks were given free 
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opportunity to critique the plan and its execution in the spirit of self-criticism.92   
Evans Carlson has been appropriately described as “a romantically-inclined 
idealist who espoused the Ten Commandments, the Declaration of Independence, and the 
brotherhood of man,” who was also “eminently gregarious and highly impressionable.”93  
His life was lived in a constant attempt to match his actions with his ideals; high on that 
list were the principles of the equality of mankind, the inherent virtue and inevitable 
triumph of democracy, and utter selflessness in devotion to one’s fellowman.  What he 
saw at work amongst the Communist guerrillas thoroughly engrossed him, and ultimately 
directed the remaining course of his life.  As he related it, “If this program was actually 
practised [sic], then I had stumbled upon Utopia.  The prospect was thrilling.”94  His 
passionate commitment to the democratic ideal served as a double-edged sword:  it gave 
him relentless intensity but blinded him to a more critical assessment of causes he backed 
and leaders he so admired. “I try to be objective and impartial,” he wrote, “but I must 
admit that my admiration for the courage and resourcefulness of these people, who are 
fighting against tremendous odds, is thoroughly aroused.”95  Carlson’s self-styled “ethical 
indoctrination” would have lasting implications for the eventual creation of the Raiders. 96 
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During his time with the 8th Route Army, Carlson learned from Mao and others 
that the Japanese war effort was supplied to a large extent with trade with the U.S.  He 
perceived this as nothing short of betrayal of democracy in the pursuit of profit, and “he 
made a vow that he would bring the truth to his fellow countrymen.”97  Almost 
immediately after arriving back to Hankow in August 1938, Carlson held a conference 
with several reporters, going into great detail about what he had recently witnessed.  The 
press was thrilled to have such rare stories.  Carlson’s superiors, however, were less 
pleased.  Carlson’s outspoken views on the situation in China and his loquacious 
communication with the press outside of official channels resulted in an official 
reprimand.  Carlson, “tired of attempting to adjust my action to the arbitrary whims of a 
superior officer,” decided to resign from the Marine Corps in protest, a move he hoped 
would “enable me to express my convictions, especially on international affairs, without 
embarrassment to the naval service or to the government.”98  For the next several years, 
Carlson busily engaged in writing and lecturing across the country.  He wrote several 
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articles and books.  He publically advocated for an embargo of Japan and for support of 
the Chinese Communists, whom he insisted were the true friends of democracy in Asia.  
Carlson made one final trip to China, as a civilian this time, in 1940 to observe the 
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.  It was on this tour that he picked up the slogan that the 
Raiders would later make famous – “Gung Ho,” which Carlson translated as “work 
together.”99 
By late 1940, Carlson’s observations had convinced him that Japan would soon be 
ready to wage war against the U.S.  As early as January 1941 he was confidently 
asserting that Japan would attack the U.S. within ninety days.  He felt duty-bound to 
return to the U.S. and offer his services as a U.S. Marine once again to the Commandant. 
Holcomb gladly accepted him back into the Marine Corps as a major in the Reserves.  
Once back in uniform, Carlson was assigned to active duty with the 2nd Marines in 
California.  Carlson also took the time to write to Commandant Holcomb, volunteering 
for service with any commando or guerrilla units that might be created and offering his 
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own suggestions as to how such a unit should be organized.100  
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and William Donovan 
It is doubtful that Carlson’s suggestions were the defining factor in the creation of 
the Raider battalions, though many of Carlson’s admirers would like to think so. 
Complete credit for the creation of the Raiders cannot be given exclusively to Edson’s 1st 
Separate Battalion either.  Both certainly provided key components, but the catalyst for 
the decision to form Raider battalions came from outside the ranks of the Corps, a fact 
that set the Raiders on a different trajectory from other Marine Corps units.  The 
developments of the Marine Corps in the pre-war period, including Smith’s and Edson’s 
development of the APD Battalion and Carlson’s advocacy for guerrilla units, provided 
fertile soil for the creation of a unique sort of special operations unit.  However, the 
impetus for springing special operations units into existence must frequently come from 
some high-ranking patron figure, often a romantically-inclined wartime leader. This was 
especially true in the early 1940s when such concepts were new and unproven.  The 
Raiders found a patron in President Roosevelt himself, though he did not arrive at his 
conclusions without assistance from some colorful figures.101   
In June 1940, with Britain reeling from the disaster at Dunkirk, Prime Minister 
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Winston Churchill, turned to the concept of raiding targets in Axis-occupied Europe – if 
only to demonstrate to the British people and the world that Great Britain was not yet out 
of the fight.  Declaring that “The passive-resistance war . . . must come to an end,” 
Churchill called for “a vigorous, enterprising, and ceaseless offensive against the whole 
German-occupied coastline.”102  Such an offensive called for “specially trained troops of 
the hunter class, who can develop a reign of terror down these coasts [occupied Europe] . 
. . on the ‘butcher and bolt’ policy.”103  He realized that, “If we are to have any campaign 
in 1941, it must be amphibious in its character, and . . . will depend on surprise landings 
of lightly equipped, nimble forces.”104  Quickly dubbed “Commandos,”105 these highly-
trained, well-equipped, and mobile units engaged in some of the most spectacular raids of 
the war against German installations in Norway, France, and elsewhere.  They played a 
valuable role in bolstering beleaguered British morale.  Though America had yet to enter 
the war, the exploits of the Commandos attracted a great degree of attention in the 
American imagination.  The American press seized upon the new British “mystery unit,” 
which was reportedly “toughened by long marches on skimpy rations . . . [able to] swim 
in full battle equipment, handle all sorts of weapons and explosives, even master the 
pressure points of jujitsu,” to give the public some exciting copy.106 
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Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, America found itself equally beleaguered. 
The destruction of much of the Pacific fleet was followed by news of the fall of Guam, 
Wake, and the Philippines.  In rapid order the Japanese acquired domination of 
practically the entire Pacific theater.  Immediately after learning of the Pearl Harbor 
attack, Churchill travelled to Washington to confer with Roosevelt, arriving on December 
22, 1941, for the ARCADIA conference.  In between conversations on grand strategy, 
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox discussed a smaller scale 
item: the creation of American Commandos.107   
Central to this high-level discussion was a top secret proposal by William “Wild 
Bill” Donovan.  Donovan, a hero of the First World War and personal friend of the 
President, had recently been appointed director of the Office of Coordinator of 
Information (OCI).  The functions of this newly-established intelligence agency were 
deliberately vague, and Donovan was casting about for a mission. 108  He suggested to the 
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President, “That there be organized now, in the United States, a guerrilla corps 
independent and separate from the Army and Navy, and imbued with a maximum of the 
offensive and imaginative spirit.  This force should, of course, be created along 
disciplined military lines, analogous to the British Commando principle.”109  The 
unstated implication was that such a force would be under Donovan; and the Marine 
Corps was the most promising recruiting grounds for a unit separate from Army and 
Navy.   
President Roosevelt was obviously influenced by numerous factors, including 
Donovan’s memo and his previous communications with Evans Carlson.  The President, 
like most Americans at the time, was impressed by the exploits of the British 
Commandos. Roosevelt’s counter-part, Churchill, had personally championed the 
Commando concept in the face of reluctance by the British military establishment.  
Churchill’s primary concern in December 1941 was securing American support for 
projective offensive operations in the European theater, though he did propose that the 
Japanese must be forced to overextend their resources by constant hounding.  
Commandos would be a good way to fulfill this purpose.  The exact details remain 
somewhat murky.  What is clear is that the creation of specially-designated Commando 
units for use in the Pacific was discussed amongst the ARCADIA attendees, including 
Secretary Knox (Donovan was not privy to ARCADIA). Churchill later credited 
Roosevelt with initiating the discussion, but he heartily endorsed the concept:  
When you told me about your intention to form commando forces on a 
large scale on the California shore I felt you had the key.  Once several 
good outfits are prepared, any one of which can attack a Japanese-held 
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base or island and beat the life out of the garrison, all their islands will 
become hostages to fortune.  Even this year, 1942, some severe examples 
might be made causing great perturbation and drawing further upon 
Japanese resources to strengthen other points.110 
 
While it is difficult to discern precisely which of the aforementioned influences factored 
most strongly in the President’s thinking, the immediate consequences of the ARCADIA 
discussions reverberated through the Navy Department.  Ironically, Donovan’s memo 
appears in retrospect to reflect merely his search for a specific mission to help define his 
new agency.  Events unfolded in an entirely different direction:  the OCI was soon 
transformed into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), giving Donovan a much more 
suitable role and apparently ending his commando visions.  But Donovan’s “old friend,” 
Frank Knox, ensured that the idea was pursued with more enthusiasm in the Navy 
Department.111   
On January 8, 1942, Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Fleet (COMINCH), sent a memo to Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, informing him that “the President is much interested in the 
development and use of the equivalent of British ‘commandos,’ [And] The Secretary 
[Knox] told the President that you have such groups in training.”112  This appears to be 
the first time that Holcomb became officially privy to the high-level discussions 
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surrounding the commando question.  In addition to this unwelcome intrusion, Holcomb 
was informed in subsequent days that not only would his Corps have to provide the 
manpower for this new force, but it would have to commission Wild Bill Donovan as a 
Brigadier General in the Corps.  This was cause for grave concern for the Commandant. 
It represented a threat to the integrity of the ranks of Marine officers, a case of external 
interference in the Corps’ internal affairs that would have debilitating effects on morale 
and cohesion.113   
Holcomb was not inclined to passively accept this imposition without giving full 
voice to the concerns of the Corps.  On January 14, he alerted the commanders of the 1st 
and 2nd Marine Divisions (Maj. Gen. H. M. Smith and Brigadier Gen. Charles F.B. Price, 
respectively) of this development and requested their “frank expression of opinion” on 
the Donovan prospect.114  Smith responded forcefully against it, stressing the inevitable 
resentment that would accompany an appointment most would see “as political, unfair, 
and a publicity stunt.”115  Smith strongly emphasized that to bring in a non-Marine would 
publically deface the Corps’ reputation: “It would be stressed that the Marines had to go 
outside their own service for leaders.”116  Price was more circumspect in his reply.  
Officially, he opined that Donovan would be qualified for the job, but that it would only 
be prudent to undertake the so-called “Commando Project” if it could be done without 
thinning the ranks of experienced personnel and officers from existing combat units.  “If, 
on the other hand, our very limited resources in trained officers must be further dispersed 
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and if the best of the adventurous spirits and ‘go-getters’ among our men must be 
diverted from the Fleet Marine Force,” Price stated that he would “recommend seriously 
against assuming this additional commitment.”117  Privately, Price held strong 
reservations about the situation, which he revealed in a personal letter to Holcomb sent 
the same day as his official response.  Price intuited that Holcomb was not necessarily 
putting forward the Commando idea of his own initiative.118  Such external tinkering with 
the inner workings of Corps was the crux of Price’s concerns.  Confidentially, Price 
feared “the grave danger that this sort of thing will develop into the tail which will wag 
the dog eventually.  I know in what quarters the idea of foisting this scheme upon the 
Marines originated and I opine that if it is developed along the lines of a hobby in the 
hands of personnel other than regular Marine officers it could very easily get far out of 
hand and out of control as well.”119   
Holcomb apparently felt the same way.  Later that week, Holcomb confided to a 
personal friend that “The Donovan affair is still uppermost in my mind.  I am terrified 
that I may be forced to take this man.  I feel that it will be the worst slap in the face the 
Marine Corps was ever given.”120  With his own staunch opposition to Donovan’s 
appointment augmented by the opinions of two senior Marines, opinions representative of 
the rest of the officer corps, Holcomb was able to squelch the talk of forming Donovan’s 
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commandos from Marine ranks.  In this case, “the OSS marched to the aid of the 
Marines,” as Donovan moved on to head America’s new “Oh So Secret” intelligence 
agency and did not pursue the “Commando Project” any further than his original 
memo.121   
Donovan or no, Holcomb could not be rid of the demand for commando-style 
units.  In the midst of his fending off the potential Donovan threat, Holcomb received a 
parallel proposal from within the ranks of the Corps for organizing Marine Corps 
“Commandos.”  Though it came from a junior officer, the proposal carried more weight 
than usual:  its author was none other than James Roosevelt, captain in the Marine Corps 
Reserve and son of the President.122   
James Roosevelt had a unique Marine Corps career.  In 1936, he entered the 
Marine Corps as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserves at his father’s behest, in order to 
serve as an aide on a trip to South America.  James decided to stay in the Marine 
Reserves, but admitted “I do not feel my age or experience would justify my holding such 
a rank in the case of actual call to service.”123  He resigned his commission and was then 
re-commissioned as a Captain in September 1939.  His intimate connection with the 
President made him the perfect choice for several special missions. In August 1941, 
William Donovan personally requested to have James Roosevelt detached for temporary 
duty as the OCI’s Liaison Officer.  After Pearl Harbor, James requested transfer back to 
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active duty with the 2nd Marine Division in California. There he shared a room with an 
acquaintance from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s time at Warm Springs – Evans F. Carlson. 
Carlson was quickly impressed with the younger Roosevelt, discovering that James “saw 
pretty much eye to eye with me on matters social, economic, political and military.”124  
Carlson’s idealism proved very influential.  Roosevelt’s January 13 letter to Commandant 
Holcomb clearly reflects Carlson’s influence.  In James Roosevelt’s estimation, the 
situation in the Pacific called for daring action modeled on the daring raids of the British 
Commandos and the 8th Route Army in China.  Arguing that such guerrilla actions and 
raids “fits the entire tradition of action and boldness held by the Marine Corps,” and that 
“there are many officers and men [within the Corps] with experience in Nicaragua who 
have had similar experience [by this he almost certainly meant Carlson],” Roosevelt 
proposed that such units would be an efficient remedy to the Japanese onslaught, raiding 
captured islands, the Philippines, and “even more devastating action frontally by landing 
on Japan proper.”125 
Roosevelt’s letter arrived in the midst of Holcomb’s correspondence with Smith 
and Price.  It only added to Holcomb’s troubles – in addition to fending off romantic 
Commando intrusions into the Corps, he now had the President’s own son urging 
adoption of Carlson’s special operations guerrilla units for quixotic raids on Japan.  
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Though Donovan was out of the picture, the ideas of a commando force had already been 
sown and taken root in too many influential minds for the concept to merely fade away 
quietly.  This became painfully obvious on January 24, when Admiral Nimitz, 
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), informed Marine Maj. Gen. 
Clayton B. Vogel, commander of the 2nd Joint Training Force in California, that “it is 
desired that immediate steps be taken to organize and train four ‘Commando’ type units 
in your force.  Details of organization, development, and training are left to your 
discretion.”126  Nimitz further ordered the transfer of the APD fleet from Virginia to 
California, signaling that these new raiding units would be operating in the Pacific 
theater.  As of February 4, there was still uncertainty as to the exact nature of these units, 
which for all practical purposes existed only on paper.   
Holcomb recognized that by this point that the creation of commando forces in 
some form was inevitable.  The idea was supported by the President, as well as Secretary 
Knox, Admiral King, and Admiral Nimitz, and had started to create a stir amongst the 
public.  However, rather than protest Nimitz’s order, Holcomb sensed an opportunity to 
at least maintain full Marine Corps control of the new commando units, thereby avoiding 
their becoming “a tail which will wag the dog.”127  Merritt Edson and the 1st Separate 
Battalion gave Holcomb the perfect opportunity to comply with the directives from on 
high while still maintaining the integrity of the Corps.128  
In a February 4 memo to King, Holcomb acknowledged Nimitz’s call for the 
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creation of commando-style units, but maintained that the 2nd Marine Division (out of 
which those units were to be carved) was already too understrength to furnish the 
personnel.  However, he pointed out that Edson’s battalion “has been in existence for 
years and has been undergoing intensive training in the execution of small-scale 
amphibious raids and surprise landings for the past year.”129  Holcomb sought to regain 
the reins on the commando initiative by proposing to send a reinforced company of the 1st 
Separate Battalion to California to serve as the nucleus for the new raiding unit, to be 
known as the 2nd Separate Battalion.  However, King made the increasing impatience of 
the Navy Department clear in a memo to Holcomb a few days later:   
Will you please have your people follow up and follow through on the equipment 
and ammunition (for training) of ‘Commando’ troops with first priority for units 
on the West Coast (Pacific Fleet)[?] By equipment is meant everything needed to 
make the ‘Commando’ units effective – to include, for instance, demolition, 
portable radio, rubber boats, special weapons, etc.130   
 
Merely designating “Separate Battalions” was not going to suffice to appease the demand 
for commandos, yet Holcomb found a way to gain institutional victory in the sparring 
over the commando project.  Writing to Vogel on the day after receiving King’s memo 
(February 10), Holcomb confided that though the Donovan question appeared to have 
died down, “the idea is too strongly imbedded to remain dormant very long unless we 
move promptly to broaden our amphibious training in such way as to head off any 
outside interference.”131  Holcomb outlined the course of action:  “in view of 
COMINCH’s memorandum, herein quoted, and as a means of forestalling the Donovan 
case, we must act and act quickly.  We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our 
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important missions, viz: the execution of amphibious raids.”132  Full training and 
equipping of the Separate Battalions was to be “of first priority.”133  Of course, to do so 
would involve “some sacrifice for the time being of the other units [of the 2nd Marine 
Division] in the matter of experienced personnel and equipment,” but Holcomb felt that, 
“in view of the situation now facing us, it is imperative that we get underway at once.”134  
Holcomb concluded by underscoring the urgency now attached to the Commando 
project: “It is really a matter of grave concern to me, as it may have a very important 
influence on our future.”135  Holcomb, always attentive to how the changing attitudes in 
Washington could affect the Corps for good or ill, was keenly sensitive to the mounting 
pressure from high authorities who wanted some American equivalent to the vaunted 
British Commandos.  Although the Donovan proposal ultimately amounted to little more 
than speculation, Holcomb recognized the need to act fast to placate the authorities while 
still maintaining internal control of the special operations experiment.  Edson and the 
Separate Battalion, prepared under Smith’s earlier, more conventional parameters, 
provided Holcomb with his solution. 
Holcomb retained his staunch disapproval of the term “Commando,” for as he 
continued to insist, the Marines already were America’s elite amphibious troops, easily 
the equal of any Commandos.136  He believed that “the term ‘Marine’ was ‘sufficient to 
indicate a man ready for duty at any time, and that the injection of a special name, such as 
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“Commando,” would be undesirable and superfluous.’”137  This opinion was shared by 
most in the Marine Corps.  Holcomb consulted both Vogel and Smith for suggestions for 
a better name for the two Separate Battalions, noting that “I don’t like the term 
‘Commando’; we are looking for a better term – one more fitting for the Marines.”138  
Smith suggested the title 1st Shock Battalion, which he felt was superior to the accurate-
but-bland terminology employed by Edson, who called his unique unit the 1st Destroyer 
(APD) Battalion.139  James Roosevelt had included a suggestion that his proposed 
guerrilla unit could be “called ‘Rangers’ or some other appropriate name.”140  It remains 
unclear who deserves credit for the exact term, but Holcomb ultimately decided on a title 
that was straightforward, yet sufficiently unique to the Corps: the U.S. Marine Raider 
Battalions.141 
The 1st Separate Battalion was officially re-designated the 1st Marine Raider 
Battalion on February 16, 1942.  For the new 1st Raiders, this was little more than a name 
change; they continued their aggressive training regimen under the command of Merritt 
Edson.  The 2nd Separate Battalion followed suit shortly, and was re-designated the 2nd 
Marine Raider Battalion on February 19, 1942.  This new special operations unit was the 
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fulfillment of Carlson’s long-held dreams, for General Price selected him to serve as the 
commanding officer of the new battalion.  For his executive officer, Carlson selected 
none other than James Roosevelt.142 
 
Suspicion of Outside Interference 
In order to fully appreciate the tension created by the Raiders within the culture of 
the Marine Corps, one must consider the unique perspective shared by most Marines.  
Many Marine officers sincerely believed that dabbling in experimental special operations 
posed an existential threat to the Corps they were trying to build and defend.  In his 
landmark history of the development of Corps culture during and after World War II, 
Aaron O’Connell draws attention to the “minority status, sense of persecution, and 
paranoia that have always been a dominant cognitive frame in Marine Corps culture.”143  
Though the Marine Corps had existed within the U.S. Navy since 1798, prior to the 20th 
century they remained a small force of sea-going soldiers, neither fully Army nor fully 
Navy.  On numerous occasions between the American Revolution to the Second World 
War, the Corps had come dangerously close to being abolished; such institutional 
memories of threat from other services were a crucial factor in shaping the mindset of 
Marines.  O’Connell posits that “A feeling of being persecuted, already well established 
in their service history, instilled in Marines a feeling of hypervigilance . . . . That 
hypervigilance and the group cohesion which flowed from it were the engines of the 
Marines’ cultural power and success.”144  This hypervigilance meant that Marines, 
especially those in senior positions, were extremely wary of external interference in 
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Marine Corps internal affairs.  All such attempts were greeted with suspicion as potential 
efforts to marginalize the Corps and subvert its unique role in national defense.145 
The Raiders represented Holcomb’s concession to the realities of the mood of 
America’s top leadership in the depressing days of early 1942.  The maneuverings of 
Holcomb and his top generals successfully forestalled any direct outside interference in 
the internal organization and chain-of-command of the Marine Corps.  To be sure, the 
impetus for the 1st Separate Battalion had come not from politicians or the Navy 
Department, but from Holland Smith’s experiences with the FLEXs.  Yet an important 
aspect of the Raider concept that was developed by Edson, under Smith’s command, was 
the incorporation of the Raiders as one weapon among many in the Corps amphibious 
assault arsenal.  Edson deliberately shaped his battalion with a view towards a supporting 
role in larger-scale amphibious assaults; his 1st Raiders were designed not only to 
function as independent companies for raids and reconnaissance missions, but also to 
serve in joint operations with normal infantry battalions.  This supplementary role was 
very much in line with the ethos of Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), namely the 
establishment of the amphibious assault as the Corps’ primary mission.  Amphibious 
assault was the Corps’ defining feature, the justification for their continued existence 
which preempted the charge of many that the Corps merely duplicated the efforts of the 
Army.  As historian Joseph Alexander put it, “Any other missions – especially the 
creation of a large-scale, elite commando force – that diluted or distracted from this 
primary role would be decidedly unwelcome.”146  Holcomb made this clear in his letters 
to Vogel and Smith, in which he plainly stated “I want to emphasize that I consider the 
                                                 
145 The institutional survival of the Corps is described in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., “The Cat With More Than 
Nine Lives,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 80, no. 6, (June 1954): 658-671.  
146 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 28. 
 60 
 
so-called ‘Commando Operations’ only one feature of normal Marine Corps work.”147 
Thus, in Holcomb’s mind the Raiders would be an ancillary force that could serve 
a useful purpose in support of amphibious operations.  With that in mind, Holcomb 
sought to use Edson’s battalion as template, the pattern which the newly founded 2nd 
Raiders should follow.  As it turned out, Evans Carlson had other plans.  The external 
interest of influential figures continued through 1942, leading HQMC to handle them 
with kid gloves.  King continued his interest in the training of the Raider battalions, 
inquiring about their training progress again in March.148  Carlson maintained his 
correspondence directly with the Commander-in-Chief, informing President Roosevelt of 
the details of the 2nd Raider Battalion’s missions, organization, and training.149 Roosevelt 
continued to take a personal interest in the 2nd Raiders, not the least because his own son 
was its executive officer.  He responded warmly to Carlson’s updates, remarking that 
“What you tell me about the new outfit is most interesting and surely there will be a 
chance to use it.”150  Such investment by high-level authorities outside of the Corps 
would become a defining feature of the Raider battalions.  As has been noted of many 
other units the Raiders experience – indeed, their very existence – was directly tied to the 
interest of high-ranking benefactors.  The continued attraction of non-Marine leaders to 
the Raiders fed into the perceptions of favoritism and eventual resentment that ultimately 
contributed to the Raiders’ early disbandment.151 
  
                                                 
147 Holcomb to Vogel, 10 February 1942, reproduced in Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak, 267. 
148 Charles L. Updegraph, Jr., Special Marine Corps Units of World War II (Washington, D.C.: History and 
Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1972; repr. 1977), 4. 
149 Carlson to F.D. Roosevelt, 2 March 1942, Carlson File, HDRB. 
150 F.D. Roosevelt to Carlson, 12 March 1942, Carlson File, HDRB. 
151 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, 35-44. 
 61 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE RAIDERS AS A MILITARY ELITE 
 
Following the formal establishment of the Raider Battalions in February 1942, it 
did not take long for them to show the signs of an emergent, elite subculture.  The 
fostering of a unique group subculture is a common feature of military units of all 
varieties, but is especially pronounced among elite units.  It is no surprise then that the 
Raiders quickly began to establish their own distinctive subculture within their parent 
culture, that of the Marine Corps at large.  From their initial days, the Raider battalions 
began establishing the Raider mystique, quickly establishing themselves as premier 
special operations units.  Even more than their special mission purpose, the Raiders were 
set apart by their natural evolution into a distinctly elite force, advancing rapidly from 
Guardsmen to Technicians and finally Warrior elites.  However, the emergence of a 
parallel subculture, one which mimicked the same features as the parent culture, 
introduced elements of friction in the Marine Corps.152 
 
The Marine Corps as a Military Elite 
As Showalter expertly frames it, the Marine Corps prior to and including the First 
World War had achieved a solid reputation, both on the battlefield and in the media.  
However, an elite designation based on reputation alone, in the absence of certain other 
factors, yields what Showalter labels a “pseudo-elite.”153  During the First World War, 
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the Marine Corps “took its first step towards true elite status by maintaining its status as a 
volunteer force until September 1918.”154  As Showalter explains, with the advent of the 
draft, the idea of an all-volunteer Marine Corps rapidly became one of the most defining 
features of service in the Corps.  “And the Marine brigade’s achievements and image 
combined to support the Corps’ emerging status as America’s version of the Old World’s 
guards formations, a force of men who had placed themselves above the ordinary soldier 
not by simple physical measurements, but democratically, by the free moral act of 
volunteering.”155 Marine recruiting during the First World War was designed around this 
very logic, as “recruiters stressed that the Corps was still an all-volunteer, elite service, an 
appeal that spared the Corps the residual contempt for conscripts and allowed it to attract 
the most adventurous, physically fit men.”156  With an overwhelming number of 
volunteers, the Corps was able to maintain stringent acceptance standards, rejecting about 
25 percent of would-be volunteers and lending much credence to the claim that the 
Marine Corps of World War I was filled with “the cream of the 1917 volunteers.”157   
Maintaining their status as an all-volunteer force with the most difficult entrance 
standards became a crucial aspect of the Marine Corps identity, as it defined their claim 
to Guardsman elite status.  This continued in the Second World War.  As mobilization for 
war slowly got underway in the pre-war United States, the Marine Corps adhered to its 
highly selective standards, rejecting some 79 percent of applicants in 1940.158  After the 
shock of Pearl Harbor, the Marine Corps’ recruiting appeals to the “nation’s toughest, 
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most physically fit, and most patriotic youths to wear the ‘Globe and Anchor’” resulted in 
a massive influx of eager volunteers of high quality – “some of the finest men it [the 
Corps] had seen since World War I.”159  Many of the men who volunteered for service in 
the Marine Corps were motivated by intense patriotism and the desire to prove their 
manhood, combined with eagerness to get into action.  The eagerness of volunteers to 
join the Corps meant that the Corps could maintain their high standards.  Even following 
the mandated acceptance of men inducted under the Selective Service Act in 1943 the 
Marine Corps fought – and mostly succeeded – to preserve its all-volunteer reputation.  
As David Ulbrich relates, “Marine recruiters and raw recruits alike took several steps to 
circumvent the Selective Service Act while still following policies in the letter, if not the 
spirit, of the law.”160  Despite the rapid growth of the wartime Marine Corps to 
unprecedented levels, the Corps remained distinctively smaller than the other service 
branches.  The reputation of the Marine Corps as the “First to Fight” continued to attract 
“many thousands of men of the finest physical types, and of a high degree of education 
and personal initiative,” giving them the “character of hand-picked organizations.”161 
This relatively small size, combined with their all-volunteer image and rigorous 
standards, gives credence to Showalter’s perception of the World War II-era Corps as 
America’s Guardsmen. 162 
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The Marines were very aware of their elitist self-perception and did all in their 
power to encourage it.  The training of Marines centered on the idea that being a Marine 
was more than learning a new trade or acquiring a new skill-set.  Rather, the recruit 
training process is most often described as a total transformation, one that can be 
considered the adoption of a new identity or even initiation into a religious order.  Marine 
General Victor H. Krulak stressed the importance of recruit training as “the true 
beginning.  There, in a form of mystical alchemy, young men from diverse sources 
experience total immersion in an environment where the essential Marine Corps virtues 
are perceived, understood, and finally accepted as dogma.”163 Having completed the 
challenge of boot camp, the newly-minted Marine “has passed the initiation into an elect 
fraternity and, without knowing it, he has become an elitist.”164  Marine historian Aaron 
O’Connell asserts that initiation into the culture of the Corps was in fact the most vital 
part of a prospective Marine’s training, for “much of recruit training during World War II 
was designed not to impart specific skills but to ritualize the recruit’s induction into a 
new culture.”165 
The central component of the Marine Corps culture of elitism is what O’Connell 
aptly describes as the narrative of Marine exceptionalism – “a set of claims asserting 
unconditionally that Marines were, and always have been, unique and superior to all 
                                                                                                                                                 
reenlisted as regular Marines, thus sparing them the “USMCR-SS” (Selective Service” designation).  More 
than two-thirds of the 224,323 draftees who joined the Corps during the war opted for this route.  For a 
discussion of recruiting literature and stated motivations for joining the Corps, see Ulbrich, Preparing for 
Victory, 115-116; for discussion of the Corps’ reaction to the draft, see Millett, Semper Fidelis, 374, and 
Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 161-164.   
163 Victor H. Krulak, “‘This Precious Few . . .’ The Evolution of Recruit Training.”  Marine Corps Gazette 
66, no. 4 (April 1982): 48.  Krulak elaborates:  “What happens to the young man who aspires to be a 
member of the Marine fraternity begins with a reduction of all to a common denominator . . . . None is 
different than the other.  None is better than any other.  After this egoectomy they start—all the same—
from an initial zero, and they are rebuilt from there.” 50. 
164 Krulak, “These Precious Few,” 54. 
165 O’Connell, Underdogs, 37.   
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other military services.”166  As O’Connell explains, induction into the Marine culture 
took the form of a symbolic exchange between the Marine and the Corps, with the 
Marine giving total commitment of priorities, ideology, and even identity, to the Corps in 
exchange for the privilege of belonging to the elite.  “The result,” O’Connell concludes, 
“was a lasting bond, formed by shared stories and a broad network of kinship that 
encompassed both the living and the dead.  And while some Marines probably considered 
the Corps nothing more than a job, for the majority it was much more: a vocation, an 
identity, and even a family.”167  Representative of the outlook of many World War II 
Marines was Major Richard Kennard, who believed that the “only answer as to why the 
Marines get the toughest jobs is because the average leatherneck is a much better 
fighter.”168  Correspondent Robert Sherrod observed that “The Marines simply assumed 
that they were the world’s best fighting men.”169  This powerful culture of elitism served 
the Marine Corps well during the brutal fighting in the Pacific theater, as it bonded 
Marines together as members of a tight-knit fraternity in the face of unspeakable 
hardships and violence.170 
 
The Raiders as Guardsmen 
It was within this context of a self-consciously elitist Marine Corps culture that the 
                                                 
166 O’Connell, Underdogs, 27. 
167 O’Connell, Underdogs, 27. 
168 Kennard added that the average Marine “has far more guts, courage and better officers . . . . These boys 
out there have a pride in the Marine Corps and will fight to the end no matter what the cost.”  Richard 
Kennard to William Kennard, February 21, 1945, in Richard C. Kennard, Combat Letters Home: A U.S 
Marine Corps Officer’s World War II Letters from Peleliu, Okinawa and North China, September 1944 to 
December 1945 (Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania:  Dorrance, 1985), 64. 
169 Robert Sherrod, Tarawa, 35. 
170 Aaron O’Connell discusses the effects of combat on Marine esprit, and how trauma actually served to 
strengthen the cohesion of Marine Corps culture among most, if not all, Marines.  See his article, “Harsh 
and Spiritual Unity.” 
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Raiders began their existence.  The Raiders largely constituted “double-volunteers,” for 
all of their volunteers were recruited from the ranks of the Marine Corps, men who had 
already volunteered for a service that prided itself on the hazards and difficulty of joining 
it.  As might be expected, the Raiders tended to attract the most dedicated, aggressive, 
competitive, and ambitious Marines – the ones most eager for action.  The Raiders 
quickly acquired a reputation as the “suicide units of the Marine Corps,”171  From their 
earliest days the Raiders could claim to be the “crème de la crème, the Marine of the 
Marines.”172  The phrase “cream of the cream” accurately describes the effect of 
concentrating so many energetic and competitive Marines into two small battalions.  
Such concentration of talent among small, elite units is one of the most oft-heard 
criticisms of elite units, and in fact would constitute one of the most persistent criticisms 
of the Raiders throughout their existence.173 
Merritt Edson formed his 1st Raider Battalion from the previous 1st Separate 
Battalion, itself the former 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.  During their time as the 1st Separate 
Battalion, Edson had already begun the process of refining them into a rugged, special-
purpose battalion. Edson wanted “to bring the battalion . . . to as high a state of physical 
fitness as possible,” knowing that his assault troops would be performing missions 
beyond the scope of a standard infantry battalion.174   
With the start of the war and the formal creation of the Raider battalions, Edson 
intensified his efforts to get the 1st Raiders ready for battle.  In doing so, he began to 
                                                 
171 When Marine combat correspondent Frank Cannistraci asked a veteran NCO, “Just what is a Raider 
battalion?,” he was told that “They are the suicide units of the Marine Corps.”  “‘Suicide,’ I said to myself, 
‘what the hell did I get myself into?’”  Frank Cannistraci, unpub. memoir, Frank Cannistraci Collection, 
MCUA, p.10.   
172 Blankfort, Big Yankee, 9. 
173 Horn, “Love ‘Em or Hate ‘Em,” 36. 
174 Edson to Marion Dawson, 21 January 1942, Edson Papers, LOC. Edson incorporated a vigorous training 
schedule, including aspects of the Marine Parachute Battalion’s training regime. 
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establish them as a distinctly elite force.  Richard Tregaskis, a war correspondent and 
admirer of Edson’s, wrote of him:  
Edson also knew the value of morale, and he would remind his troops often that 
they were being trained to be the very best. ‘He poured into the minds of his 
boys,’ says an old Raider sergeant, ‘that they were the best, second to none…that 
no matter what they got into, they’d be able to get out of it.  He build a terrific 
amount of confidence.’175   
 
The effects of his training were evident to those outside the battalion.  The 1st Separate 
Battalion was commended for its performance as a “well trained, efficient battalion . . . . 
Their morale was of the highest, and they were at all times possessed of a strong 
initiative.”176 
Edson’s efforts to transform the APD battalion into a self-sufficient raiding force 
took a serious blow almost immediately after receiving the Raider designation.  In an 
effort to make the establishment of the newly-formed 2nd Raider Battalion easier on the 
2nd Marine Division, Commandant Holcomb ordered a reinforced company of the 1st 
Raiders to the West Coast to serve as the nucleus for their 2nd Raider counterparts.  In 
complying with this order, Edson effectively lost a full rifle company (Able Company), 
plus a machine gun and a mortar section – approximately one third of his effective 
strength in February 1942. With combat service imminent, Edson now found himself 
tasked with a serious restructuring of the battalion he had invested so much time in 
training. 177 
                                                 
175 Tregaskis, “Best Soldier I Ever Knew.”  The insistence on being the best was a hallmark of Edson’s 
leadership.  Consider his comments to the 5th Marines after assuming command of that regiment in October 
1942: “It is my intention that this regiment become the best disciplined, the best appearing and the best 
trained regiment in the Marine Corps.  Only by doing so will you become the best and toughest fighting 
regiment in the Corps.”  Edson, Regimental Memorandum, 6 December 1942, Edson Papers, LOC. 
176 This description comes from the umpire’s report of landing exercises and maneuvers on the Chesapeake 
Bay.  Quoted in Hoffman, Once a Legend, 149. 
177 Holcomb to Charles F.B. Price, 4 February 1942, Holcomb Collection, MCUA; Hoffman, Makin to 
Bougainville, 4-5; Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 29.  In addition to this detachment, several of Edson’s 
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Well before the transfer of Able Company, Edson had pointed out that acquiring 
replacements for the APD battalion could be problematic.  Experience in the previous 
landing exercises had taught him that, “replacements received at the last moment, who 
may not be tempermentally [sic] nor physically fitted for this type of duty and who have 
received no prior specialized training, are seldom satisfactory.”178  With the dramatic 
influx of new recruits into the Marine Corps in the first months of 1942, experienced 
officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were in high demand across the Corps.  
Finding replacements trained to the level of the Marines he had lost to transfers would be 
difficult, but Edson turned this situation into an opportunity. 
Though he may have been forced to accept some recruits fresh out of training, 
Edson used the restructuring of the 1st Raiders as an opportunity to establish it as an all-
volunteer outfit.  Some of the original members of 1/5 and the 1st Separate Battalion were 
unsettled by the abrupt loss of many veterans and subsequent influx of newcomers when 
it became the 1st Raiders.  To restore their confidence in the new Raider battalion, Edson 
made every member of the battalion either volunteer for continued service as a Raider, or 
else be transferred, no questions asked, to elsewhere in the 5th Marines.  Most chose to 
remain with Edson’s Raiders.  To this cadre were added the new Raiders.  Edson directed 
that “the men [replacements] will, for the most part, be selected volunteers,” and 
volunteers were often interviewed by Raider officers to ensure their suitability.179 During 
early 1942, Marine recruits performed their rifle range qualifications at Quantico (to 
relieve some of the overcrowding on Parris Island), where, due to shortages of infantry 
                                                                                                                                                 
officers and NCOs were transferred to England as official observers of the British Commandos.  Alexander, 
Edson’s Raiders, 29. 
178 Edson, “Recommended Organization,” 1st Raider Battalion Unit File, MCUA, p.14. 
179 Edson to Clifton Cates, 2 Mar. 1942; and Edson to R.S. Brown, 6 March 1942, both in Edson Papers, 
LOC; Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 31-32. 
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NCOs, numerous Raiders doubled as instructors.  Raider NCOs serving as rifle-range 
instructors had an opportunity to observe the recruits closely; those who seemed 
promising were encouraged to volunteer for the Raiders for a chance at hazardous duty.  
Edson further bolstered his ranks by sending two of his company commanders to recruit 
men from within the 1st Marine Division at New River, North Carolina, much to the 
annoyance of its commander, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift.180 
As the reputation of the Raiders spread, they had no problem attracting 
volunteers.  Private Lee Minier explained his decision to join the Raiders to his mother: 
I volunteered for service with the 1st Marine Raider Battalion and was accepted.  
This outfit corresponds to the British Commandos and also is a spearhead for 
landing parties. We operate from destroyers and land in rubber boats.  One must 
be able to swim….I only hope this outfit is as good as they say it is.  They call it a 
suicide outfit.  But I notice a lot of Marines try to get into it.  One of the 
requirements is that you must volunteer and are not asked to join and must realize 
what you are asking for.181 
 
The rapidly evolving Raider mystique drew offers of service from seasoned NCOs such 
as Marine Gunner B.M. Bunn, a decorated veteran of Nicaragua, as well veteran 
commissioned officers.182 
The selection of officers in his battalion was of particular importance to Edson.  
Edson requested the transfer of Major Joseph Berry to be his executive officer.  Edson 
pointed out that Berry had excellent credentials and, most importantly, was “aggressive, 
                                                 
180 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 31-32; Hoffman, Once a Legend, 155-156. 
181 Lee Minier to Jolette Minier, 23 Feb. 1942, Lee N. Minier Collection, MCUA. 
182 B.M. Bunn to Edson, 28 March, 1942, Edson Papers, LOC.  Though Edson politely declined Bunn’s 
initial offer of service (Edson to Bunn, 31 March 1942, Edson Papers, LOC), Bunn eventually did join the 
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an excellent troop leader, and an able staff officer.”183  Edson was not above invoking the 
Raiders’ favor with high command in his attempt to secure Berry’s transfer, frankly 
explaining that “COMINCH [Adm. King] has directed these two battalions be organized 
and trained for active operations at the earliest possible date.  As a result, the 
Commandant has directed that we be given priority on personnel and equipment over 
other units in the Corps.”184   
Edson also found only three of his five incumbent company commanders suitable 
for special operations works and petitioned for the transfer of officers that he personally 
knew to be “younger, more active and aggressive…well-grounded in infantry tactics.”185  
Additionally, Edson requested lieutenants of “above average ability for their rank…”186  
Edson was not given true carte blanche. Many of his requests were rebuffed, including 
his petition for Berry.  He did receive the transfer of Major Samuel B. Griffith II, a 
veteran officer recently returned from observing the British Commandos.  Griffith would 
prove to be a valuable asset and capable leader for the Raiders.  Nevertheless, he ensured 
that the officers of the 1st Raiders were much more “hand-picked” than in any other 
Marine battalion; indeed, it has been claimed that they were “the most eminently 
qualified and experienced ever assembled in one Marine battalion.”187   
On the West Coast, Evans Carlson’s newly-minted 2nd Raider Battalion had no 
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pre-existing template like 1/5 provided the 1st Raiders.  Carlson had to create the 2nd 
Raiders out of whole cloth.  This was not particularly troubling to him; in fact, Carlson 
recognized that this represented the just the opportunity he had been waiting for.  On 
learning of his appointment as the Commanding Officer (CO) of the 2nd Raider Battalion, 
Carlson elatedly wrote his father: 
At last I have received a break.  Today I was placed in command of a special unit 
with carte blanche to organize, train, and indoctrinate it as I see fit.  There is 
nothing like it in existence in the country.  Naturally, I’m delighted.  I will hand 
pick my personnel.  Jimmy Roosevelt is to be my executive officers . . . . Things 
seem to be moving in a direction that I have so long urged and had almost 
despaired of seeing materialize.  But now I have been afforded the opportunity to 
practice some of the precepts I have been preaching these past years.188 
 
 
Carlson proceeded to fill the ranks of the 2nd Raiders with volunteers from the 
ranks of the 2nd Marine Division. During his tenure as regimental operations officer of the 
2nd Marines in 1941, Carlson had put the regiment through a grueling march and field 
exercises, a simulation of his trek with the 8th Route Army, in the mountains of southern 
California.  The pace and conditions were so demanding that many dropped out along the 
way; however, Carlson had made special note of those who rose to the challenge.  Now 
that he commanded his own battalion, he sought to persuade the survivors of the 
miniature “long march” to join the Raiders. The remainder of the volunteers were 
recruited from the 2nd Marine Division, which was then receiving a flood of new recruits.  
Most of these recruits came from the Western states and were presumably already 
accustomed to the rigors of outdoor life.189  
Carlson had a very clear goal in mind for his Raider battalion from the outset.  In 
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order to achieve those goals, he had to have the right kind of Marine.  Carlson and James 
Roosevelt recruited and personally interviewed prospective Raiders – enlisted, NCO, and 
officer.  The rumor quickly circulated through the 2nd Marine Division that Carlson was 
searching for “the crème de la crème, the Marine of the Marines,” for his new “rugged, 
suicide” outfit.190  Prospective Raiders were questioned thoroughly, and given no 
illusions as to what they were signing up for:  “I promise you nothing but hardships and 
danger . . . When we get to battle, we ask no mercy, we give none.”191  His first questions 
were the same for all:  “Why do you want to fight? What’s the war about? What’re we 
fighting for?”192  Carlson was most interested in the attitudes of his volunteers, telling 
James Roosevelt not to take “a man who doesn’t give a damn about anything.  But if he 
has a deep feeling about wanting to fight, even for the wrong reasons, take him.  I know I 
can shape him into wanting to fight for the right reasons.”193  With some 3,000 Marines 
expressing interest in joining the 2nd Raiders, Carlson could and did select only the most 
qualified.194  Carlson boasted, “We have combed 6000 men to secure the 600 which 
comprise this organization.”195 
Though the 1st and 2nd Raider Battalions developed along divergent lines, they 
both shared a commitment to an all-volunteer status.  Edson’s 1st Raiders had proven 
themselves under his training regime, and the restructuring of that battalion brought an 
influx of volunteers, as well as certain officers specifically selected by Edson.  Though it 
was not technically all-volunteer, it certainly was one of the most (if not the most) 
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specially tailored outfit in the 1942 Marine Corps.  Carlson’s 2nd Raiders were quite 
literally hand-picked, “double volunteers” eager to set themselves apart from the norm.  
In both cases, the Raiders were quickly establishing their mystique as the elite of the 
Marine Corps.  The Raiders could easily be considered ranking among the Guardsmen 
elites as delineated by Showalter. 
 
The Raiders as Technicians 
The Raiders’ status as Technician elites emerged as a natural function of their 
special operations mission.  The Marine Corps’ institutional mission of amphibious 
assaults – a type of assault so hazardous as to be deemed all but impossible by most other 
militaries during the interwar period – made them the recognized experts during World 
War II. According to Showalter, the development and skillful execution of the 
amphibious war in the Pacific was a major factor in cementing the Marine Corps’ status 
as an elite military institution. But the Raiders took that amphibious training and 
expertise to a new level.196  
Amphibious assault doctrine as developed during the 1930s called for the assault 
of beaches which were presumably heavily defended.  Overcoming this disadvantage 
required amassing both naval and air superiority in the area.  Such superiority allowed for 
the methodical bombardment of defenses, including both naval gunfire and air support.  
The landing force would take advantage of the confusion and destruction wrought by the 
                                                 
196 See Holland Smith’s comments on the Battle of Gallipoli, and the different lessons gleaned from it by 
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bombardment, but still relied on heavy firepower to rapidly expand the beachhead. The 
assault of defended beaches proved to be one of the more complex endeavors of World 
War II, involving precise coordination between services on all levels, a massive logistical 
effort, and the continued reliance on supporting arms and firepower.  However, the 
Raiders were designed to fulfill a special role, a different type of amphibious mission.  
The Raiders, as originally conceived by Smith and Edson, served as the fast striking force 
that would supplement the main thrust of the amphibious invasion.197  They were focused 
on quick, quiet insertions, either for surprise strikes on strategic targets or securing 
beachheads for the main assault forces. The Raiders were roughly analogous with the 
paratroops, another type of special forces unit birthed in World War II. Like the 
paratroops, the Raiders could directly supplement an assault force, strike at targets on the 
enemy’s flanks and rear areas, or create diversions to distract the enemy’s attention from 
the main thrust.  Also like the paratroops, the Raiders were designed to be self-sufficient 
for brief periods, but relied on either relief by conventional forces or extraction in 
relatively short order.198 
From the outset, the Raiders had to prepare for a variety of potential missions, 
including reconnaissance, diversions, raids, flank attacks, or even full landings in support 
of conventional troops.  Never certain exactly what they would be called upon to do, the 
Raiders knew that they had to be prepared to be self-sufficient in any situation.  Once 
they were in battle, they would be on their own for the most part, and thus had to develop 
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made by Edson himself, with the notable exception that, “A parachute battalion, once committed, must 
operate in the general forces.  They cannot withdraw from action by the same route which they used at the 
beginning of the engagement.  On the other hand, an APD battalion should always have some chance of 
withdrawal from the beach and reembarkation on its destroyer transport.”  Edson, “Recommended 
Organization,” 1st Raider Battalion Unit File, MCUA. 
 75 
 
certain capabilities over and above standard amphibious assault training.  The Raider 
battalion were designed to be as mobile and flexible as possible, and to get the maximum 
offensive effectiveness out of a light infantry battalion.  This was reflected in their 
grueling and highly specialized training.  The specialized training they received to 
perform raids and other special warfare missions established the Raiders as emergent 
Technician elites. 
The entire structure of the Raider battalions was designed around the operating 
capacity of the fast APDs. However, the Raiders anticipated using even more 
unconventional platforms, such as submarines, to insert to their mission areas when 
needed.  Edson envisioned his Raiders as specialized light infantry, performing hit-and-
run raids in support of larger amphibious operations.  Even before formal designation as a 
Raider battalion, Edson had anticipated that the missions of his APD battalion: 
[M]ay embody any or all of the following:  
(a) Reconnaissance. 
(b) Feints or demonstrations. 
(c) Raids. 
(d) Secondary landings or diversions on one or both flanks of a main 
landing. 
(e) Flank attacks aimed at lines of communications or reserves in rear of 
the main beach defense. 
(f) Seizure of an initial beach head to cover the landing of the force. 
(g) Main landing executed as a combat team attached to a regiment or an 
infantry division.199 
Raider training was shaped by the need to be able to respond to any of these 
contingencies.  Edson wanted his Raiders to be flexible, equally able to operate as a 
whole battalion or as individual companies.  His anticipation of operating in 
“detachments varying in strength from a platoon or a company . . . to the entire 
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battalion,” often “on two or more widely separated and mutually unsupported beaches,” 
explained his pressing insistence on initiative and ability to operate independently.200   
To assure the element of surprise meant that the Raiders had to master stealth 
landings.  While the Raiders were capable of working in a variety of landing craft, their 
favored method of ship-to-shore transport was rubber boats.  Edson’s Raiders emphasized 
night operations with the rubber boats, eventually perfecting their methods to the point 
where they could disembark, land, and move towards their objectives without verbal 
commands.  In addition to the difficulty of mastering night landings, Edson further 
anticipated that the most ideal beaches would be the most defended.  Raider landings 
would more likely “be executed on beaches protected by a coral reef or other natural 
obstacles . . . and which are backed by steep cliffs or rugged terrain.”201  He concluded 
that, “mobility will be a primary factor” for the Raiders.  Since they had no capacity for 
motor transport organic to their battalions, the Raiders would take into battle on that 
which could be carried by hand, and “this equipment should be as light as possible 
commensurate with adequate firepower.”202 
Edson’s training regime reflected his understanding of the role the Raiders would 
fill.  Encouraging individual initiative and aggressiveness to seize the offensive 
momentum were hallmarks of Edson’s training program: “During conferences with his 
junior officers, Colonel Edson outlines the broad pictures and allows the juniors to supply 
the details subject to his approval . . . . With all his strictness, Colonel Edson keeps the 
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welfare of his men uppermost in mind.”203  Physical fitness was a top priority, with a 
heavy emphasis on endurance and speed on hikes over rough terrain.  Lee Minier of the 
1st Raiders wrote of hikes of 15 to 20 miles a day, with part of the march spent running 
“like the devil himself was after us.”204  Correspondent William McCahill, after 
observing the 1st Raiders’ training regime at Quantico, marveled at the “perfect physical 
conditioning of the First Raiders.”205 Edson, himself an expert with a rifle, placed a heavy 
emphasis on small arms proficiency for his Raiders.  He considered it “essential that 
every officer and man in this battalion become thoroughly indoctrinated in the spirit and 
technique of hand-to-hand fighting.”206  He wrote directly to Commandant Holcomb to 
secure the re-activation of retired Marine Col. A.J. Drexel Biddle, widely acknowledged 
as “the best instructor of the Marine Corps” for teaching hand-to-hand and bladed 
weapon techniques.207  He frequently sent his men for specialized training, so they could 
then instruct the battalion.  As Edson learned in Nicaragua, knowledge of the jungle, how 
to navigate through it and how to fight in it, was of utmost importance.  Consequently, 
land navigation (both day and night) and “wood lore” were stressed in Raider training.208 
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Lee Minier described the rigorous training of the 1st Raiders while they were at 
Quantico in early 1942.  Some days were spent marching in the Virginia hills before 
executing maneuvers and field problems all night; others found the Raiders learning to 
handle their rubber boats on the Potomac River in the cold of winter, only to depart on an 
all-night hike that same evening.  He wrote to his mother in tongue-in-cheek fashion, 
“I’ve been thinking I’d like to raise hell with the Colonel about this and several other 
things I want straightened out around here.  But seriously the Colonel is a pretty good egg 
and walks with the rest of us wherever we go.”209 
On the nation’s other coast, Carlson likewise trained his freshly recruited Raiders 
to a razor’s edge.  Carlson wanted his men to become accustomed to living under less 
than ideal conditions, so he had them establish a Spartan camp at a location known as 
Jacques Farm at Camp Elliott, California, where the bulk of their training occurred. He 
held that “In order to lick the Japanese we must out-hike, out-smart and out-shoot him,” 
and hence in the training of the 2nd Raiders “emphasis is on speed of movement on foot, 
endurance, self-sufficiency and great fire-power.”210  Carlson shared with Edson a firm 
belief that “Conditioning for long marches loaded with field equipment is a ‘must’ on the 
training schedule.”211  In his view, “The entire training program should be so framed as to 
develop the prime requisites of initiative, resourcefulness, control of small groups in the 
jungles, stalking, instantaneous reaction in ambushes and aggressive action at all 
                                                                                                                                                 
March 1942, Edson Papers, LOC, p.3. McCahill also noted that “Colonel Edson demands that his men be 
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times.”212  The men endured constant physical training, supplemented by rapid-pace 
hikes of twenty miles or more; they were drilled in every conceivable discipline they may 
need: “Calisthenics, swimming, running, hiking, jungle tactics, map reading, 
camouflaging, jungle hygiene, demolitions, sharpshooting, street fighting, cliff scaling, 
and sniping.”213   
In describing the missions of the Raiders, Carlson laid out similar goals as those 
of Edson, with one notable addition.  Carlson envisioned his Raiders as a force capable of 
“(1) Hit and run raids; (2) Spearhead landing operations calling for landing by stealth in 
rubber boats on beaches ordinarily regarded as inaccessible . . . .  (3) Guerrilla operations 
for a protracted period behind the enemy’s lines.”214  Inspired by his experience with the 
Chinese and hoping to return to aid their fight against Japan, Carlson incorporated a 
heavy emphasis on guerrilla warfare. He wanted his battalion to be as self-sustaining as 
possible for operations deep behind enemy lines.  For this end, Carlson placed great value 
on what he called “individual cookery,” training each Raider to carry and prepare his own 
rations, as often as not consisting of a minimal amount of rice, with some dried food or 
food concentrate cubes.215  This would be supplemented by food “liberated” from the 
enemy and by living off of the land, as Carlson had learned to do in China with the 8th 
Route Army.   
The Raiders’ perfection of specialty crafts, such as the fast-strike raid, guerrilla 
operations, and stealth insertions via rubber boats, demonstrates their accession to the 
Technician elite as laid out by Showalter.  Additionally, their honing of a particularly 
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demanding form of amphibious assault made the Raiders a highly specialized subset of 
Technician elites.  As a force drawn from a body of elite “shock troops,” and then given 
specialized training to perform an extraordinary mission, the Raiders truly were a doubly 
elite force, the special operators of a corps d’elite.  The Raiders present a rather unique 
case among the special forces units of the Second World War, though certain parallels 
can be drawn with other specially purposed units, such as the specially trained 
Fallschirmjager unit that led the German assault on Eben Emael or the Pathfinder Force 
of RAF Bomber Command.  It was not mere self-selection or self-proclamation that set 
them apart.  The Raiders truly were a highly-trained and specialized group of U.S. 
Marines.216 
 
The Raiders and Internal Conflicts 
Proceeding from their initial formation in February 1942, the Raiders established 
their reputation quickly.  As new members were assimilated into the Raider ranks and 
training proceeded apace, a distinctly elite subculture evolved rapidly, establishing a 
separate identity for the Marine Raiders.  However, this evolution did not proceed 
inevitably or smoothly.  The Raiders, whose very origins were in strife, continued to be 
plagued by institutional strife – not only with their brethren in the Marine Corps at large, 
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but also within the Raider battalions. 
When the Raiders were initially established, Holcomb desired to build the 2nd 
Raiders on a foundational company of Edson’s already proficient 1st Raiders.217  Edson 
dutifully detached Able Company to California.  Upon arrival, Captain Wilbur Meyerhoff 
of Able Company found that “the set up was quite different than we had anticipated.”218  
Rather than accepting them, Carlson made the former 1st Raiders go through the same 
process as the raw-recruit volunteers.     
The majority of Carlson’s volunteers from the 2nd Marine Division were recruits 
fresh out of boot camp, lacking in experience but full of desire.  Carlson did not see that 
as a disadvantage.  In fact, he preferred it that way, in order to ensure that they would be 
“amenable to his training philosophy and uncorrupted by that of others.”219  When he 
received world that a reinforced rifle company of Edson’s 1st Raiders was en route, 
Carlson was not at all pleased.  He promptly dissolved Able Company, 1st Raider 
Battalion, and required those who were willing to re-volunteer for service with the 2nd 
Raiders. Subjected to such indignity, only “About half the transferees volunteered for this 
[Carlson’s] battalion and, of them, about fifty were accepted.”220  Those who did then had 
to pass his psychological screening interview.  This of course was taken as a profound 
insult by the former 1st Raiders, even with those few who were accepted into the 2nd 
Raiders:  “This was a hell of a mess and most of us tried to ‘qualify’. . . we were proud . . 
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. and just could not stand rejection by the West Coast mob.”221  Carlson was not about to 
let his organization be colored by the methods and ideas of Edson.  One officer of the 2nd 
Raiders later accused Carlson of deliberately segregating the former Edson’s Raiders “to 
prevent contamination of his raiders.”222  The remainder of Able Company was dissolved 
and scattered across various billets in the 2nd Marine Division.  Meyerhoff reported of his 
former company:   
The majority of the men were sorry to leave the First [Raider] Battalion.  Many 
were disappointed when the dissolution of “A” Company Reinforced was 
effected, for the remainder of the company was scattered at random throughout 
the Fleet Marine Force.  I did not particularly like the transaction for, although 
many good men were transferred to the [2nd] Raider Battalion, there still remained 
the nucleus of an excellent line company.  However, the Division did what it 
deemed best.223 
 
Some twenty seven members of former Able Company petitioned Edson himself for 
return to the 1st Raiders, pleading that “We would gladly pay our fare back to get into our 
former outfit again if such is possible.”224  Edson was furious about this fait accompli, but 
he had no authority to recall them after they were detached from his command.225 
The rejection of Able Company infuriated Edson.  He never forgave Carlson, whom he 
had never held in high regard anyway.  As if learning his loss had been almost 
completely in vain was not bad enough, Price rubbed salt in the wound by insinuating 
that the “very bad impression” made by the former 1st Raiders was Edson’s fault:  “Either 
there is an entirely different impression in the East as to what these men are to do and the 
type of men required effectively to do it or someone has made a serious bust.”226  Price 
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hinted that an official complaint was in the offing, warning Edson that “the angel of 
wrath is abroad.”227   
Edson responded to Price’s accusations bluntly, noting that he was “pretty sore 
about” Carlson’s rejection of Able Company228  He could see no reason why his Raiders 
would fail to pass the muster.  He made his grievances abundantly clear in his rebuttal to 
Price: 
The implications in your letter, tended only to increase my anger and 
disgust at what I consider to be an unjust and prejudicial attitude . . . . I do 
not know what you or Carlson expected to get.  I do know what I sent you: 
a well trained rifle company, machine gun platoon and 81-mm mortar 
section, which represented more than a third of my battalion.  In my 
opinion, and in the opinion of others who have seen it perform in the field 
and in maneuvers, it was, until I sent this detail to Carlson, the best 
battalion on the east coast and as good or better than any similar outfit in 
the 2nd Division.229   
 
Noting that his company had been composed almost entirely of veterans of several years’ 
service, including time spent in intensive training with 1/5 and the APD Battalion, Edson 
reasoned that “It is unbelievable that they have no place in any organization which is 
made up largely from recruits as I believe is the case in the 2nd Division.”230  Rejection of 
most of them and their subsequent dispersal at random throughout the 2nd Division was 
“not so much a reflection upon the quality of men sent as upon the prejudicial attitude 
and ignorance of the officers under your command.”231   
Edson did not shy away telling Price in no uncertain terms exactly what he 
thought of Carlson – “Whatever Carlson’s so-called standards may be, his refusal to 
accept three out of four of these men only confirmed my opinion that the Marine Corps 
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had lost nothing by his resignation a few years ago and has gained nothing by his 
return.”232 As for Carlson’s executive (upon whom Price had attempted to shift some 
blame), Edson noted, “It is true that Jimmie Roosevelt has connection with high officials 
in this country.  It is also true that he is a reserve captain with very limited military 
experience as an officer in the Marine Corps.”233  Edson frankly acknowledged, even 
welcomed, the possibility of an official complaint, but noted that if and when such 
complaint was made, he would involve his “immediate superior in command” –Holland 
M. Smith.234  This broadside gave Price pause, and he immediately struck a more 
conciliatory tone.  Edson had “entirely missed the point,” Price claimed, since his letter 
“was intended in the most benevolent and friendly spirit.”235  Price astutely decided to let 
the matter drop.  
As Marine historian Joseph Alexander summed up the situation, “A natural 
rivalry emerged between the 1st and 2nd Raider Battalions, but an unfortunate enmity also 
developed and festered, a resentment that stemmed almost entirely from the mandated 
transfer of the reinforced rifle company from Edson to Carlson during February 1942.”236  
It took years for this rivalry to die down.  Questions over the chronology and origins of 
the Raiders persisted through the post-war years, with many erroneous public assertions 
that Carlson was the sole originator of the Raider concept.  The oft-repeated claim that 
the 1st Raiders were “first in name, but not origin,” caused Edson and other veterans of 
the 1st Raiders no small annoyance.237  Even after the war, many veterans of the 1st Raider 
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Battalion remained aloof from their 2nd Raider counterparts.  Veterans of the 1st Raiders, 
at the suggestion of Lew Walt, formally established the Edson’s Raiders Association in 
February 1950.  Membership was open only to those who had served in the 1st Raiders; 
former 2nd Raiders were excluded.238  Walt felt this decision was fully justified, for “As 
Raider battalions, there was no special feeling of comradeship or any close physical 
association between the four Raider battalions.  In fact, there was an opposite type of 
feeling between the First and Second Raider Battalions, at least throughout the first 
months of their existence.”239 
Thus, solidarity was lacking between the two specialized, elite battalions.  Though 
they both shared the name and reputation of “Raider Marines,” they shared little else.  
The intra-Raider strife occasioned by differing personalities and visions of the Raiders’ 
mission and purpose can be seen as a microcosm of the strife that ensued between the 
Raiders and the main body of the Marine Corps, and is just one illustration of the 
potential pitfalls of conflicting loyalties that can accompany the creation of elite units.   
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The nature of their mission and the circumstances surrounding their creation 
practically guaranteed that there would be friction between the Raiders and the Marine 
regular ground forces.  The seeds of jealousy against the Raiders were sown in their early 
days when the Raiders enjoyed favored status in almost every area.  Much of the friction 
started as resentment of preferential treatment, both real and perceived.  The Raider 
method of acquiring personnel garnered much bitterness among other Marines.  The 
Marine Corps had a general shortage of experienced personnel in early 1942; officers and 
NCOs with the experience and training provided by years of service in the Corps were in 
high demand as the Corps sought to rapidly train and assimilate thousands of raw 
recruits, transforming them from fresh recruits to battle-ready Marines.  The coopting of 
prime personnel, officer and enlisted, by the Raiders was one of the foremost complaints 
leveled against them.  The Raiders, with their promise of exciting clandestine action and 
special operations élan, siphoned off a disproportionate number of bright, energetic 
officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted Marines.  This drain on resources came 
at a time when men could scarcely be spared.240   
In later years, Vandegrift complained of the difficulties caused to his 1st Marine 
Division in March 1942 when “Merritt Edson, armed with appropriate orders, arrived to 
comb our units for officers and men deemed suitable for his 1st Raider Battalion . . . . 
Edson’s levy against our division, coming at such a critical time, annoyed the devil out of 
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me, but there wasn’t one earthly thing I could do about it.”241  Vandegrift’s West Coast 
counterpart, Charles Price, faced a similar predicament when Evans Carlson began 
recruiting Raiders out of the already depleted ranks of the new 2nd Marine Division.  
Carlson enjoyed wide latitude in his recruiting, picking out the cream of the crop to form 
“a really handpicked outfit.”242  Price felt that his best course of action was to handle the 
2nd Raiders with kid gloves, as “this commando business is a hobby with high authorities 
in our nation and Capt. James R. is the Executive of the Bn.”243  Outsiders quickly 
perceived that Carlson had “top priority of men and material in the Fleet Marine Force 
here” – as one 2nd Raider officer put it, “no one interferes with us.  No red tape.”244  By 
drawing away these volunteers, the Raiders concentrated some of the best and brightest 
Marines in the Corps into two individual battalions.245   
The concentration of high achieving personnel into select units is a common 
criticism of elite units of all varieties.  Segregation of military bodies in this way is often 
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perceived to have a negative effect on the “non-elite” units.  As the discussion of elite 
theory in previous chapters illustrates, elites are typically defined in negatives – hence, 
elite status confers not only explicit superiority to the elite group, but also implies the 
inferiority of the remaining, “non-elite” group.  In a Corps which considers each Marine a 
member of an elite force, elevating one unit as even more elite than the Corps norm 
carries the potential for conflict – conferring such elite status on special units can be 
interpreted as casting negatives on the elite status of the remainder of the Corps.246 
Another factor which contributed to the perceptions of elitism and separate status 
that surround the Raiders was their unorthodox requirements for special weapons and 
equipment.  The Raiders frequently requested – and received – weaponry above and 
beyond that of the standard Marine infantry battalion.  Both Edson and Carlson believed 
that the success of the Raiders depended on their ability to move rapidly and bring 
concentrated firepower to bear, and structured their new battalions accordingly.  With his 
rifle companies trimmed down to fit onboard the APDs, Edson knew that the Raiders 
could only rely on those weapons that were man-portable.  He made modifications to his 
battalion accordingly.  The 81mm mortars of the standard infantry battalion were 
replaced by the lighter 60mm mortars.  The standard platoon of 1st Raiders had a 
“armament, all of World War I vintage [like the rest of the Marine Corps], but by no 
means ineffective, consisted of six .30-caliber, bolt action, Springfield [1903] rifles and 
two .30-caliber Browning automatic rifles (BARs).”247  Edson’s requisitions were usually 
taken seriously, though hampered by shortages.  When he called the quartermaster at 
HQMC to request additional light machine guns for his battalion, he was referred directly 
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to the Commandant with the quartermaster’s advice that “I believe your request will meet 
with approval, in view of the specific duties assigned to your battalion.”248  Unable to 
procure the new M1 Garand rifle, and with Thompson submachine guns in scarce supply, 
Edson requested an increased supply of scoped Springfield 1903 rifles for his rifle 
companies, and a supply of Reising submachine guns for Raider officers and NCOs.  
Some of his requests were fruitless, such as his requests for the experimental Johnson 
light machine gun and for Bangalore torpedoes, though he did acquire twelve Boys .55 
caliber anti-tank rifles special ordered from Canada.  Though still bound by the general 
scarcity of combat weapons and ammunition in early 1942, Edson still managed to ensure 
that his outfit was armed with the best that could be had at the time.249   
On the West Coast, Evans Carlson enjoyed almost as free a hand in acquiring the 
latest weaponry for his Raiders as he had in recruiting them.  Like the 1st Raiders, the 2nd 
Raiders limited the size of their rifle companies to fit the capacity of the APDs.  
However, in the attempt to achieve the maximum firepower possible, Carlson turned his 
attention to procuring as many automatic weapons as could be found, with enviable 
success.  Unlike Edson’s Raiders, the 2nd Raiders would go into battle equipped with the 
new M1 Garand semi-automatic rifle, numerous Thompson sub-machine guns, and 
additional BARs.  As 2nd Raider officer Oscar Peatross stated, “The firepower of our 
Raider squad (three BARs, three Thompson submachine guns, and four M-1 rifles . . .) 
was now superior to that known to exist in any unit of comparable size in the world and 
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was far superior to that of the rifle squad of the Marine infantry battalion (two BARs and 
six Springfield rifles).”250 Similar to the 1st Raiders, the 2nd Raiders carried 60mm 
mortars, the Browning light machine gun, and the Boys AT rifle; they also became fond 
of the Winchester shotgun for use in jungle firefights.  The 2nd Raiders further gained 
notoriety for their unique fighting knives.  The Raider stiletto, a nimble weapon designed 
to neutralize enemy sentries, was specially designed for the Raider battalions.  Later, the 
2nd Raiders also adopted the “Gung Ho knife,” a unique, all-purpose Bowie knife that 
proved very useful in jungle environments.  Both of these unique blades became iconic 
symbols of the Raiders.251   
Non-standard weapons were not the only thing separating the Raiders from other 
Marine infantry battalions.  They also distinguished themselves via an array of unique 
uniform items and equipment.  Both Raider battalions were issued “Raider boots.” 
Similar to the jump boots of the airborne divisions, these coveted boots were a significant 
improvement over the standard issue “boondockers” of the day.  The 1st Raiders had their 
share of unique uniform requests.  Part of the impetus for customizing the gear came 
from the Raiders themselves, as they “never hesitated to let their officers know how they 
felt about the weapons and gear they were expected to carry into combat [and] Edson and 
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Griffith listened.”252  Edson further wrote to the Commandant directly, requesting a litany 
of non-standard items, including camo helmet covers, air compressors for inflation of 
rubber boats, and collapsible bicycles – in vain, as it turned out, as none of these items 
would be forthcoming.  The 2nd Raiders customized their uniforms even more.  Lt. 
Apergis reported that the 2nd Raiders “has priority on equipment out here.  So far we have 
special uniforms and aviation helmets . . . We have a ten inch shoe which is similar to the 
ones the Colonel has [i.e. Raider boots].”253  Carlson frankly admitted that “The whole 
thing [uniform] is unorthodox, in the military sense, but it will do the job.  Our pack, for 
example, is designed from a hunting jacket.  It doesn’t look smart, but it enables a man to 
carry the essentials of life on long, swift marches with a minimum of inconvenience.”254  
He dryly added that such ideas “are meeting with opposition from the orthodox brass 
hats.”255 
The almost unlimited access to specialized weapons and gear certainly made an 
impression throughout the rest of the Marine Corps.  Even rumors that would otherwise 
be outlandish seemed plausible for the Raiders.  One officer matter-of-factly repeated a 
rumor that “As you know, Carlson had bows and arrows.”256  Besides starting rumors, 
such treatment generated resentment, as can be sensed in the derision more orthodox 
Marines had for the “Boy Scout equipment” Carlson had attempted to implement.257  A 
final aspect of the Raider battalions that remains rather unique to them is their indelible 
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association with the names of the first two Commanding Officers of the Raider battalions.  
Even though both Edson and Carlson were eventually promoted out of their battalions, 
they were and continue to be known as “Edson’s Raiders” and “Carlson’s Raiders,” 
something of an anomaly among Marine Corps infantry battalions. 
 
Carlson’s Gung Ho Raiders: A Special Case 
Carlson’s battalion presents a special case in Marine Corps history.  It would 
hardly be an exaggeration to describe Carlson’s Raiders as not just a hand-picked outfit, 
but a hand-crafted one.  Carlson intended more than the creation of the most efficient 
guerrilla outfit in the world.  He intended to make the 2nd Raiders quite possibly the most 
unique battalion of the war – certainly the most unique in the Corps.  Almost everything 
about them diverged from Marine Corps norms, and from military norms generally.  This 
of course did not usually engender much enthusiasm from the majority of Marine Corps 
officers, prompting reactions ranging from indifference to antipathy.  The resentment 
garnered by Carlson’s unorthodox methodologies was certainly a major factor in the 
disdain that many career Marines felt towards the Raider battalions.258  
Executive Privilege?  Carlson’s personal relationship with the Commander-in-
Chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt, raised eyebrows among his fellow Marine officers.  His 
continued personal correspondence with the President, completely independent of the 
normal chain of command, was viewed with suspicion by many.  Their correspondence, 
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established during Carlson’s China days, continued through the creation of the Raiders.  
The President responded as warmly to Carlson’s updates as he had to his China reports:  
“I am delighted to have your letter and to know that all goes so well with you.  What you 
tell me about the new outfit is most interesting and surely there will be a chance to use 
it.”259  Carlson’s correspondence with Roosevelt was hardly a secret, leading to the 
widely held belief that “Second Raiders will never need any artillery support.  Carlson’s 
always got twenty-one guns [a slang reference to the President] in his hip pocket.”260 
 The fact that Roosevelt’s son conveniently served as Carlson’s executive officer 
did nothing to assuage the widely-held impressions of presidential favoritism.  James 
Roosevelt recognized that Carlson’s personal access to the President generated 
unfavorable impressions, even before the Raider experiment was launched.261  Despite 
his lack of traditional experience, Roosevelt did earn the respect and admiration of the 
Marines he served with.  Said Raider James Alverson, “If you are ever around and you 
hear it said that Jimmie Roosevelt got where he is because he is the President’s son, tell 
‘em to say it rather softly if there are any marines around.”262  Raider officer Oscar 
Peatross admired Roosevelt’s tenacity and willingness to serve in the most hazardous 
combat duty, despite his pedigree and history of gastrointestinal illness.  The Raiders, 
Peatross noted, could see that “He [Roosevelt] was thin, he wasn’t very strong or robust 
sort of person, but a very gutty person, very much a doer.  Well, from that point of view I 
                                                 
259 F.D. Roosevelt to Carlson, 12 March 1942, Carlson File, HDRB.  Of course, Roosevelt had even more 
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think everybody admired him.”263  Fellow 2nd Raider officer Charles Banks echoed this 
perception, noting that Roosevelt “was a very fine officer and a born politicians.  I think 
he was a real credit for the Marine Corps, and I think he did a damn good job in the 
Marine Corps.”264   
In addition to being a capable executive officer, James Roosevelt proved a boon 
to the 2nd Raider Battalion.  The Raiders found that “having the President’s son as our 
executive officer was a big help in procuring special arms and equipment.”265 Roosevelt’s 
name on a requisition letter was also known to magically procure sizeable numbers of 
everything from jungle hammocks to Raider boots.  Roosevelt’s postwar explanations of 
his role in early 1942 are conflicting.  He once admitted that Carlson had assigned him to 
requisition for specially issued Raider boots, knives, and state-of-the-art radios, but 
denied that his father had anything to do with the requisitions.  He pled naivety, stating 
“But I guess now, being realistic, the fact that I, as the son of the President, would walk 
into the quartermaster’s office and say ‘I gotta have this and I gotta have that,’ maybe 
was the part of the reason at least that we got it.”266  In later years, James Roosevelt was 
even more candid about his role, claiming that he undertook such requisitions on his own 
initiative, asserting that “I was able to use my influence to get ‘Carlson’s Raiders’ the 
special equipment we needed  . . . . And of course there was some resentment at our 
getting equipment others could not get.”267  Regardless of which version is closest to the 
truth, the perception that James endowed Carlson with special privileges persisted.  
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Peatross, himself a 2nd Raider and supporter of Carlson, aptly described the perceptions 
within the Raider battalion in no uncertain terms:  “Well, Carlson had [James] Roosevelt 
with him, you know, and he was the son of the ‘great king.’  He could get most anything 
he wanted between the two of them.”268  Such was the perception amongst the Raiders, 
who benefited from the familial associations of their executive officer, to say nothing of 
perceptions of those outside the Raiders.   
Raider Innovation.  In keeping with his generally unorthodox character, Carlson 
brought a unique structure and practices to his Raider battalion.  Some of his methods 
were met with cold suspicion by his fellow Marines, while others had a permanent impact 
on the basic structure of the Marine Corps for years to come.  Carlson’s most notable 
innovation was the development and refinement of the fire team as the basic structure of 
the Marine infantry company.   
Carlson’s virtual carte blanche did in fact have some limitations, but he still 
managed to tailor the organization of his battalion to better suit his concept of the 
Raiders’ mission.  The most significant change implemented in the 2nd Raiders was the 
reorganization of the rifle squad, then typically composed of nine Marines: six riflemen, 
two automatic riflemen, and a squad leader.  Concerned that this arrangement was 
unwieldy in actual combat scenarios because the squad leader would not be able to keep 
in close contact with each member of his squad, Carlson called together his Raider 
officers to brainstorm a new method.  The result was the subdivision of the squad into 
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three “fire teams” of three men each, all under the command of the squad leader.  Each 
fire team was designed to “provide the squad leader optimum control over his men and 
their firepower.”269  The fire teams each included two men and a fire team leader, who 
reported in turn to the squad leader; under this arrangement, the squad leader now only 
had to coordinate his three fire team leaders, while the fire team leaders coordinated the 
fire and maneuver of their fire team members.  This system paradoxically allowed for 
both increased command and control and increased small unit independence, as it was 
considerably easier for the three man fire team to react and respond to any variety of 
situation than it was for the standard nine man squad.  Carlson ensured that his fire teams 
were built around automatic weapons; each fire team included a BAR, a Thompson 
submachine gun, and a new M1 Garand semi-automatic rifle for the team leader.  “This 
type of organization,” he reasoned, “has the advantages of mobility, flexibility, and great 
fire power.  It provides a team which can hold its own against an enemy force three or 
four times its strength, and can easily destroy any force of equal strength.”270 
The innovative approach of the 2nd Raider Battalion, with some modifications, 
became the standard operating procedure for the entirety of the Marine Corps by the end 
of the war.  Carlson is frequently described as the originator of the fire team idea and 
practice, but there is some question on this matter.  Seeking adequate command and 
tactical control of small units on the battlefield was certainly not new to the Marine 
Corps; tactical units based on groups of three or four date back to ancient times.  Various 
examples of them had cropped up in the American military from the late 19th-century 
onward; the Marine Corps’ counter-guerrilla operations in Nicaragua further refined 
                                                 
269 Peatross, Bless ‘Em All, 15.   
270 Carlson to Holcomb, 27 January 1943, Carlson File, HDRB.   
 97 
 
small-unit doctrine.  In 1940, the 4th Marines deployed four-man teams to help suppress 
riots in China.  There is evidence that the 1st Marine Parachute Battalion had 
experimented with three-man fire teams even before the outbreak of hostilities, deploying 
them in summer of 1941.  Credit is occasionally given to Lieutenant Colonel Homer 
Litzenberg’s 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, who formally adopted the fire team after 
conducting rigorous field testing at Camp Pendleton in the summer of 1943; however, 
Litzenberg freely acknowledged that the Raiders had been operating in fire teams for 
some time before the 3/24 experiments.  Carlson’s biographer, Michael Blankfort, 
suggests that Carlson and his fellow Raiders fought tooth-and-nail against HQMC to get 
the fire team idea approved and gives Carlson sole credit for the idea’s eventual adoption 
by the rest of the Corps.  While it is unclear exactly where the idea of fire-teams 
originated, it is generally agreed that “What the Raiders should get credit for is the first 
use of the fire team under fire.” 271    
Furthermore, it is feasible to claim that the 2nd Raiders brought the fire team to the 
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rest of the Marine Corps, albeit in an indirect manner.  Though Edson relied on the 
standard nine-man squad structure, his executive officer, S.B. Griffith, was fascinated 
with the fire team concept, even going so far as to visit Carlson’s California training 
camp to see it in action. Later, when Griffith succeeded Edson as the CO of the 1st Raider 
Battalion, he would implement the fire team in the 1st Raiders for their battles in New 
Georgia. The utility of the three man fire team made an impression on 1st Raider Captain 
Houston Stiff.  Forced stateside by combat wounds, Stiff was reassigned as CO of 
Company L, 3/24, and began implementing the three man fire team idea he had used in 
the Solomon Islands. Stiff’s new commanding officer (Litzenberg), was duly impressed.  
Litzenberg proceeded to initiate the 3/24’s experiments with the fire team, setting in 
motion the events that led to its adoption by the entire Marine Corps later in the war.  
Thus, while Blankfort embellishes Carlson’s role, it is accurate to ascribe his 2nd Raiders 
with being the pioneers of the fire team concept that the Marine Corps came to embrace 
and continues to use today. 272 
The Gung Ho Method.  While the fire team concept would prove to be his most 
far-reaching contribution, Carlson wanted to do far more than change the structure of his 
squads.  He intended nothing less than a grand social experiment, in which his egalitarian 
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ideals would be put into action.273  Carlson’s training regimen proceeded along parallel 
tracks.  The grueling physical exertions of Raider training were one track.  The other was 
civic education.  As Carlson saw it, education – or in his terminology, “ethical 
indoctrination” – was every bit as vital to their success as Raiders and as men as their 
combat training.  Carlson told his Raiders of his journey with 600 Chinese guerrillas of 
the 8th Route Army on a forced march over fifty-eight miles of mountainous terrain.  He 
marveled that not a single soldier had fallen out during the trek.  Carlson once asked one 
of the peasant guerrillas if he was tired.  The guerrilla replied that, “If a man has only 
legs, he gets tired.”274  Carlson later elaborated on the significance of this event for his 
system of Raider training: 
It dawned on me the day I completed a march of 58 miles (93 kilometers) 
without sleep with a column of 600 men, without a man leaving the 
column, an unprecedented record.  What could be the stimulus?  It could 
be nothing else than the desire, the will of each individual to complete the 
task.  Here was the secret weapon of this great Army.  Through systematic 
education each member had received what I came to call ethical 
indoctrination.  He knew why it was necessary to endure great hardships 
and to make great sacrifices.  He knew the value of freedom.  There was 
created within him a desire to do his duty no matter what sacrifice or effort 
it entailed because he knew the performance of that duty was an essential 
step in the direction of attaining the victory which would insure 
freedom.275 
 
Carlson was convinced that it was necessary for his Raiders to know the cause they were 
fighting for – to know why they were willing to lay down their lives.  Carlson recognized 
the value of esprit de corps, of fighting men willing to risk everything for their fellow 
Marines.  But, while esprit de corps was “mighty important, and the Marine Corps has 
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got it to a high degree,” Carlson believed that “when the going gets toughest, when it 
takes a little bit more drive to keep sane and to keep going, and a man is hungry and tired, 
then he needs more than esprit de corps.  It takes conviction.”276  Ethical indoctrination 
was Carlson’s attempt to instill in his Raiders such a conviction, based on knowledge, 
reason, and unwavering commitment to democratic ideals.277  
One of his first actions was to implement the Chinese phrase “Gung Ho” – which 
he interpreted as “work together” – as the motto of Carlson’s Raiders.  “Gung Ho” 
quickly became their hallmark slogan and has since entered the American lexicon at 
large, though it has strayed from its intended meaning.  Michael Blankfort describes 
Carlson’s explanation of this Chinese slogan to his quizzical Raiders: 
“The Chinese have two words for ‘working together,’” he said. “Gung, 
meaning ‘work’; Ho, meaning ‘harmony.’  Gung Ho! ‘Work Together!’  
That is the end result of ethical indoctrination.”  He went on to explain 
that Gung Ho was important to all of them, because they were 
Americans—for it gave them the chance to practice the democracy they 
believed, where no man should have privileges over another man and 
where discipline comes from knowledge…. “We will strive,” he said, “for 
ethical indoctrination, and so I propose that Gung Ho be the spirit and 
slogan of our Raider Battalion.”278 
 
The Gung Ho Raiders would thus be a democratic experiment carried out in the 
unlikeliest of places.  While rank structure and military discipline were not completely 
abolished, they were minimized to an unprecedented degree.  Officers were accorded 
respect based not on rank but on perception of their merit – or lack thereof – by the 
enlisted men.  Many privileges commonly accorded to officers, such as separate messes 
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and sleeping quarters, were abolished. Carlson wanted all of his officers to “cheerfully 
and willingly forego those superficial privileges which ordinarily insulate offices from 
their men and impair mutual sympathy and understanding.  They must share the 
hardships and privations of those they lead and prove by their character and ability their 
qualifications for leadership.  Only in this way could full confidence be engendered and a 
harmony of spirit prevail.”279  Officers were expected to issue only orders that could be 
rationally defended to subordinates, who were themselves encouraged to participate in 
the decision-making process and offer their own opinions.  He lived by his refrain, “I like 
men who think.”280  After-action critiques in which every man present was permitted to 
offer suggestions and criticisms were standard practice in the Raiders.281 
On the presumption that well-informed men make better warriors, Carlson made 
weekly “Gung Ho meetings” a central component of Raider training.  These open forum 
meetings usually opened with singing, followed by informal talks by Carlson on topics 
ranging from the value of democracy to the grand strategy of the war effort.  James 
Roosevelt frequently discussed world events, explaining the events leading to the world 
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war, showing how America had become involved and why America needed to seek total 
victory.  In his time with the Raiders, Marine correspondent Jim Lucas observed that 
Gung Ho meetings could be quite spontaneous, with Raiders bringing complaints, 
suggestions, or questions up for discussion as a unit.  Lucas noted that “Not infrequently, 
when an enlisted man has ‘griped’ about the orders of one of his superiors, the officer is 
called on to explain it to the battalion.  Some heated arguments have followed, and 
usually end with both sides understanding the other.”282  Carlson held that “the force 
which impels men to carry on when going is tough and victory appears to be remote is a 
deep spiritual conviction in the righteousness of the cause for which he fights and in the 
belief that victory will bring an improved social pattern wherein his loved ones and the 
loved ones of future generations will enjoy a greater measure of happiness and well being 
than was his lot.”283  He was careful not to preach party politics.  “We tried,” he recalled, 
“to educate them politically—by that I don’t mean we told them whom to vote for, but 
what to believe in.”284  The Gung Ho meetings were rather free-wheeling affairs; 
discussion topics ranged from strategy and the nature of the enemy to such theoretical 
issues as “The Kind of Social Order We Want after the War” and the desirability of 
mandatory income limits of $25,000 after the war.  Light topics, such as home-spun 
comedy acts, poetry recitations, and singing, also featured prominently in the Gung Ho 
meetings, as did special guests, including Secretary Knox and First Lady Eleanor 
Roosevelt.285 
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Carlson took the opportunity that the Gung Ho sessions afforded him to elaborate 
on his favorite topic – the war in China.  He harbored the sincere belief that his Raiders 
would eventually spearhead the return of the Marines to China.  Such a belief 
undoubtedly shaped his outlook in forming the 2nd Raider Battalion as a guerrilla warfare 
outfit.  His Chinese dream took hold in at least some of the Raiders, who eagerly awaited 
their chance to fight in China. Throughout their training, many Raiders came to identify 
themselves according to Carlson’s vision, as they loudly proclaimed in song:  “We’re 
Raiders—For Democracy. We work together; that’s why were free. Gung Ho! Gung Ho! 
Gung Ho! Ho!”286 
Of course, the idea of a group of elite “Raiders for democracy” is itself 
paradoxical.  The concept of elitism, laden with connotations of inherent superiority, is in 
direct tension with the egalitarian impulses of democracy, especial such an idealistic 
version as Carlson espoused.  But Carlson’s system lent itself to paradox in many ways.  
Consider his insistence on the primacy of the group – the soul of Gung Ho – at the same 
time he “tried to encourage individualism.”287  This could stem in part from his natural 
optimism and faith in mankind, his single-minded focus on the doctrines flowing out of 
1930s China, or his zealous dedication to what he perceived as his higher calling.  Likely, 
it was a combination of these factors.  Phyllis Zimmerman presents the complexities of 
Carlson’s character and idealism in a nutshell when she discusses his belief that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
week before,’ Colonel Carlson said with a grin, ‘We discussed “Shall the Soldier be permitted to vote?”  
One of the boys was a southerner, and we got back into the civil war.  It almost ended in a riot.’” Lucas, 
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beyond China, probably because of his over specialization in that field.”  Bless 'Em All, 6. 
287 Sherrod, Tarawa, 37. 
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Chinese Communists represented “a kind of ‘Revolutionary Christianity’ characterized 
by truth, honesty, selflessness, love and working for the betterment of people.”288  Such 
ideals were the guiding influence on Carlson’s life.  He made every effort to remain true 
to his faith in the good of mankind and the inherent virtue of democracy, even when it 
tended to launch him on crusades that appeared doomed from the outset.  As John 
Wukovits points out, “The quixotic nature of Carlson blinded him to the difficulties.  He 
planned to democratize an organization that, by its very nature, relied on autocracy.”289  
By 1944, it was clear that for all his zeal, Carlson had enjoyed approximately the same 
level of success as Don Quixote had against his windmills. 
The Gung Ho method was not accepted by all hands in the 2nd Raiders. Some 
veteran Marines, NCOs and officers, viewed the Gung Ho method with skepticism or 
outright disdain.  Those who disapproved usually found Carlson’s methods “adolescent, 
but in view of the enthusiasm around them, they kept their feelings to themselves.”290  
Others, such as Charles Lamb, “could not understand or digest Carlson’s double talk,” 
and were more openly “distrustful of his words and methods.”291  More orthodox Marines 
soon shied away from the Raiders as their reputation spread.  Then-Major Alan Shapely 
recalled that Carlson personally asked him to volunteer for the 2nd Raiders; but when 
Shapely heard Carlson say “Well, we don’t pay any attention to rank in the Raiders,” he 
“decided it was a hell of an outfit to be in and I’d have nothing to do with it.”292    
Carlson himself admitted that it was difficult to get his communitarian ideals to take hold 
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at first, for the “Gung Ho spirit” was hindered by “our native background [as Americans] 
in which greed and rugged individualism predominated.”293 In his estimation, “Lack of 
adequate faith is the real cause for our failure to bring the Gung Ho spirit to its highest 
perfection.”294  Conversely, many of the Raiders, especially the younger, enlisted 
Marines, took to the Gung Ho spirit enthusiastically after becoming accustomed to it.  
Carlson’s popularity with the enlisted men soared.  Oscar Peatross recalled fondly that 
“there is no doubt in my mind that the rank and file of the 2d Raider Battalion would 
have followed Carlson to hell and back on his command, ‘Follow me!’”295   
 
The Raiders as Special Operations Elites   
As Gung Ho took hold and their training progressed, the 2nd Raider Battalion 
quickly became a cohesive fighting force and a highly efficient – if unconventional – one 
at that.  By April 1942, Admiral Nimitz was convinced that “the battalion, by virtue of 
morale, organization, equipment, training, and development and encouragement of 
individual initiative and resourcefulness, is a striking force out of proportion to its 
numbers.”296  Their baptism by fire would come soon enough.  Both of the Raider 
battalions would play roles in the Allies’ first major counteroffensive of the Pacific War.   
However, even before their baptism by fire, signs were showing that the Raider 
                                                 
293 Carlson, “Address of Commanding Officer . . .” Carlson Collection, MCUA. 
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battalions were evolving a distinct subculture befitting their role as the special operations 
“shock troops” of the Marine Corps.  For example, the Raiders of Edson’s Able Company 
protested their reassignment across the 2nd Marine Division strenuously.  They wanted to 
return to the 1st Raiders, for “We feel we could do more for our country and the Marine 
Corps in an outfit we are best suited for and like best.”297  The attitude developing among 
the Raiders is evident in some of the marching songs that were popular in their ranks.  
The 1st Raiders proudly boasted: 
Oh we are Edson’s Raiders 
We’re the members of a band 
Although we’re few in number 
We’re the finest in the land . . . . 
There’s A and B and C and D 
But no more company E 
A finer bunch of real Marines 
 There never has been seen298 
 
Not to be outdone, the 2nd Raiders were fond of singing a ditty written by Raider Vernon 
Akers:   
In the memory of men, there were those who were brave 
And fought like the heroes of old; 
But none of the fame who carry the name 
Of Carlson’s Raiders so bold . . .  
 
They carry machine guns like pistols, they say, 
And a knife that was tempered in hell; 
And the Raiders all claim no mortal by name 
Could use them one quarter so well. 
 
They whisper of Raiders who gambled with death 
And fought like the demons of old, 
And those who were there are willing to swear 
By Carlson’s Raiders so bold.299 
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These humorous lyrics offer a glimpse at the emergence of a separate, Raider identity.  
This began during training, as “Marines became Raiders—Carlson’s Raiders.”300  Years 
after the war, former Raiders recall feeling a degree of separatism.  For instance, Raider 
Lowell Bulger once assured an interviewer that, “We considered ourselves an elite 
force.”301     
The unique identity that came with being a Marine Raider was complemented by 
the addition of the Raider patch, a fearsome emblem of the Raiders’ deadly skill in battle.  
The Raider patch originated with Evans Carlson’s print of a skull silhouette over crossed 
scimitars, which became the emblem of the 2nd Raiders.  The skull-and-scimitar logo 
apparently remained unique to the 2nd Raiders.  After the Guadalcanal campaign, the 1st 
Marine Division adopted an official patch, with the name “Guadalcanal” inscribed 
vertically on a red numeral “1,” set against a blue diamond background featuring the five 
stars of the Southern Cross constellation.  An enterprising member of the 1st Raider 
Battalion then substituted a skull in place of the “1,” thus creating the famed Raider patch 
which eventually came to be associated with all four of the Raider battalions.  The 
evolution of the Raider patch as a specific insignia setting them apart as specialized elite 
Marines has parallels to the development of unique insignia and other trappings common 
to elite units. 302 
The Raiders then were not only evolving as a special operations unit, but as a 
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miniature corps d’elite; indeed, an elite of the elites.  This sense of elitism contributed to 
the rise of a separate, Raider identity which was gradually superimposed over the 
standard Marine Corps identity.  Raider historian Oscar Peatross identified the common 
factor amongst all four of the eventual Raider Battalions as “a spirit far transcending that 
implied by esprit de corps—a gung ho spirit, as it eventually came to be called, that 
inspired individuals to accept as standard a level of performance that elsewhere would 
have been termed ‘outstanding’ and marked them as unique among Marines.”303  The 
sense of separateness and self-recognition as elites among elites would serve the Raiders 
well as they fought against desperate odds in the South Pacific, and earned their 
reputation as Warrior elites. Yet the very culture of elitism that fostered such a high 
degree of camaraderie within their ranks subtly alienated them from their fellow Marines 
in non-Raider units, carrying the seeds of their own dissolution.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE RAIDERS AS WARRIORS 
 
By mid-1942, the Raiders exhibited all the central features of both Guardsman 
and Technician elites.  They had extensive, specialized training, and self-selected status.  
They were developing many of the other trappings of elitism as well and fostering their 
own unique subculture.  However, they had not yet had an opportunity to put their 
potential to the test.  That would change soon enough. The Raiders were to play a role in 
the first Allied counter-offensive against Japan, where they would quickly earn Warrior 
distinction in the jungles of the South Pacific. 
The Raiders claimed Warrior status for themselves from the outset.  Raider 
Lieutenant W.S. LeFrancois claimed that “Graduates of the [Raider] course were 
rightfully considered men among men by other marines, and were very proud boys.”304  
The Raiders were able to project this impression of elitism to those outside their ranks 
because they wholeheartedly believed it themselves.  According to LeFrancois, the 
Raiders’ creed was, “The individual man is a big shot in a raider group.  You are a fighter 
who will kill the Japs [sic] . . . You are supermarines. You will strike hard and fast. You 
will win.”305  They would prove beyond doubt that such boasts were not exaggerated (or 
at least, only slightly exaggerated) by backing them up with a stellar combat record 
during 1942 and 1943.  But due to a variety of factors, the Raiders never solidified their 
role as special operators.  Instead, the combat history of the Raiders, while certainly 
among the most distinguished Marine units of the war, reflects the most common pitfall 
of World War II-era special operations forces – that is, they served more often as “shock 
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troops” than as a mobile striking force. 
Complete recounting of the Raiders’ battle history in a single volume would be a 
worthwhile endeavor, but it far exceeds the scope of the present study.  No study of the 
Raiders would be complete without a discussion of their battlefield performance, 
however.  As this account is centered on the institutional history of the Raiders and their 
place in the Marine Corps, this study will rely instead on the existent combat narratives 
and analyses to briefly illustrate the Raiders’ history as Warriors. 
 
The Pacific Theater in 1942 
The first half of 1942 was a bleak time for the Allies.  The panic and despondency 
that ran rampant with the general American public after Pearl Harbor only increased as 
each new month brought new hammer blows from the Japanese.  The Japanese 
immediately followed up on their victory over the U.S. Fleet with a well-coordinated 
Pacific blitz across the Pacific and Southeast Asia.  By mid-year, the Japanese began 
establishing bases in the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific, threatening the shipping 
lifeline between Australia and America (see Appendix A). In April 1942, the Japanese 
began construction of a permanent airfield on the island of Guadalcanal in the lower 
Solomon Island chain. Though it did not portend such at the time, the beginning of 
construction on Guadalcanal made it one of the most valuable pieces of real estate in the 
South Pacific.306 
President Roosevelt fully recognized the need to bolster flagging morale in the 
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early months of 1942.  Despite the lack of resources to challenge the Japanese Navy in 
open battle at this stage of the war, Allied high command cast began casting about for 
any way to strike back at the Japanese.  In January 1942, the Navy sent carriers 
Enterprise and Yorktown to raid Japanese forward bases in the Marshall Islands – a raid 
whose small strategic significance was wildly over-blown in the American press. In 
April, Army Air Force Colonel James Doolittle pulled off one of the most celebrated 
raids of the war, flying twin-engine B-25 bombers off the deck of the USS Hornet for a 
low-level bombing raid on Tokyo.  Though little physical damage was done, the 
“Doolittle Raid” had tremendous psychological impact on both the Americans and the 
Japanese, who scrambled to respond to the loss of face inflicted on them.307 
In the aftermath of the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese high command committed to 
several more offensive measures in the Pacific.  The Japanese military has been accused 
of succumbing to a bad case of “victory disease” in 1942, as they over-extended their 
resources with continued land and sea offensives.  Their plan to seize Port Moresby was 
stymied in the Battle of the Coral Sea, a tactical stalemate turned strategic victory for the 
Allies.  The tide of the war took an even more dramatic turn at the Battle of Midway in 
June 1942, a decisive victory for the U.S. Navy.    The hitherto unstoppable Japanese 
military now shifted the defensive, consolidating their gains in New Guinea and the 
Solomons, thereby setting the stage for America’s first counter-offensive land campaign 
– and the Raiders’ baptism by fire. 308 
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The Allies goal in the South Pacific was to climb up the “ladder” of the Solomon 
Islands chain to capture the strategic Japanese stronghold at Rabaul on New Britain (see 
Appendix B).  Securing the first rung on the ladder to Rabaul fell to the Navy and Marine 
Corps.  Operation WATCHTOWER would take the first step by securing the almost-
completed airfield on Guadalcanal, thereby establishing air superiority in the southern 
Solomons.  The urgent need to secure the airfield before the Japanese could establish a 
major base there precluded the thorough preparations that ordinarily take place before an 
amphibious landing; many Marines would come to call it “Operation Shoestring,” due to 
the seemingly perpetual shortages.  Besides lacking adequate supplies for extended 
action, Gen. Vandegrift’s 1st Marine Division was not at full strength, having detached its 
strongest regiment to garrison Samoa.  To compensate for this loss, the 1st Parachute 
Battalion and the 1st Raider Battalion were attached to Vandegrift’s command for 
WATCHTOWER.309  
 
Edson’s Raiders on Guadalcanal  
On August 7, 1942, the first Allied offensive in the Pacific began auspiciously as 
the fleet arrived undetected off of Guadalcanal.  While the 1st Marine Division landed on 
Guadalcanal and rapidly secured the airfield (which the Marines re-named Henderson 
Field), the Raiders landed on the small island of Tulagi across Sealark Channel from 
Guadalcanal (see Appendix C).  Edson chose his landing beaches with surprise in mind, 
choosing to land on the more difficult beaches on the western side of the island rather 
than the more accessible – and hence better defended – beaches elsewhere (see Appendix 
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D).  The Raiders landed on Tulagi not as stealthy infiltrators but as assault troops, and 
accordingly went ashore in Higgins boats in lieu of their customary rubber craft.  They 
took no casualties in the landing and quickly secured the cross-section of the island.  
They then warily advanced southeastward towards the harbor.310   
The Raiders faced only sporadic and ineffective resistance during the morning but 
encountered spirited resistance around noon, suffering several casualties.  For the rest of 
the afternoon the Raiders engaged in a firefight with the Japanese defenders over the 
grounds of the former British installation.  At nightfall the Raiders settled in hasty 
defensive positions and awaited the inevitable counter-attack.  The Japanese did not 
disappoint.  They attacked aggressively several times throughout the night, combining 
infiltration tactics with several of their hallmark banzai attacks.  The Raiders proved up 
to the challenge of their first night combat, beating back the repeated attacks with 
machine guns, hand grenades, and bayonets.  Typical of the élan displayed by the Raiders 
was Private First Class Edward Ahrens.  Finding himself at the center of a banzai charge, 
Ahrens refused to give ground.  Captain Walt found him in the morning, mortally 
wounded and moments from death.  He had killed 11 Japanese troops around his foxhole 
plus 2 more in his foxhole on top of him.  Ahrens died before Walt could get medical 
assistance, but not before telling the captain “The bastards tried to come over me last 
night – I guess they didn’t know I was a Marine.”311   
Their numbers decimated in the failed attacks, the remaining Japanese troops 
barricaded themselves in caves scattered across the rugged southeast tip of Tulagi.  The 
entire Japanese garrison fought to the last man rather than surrender.  The Raiders, whose 
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only support weapons were 60mm mortars, had to improvise methods to clear the 
remaining caves without becoming casualties themselves.  Led by Sergeant Angus Goss’ 
demolition platoon, the Raiders relied on TNT strapped to sticks, supplemented by an 
abundance of personal courage, to destroy the last pockets of resistance.  Edson declared 
Tulagi secured on August 8, though the “mop-up” phase continued for several days.  
Thirty-eight Raiders died and fifty-five more were wounded in taking Tulagi, while 347 
(of the 350 total) Japanese troops perished.312 
At evening on August 8, all seemed well:  the 1st Marine Division had secured 
Henderson Field against virtually no opposition.  The 1st Parachute Battalion had run into 
a much more difficult time than expected in their landing on Gavutu-Tanambogo near 
Tulagi, but those islands too would be mostly secure by the evening of August 8.  That 
night, Allied fortunes took a turn for the worst when a force of Japanese cruisers 
surprised the Allied fleet near Savo Island.  In one of the worst defeats in U.S. Navy 
history, four Allied cruisers and a destroyer were sunk in minutes while the Japanese 
escaped practically unscathed.  With his protection gone, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly 
Turner, commander of the amphibious force, had no choice but to withdraw his 
vulnerable transports to friendly waters, leaving the Marines dangerously short on ammo, 
rations, and medical supplies.313  
With their naval lifeline cut, Henderson Field assumed even greater importance 
for Vandegrift’s 1st Marine Division.  Maintenance of air superiority by the “Cactus Air 
Force” was the only way to stave off the Japanese navy.  The struggle for Guadalcanal 
evolved as a series of naval and air strikes and counter-strikes as both sides struggled to 
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gain naval and air superiority in the area.  For the Marines on Guadalcanal, always 
undersupplied and beleaguered by tropical diseases, rampant malaria, continual 
bombardment, and repeated attempts to retake Henderson Field, the APDs were their 
lifeline.  Meanwhile, the Japanese likewise relied on destroyers to ferry men and 
materials to Guadalcanal.  These destroyers made their runs by night to avoid attack from 
American aircraft, and usually shelled the Marine positions along the way; the Marines 
soon dubbed these runs the “Tokyo Express.” 314 
After defending a major attack on his perimeter at the Tenaru River on August 21, 
General Vandegrift recalled the 1st Raiders and the battered remnants of the 1st Parachute 
Battalion to the main island to assist with the defense of Henderson Field against 
imminent Japanese offensives.  On September 8, the Raiders headed east on a makeshift 
flotilla of APDs and converted tuna boats to disrupt the landing of Japanese 
reinforcements in the vicinity of Tasimboko village.  By a stroke of good fortune, the 
Raiders’ landing went unopposed, as those Japanese troops in the area fled from what 
they believed to be a large-scale assault force.  Expecting only a small force, the Raiders 
quickly realized that they had landed not far behind a rather larger body of troops – 
Japanese Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi’s 35th Infantry Brigade.  Kawaguchi’s 
main body had already headed inland on its way to attack the Marine perimeter, leaving 
only rearguard troops to watch his supply stores at Tasimboko.  The Raiders drove off the 
rearguard and proceeded to wreck Kawaguchi’s supply dump, including several artillery 
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pieces and large quantities of food and ammunition, pilfering what they could and 
destroying much of the rest before withdrawing back to the perimeter.  The Raiders had 
not yet seen the last of Kawaguchi’s brigade.  Usually remembered as a minor event in 
the Guadalcanal campaign, the Tasimboko Raid was actually one of the Raiders’ finest 
moments. 315 
Operating with a combination of speed, surprise, and aggressiveness, the Raiders 
had lived up to their billing as a special operations force.  One member of Vandegrift’s 
staff would later compare the Tasimboko Raid with Sir Francis Drake’s raid on Cadiz in 
1587, claiming that Edson staged “a classic example of the brilliant employment of hit-
and-run tactics by a raider,” while Oscar Peatross held that the Tasimboko Raid was one 
of the signal accomplishments of any of the Raider battalions.316 The destruction of 
Kawaguchi’s artillery pieces and vital supplies, the Raiders significantly weakened his 
ability to mount a sustained action against the 1st Marine Division.  Furthermore, though 
they would not know this until later, the raid provoked a response by the Japanese that 
was out of proportion to the small striking force:  convinced that Edson’s battalion was a 
much larger force, they nervously redirected several battalions to the area in order to 
counter the perceived threat.317  
On September 10, Vandegrift moved the 1st Raiders and the remnants of the 1st 
Parachute Battalion (which had been mauled in the fight for nearby Gavutu-Tanambogo 
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Island) to new positions on a small, grass-covered ridge south of the airfield (see 
Appendix E).  Ostensibly this would give the Raiders and Paramarines a much-needed 
rest.  However, the “rest area” quickly turned out to be the scene of some of the most 
desperate fighting of the campaign.  Edson had deduced – correctly, as it turned out – that 
the spine of the ridge provided the best possible opportunity for Kawaguchi to advance 
on Henderson Field.  Should the Raiders fail to hold, Kawaguchi would be able to sweep 
over the ridge and have virtually unopposed access to Henderson Field.  The Raiders 
were well aware of this.  The terrain did not favor the defenders:  the exposed, grass-
covered ridge was surrounded on all sides by dense jungle, allowing the Japanese to get 
close before being seen, and the coral formation of the ridge thwarted Marine attempts to 
dig defensive positions.  Edson readied his men, arranged for artillery support, and 
waited.  On the night of September 12, following a bombardment by Japanese navy 
vessels, Kawaguchi launched his first attacks on the ridge.  The Japanese fought fiercely, 
but the thick jungle foiled Kawaguchi’s plan for a single, decisive attack as his 
disorganized units attacked piecemeal throughout the night.  The Raiders fought the 
Japanese back and held the ridge, though Kawaguchi’s men did succeed in pushing 
Edson’s right flank back, essentially isolating the ridge as a salient surrounded on three 
sides by the Japanese-occupied jungle (see Appendix F).318 
The Raiders, weary from nearly five days of continuous action, received little 
respite on September 13.  Based on the intelligence estimates that Kawaguchi still had 
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nearly 3,000 fresh troops in the jungles around the Ridge, Edson warned his men, “They 
were testing.  Just testing.  They’ll be back.”319  The Raiders and Paramarines 
consolidated their positions around the perimeter of the Ridge, improving the fields of 
fire for their machine guns so that the attackers would have to cross 100 yards of open 
field under fire.  After dark on the evening of September 13, the Japanese launched a 
series of concentrated attacks on the Ridge, primarily composed of the two battalions that 
had not participated in the previous night’s fight at the Raiders, nearly 2,000 men.  
Kawaguchi’s brigade attacked three times between 2100 and 0230, each time more 
desperate than the last.  Edson called for continuous artillery fire from the 11th Marines’ 
105mm howitzers; as the battle grew more heated, he requested the fire to be placed 
nearly on top of the Raider lines.  Near midnight, the Marines conducted a limited 
withdrawal to a makeshift perimeter around Edson’s command post on the high point of 
the Ridge, a small grassy knoll.  It was a desperate night, perhaps the most crucial of the 
campaign: “About 300 Marines gripped the knoll—the last defensive position before 
Henderson Field—in a horseshoe-shaped line . . . . All the while Edson moved the 
artillery barrage closer and closer, but still the Japanese came.”320  (See Appendix F). 
Marine historian Joseph Alexander says of the grim combat on the Ridge, “This was one 
night when the Marine rifle became more useful as a bayonet mount than as a firearm.”321  
At this point in the fight, the Raiders passed the word, “Nobody moves, just die in your 
                                                 
319 Quoted in Hoffman, Once a Legend, 199. 
320 Frank, Guadalcanal, 239.  Frank further notes that “the soul of the defense this night was Merritt Edson.  
A scant 10 or 20 yards behind the firing line—his clothes were pierced at the collar and waist by bullets—
he controlled the battle with his rasping voice, exhorting the steadfast and excoriating those few who 
wavered: ‘Go back where you came from. The only thing they’ve got that you haven’t is guts.’” 
Guadalcanal, 240. 
321 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 176. 
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holes.”322  They did just that for the remainder of the night, repelling the enemy several 
more times with small arms fire, grenades, and hand-to-hand fighting.  At first light, 
elements of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, filtered into line to augment Edson’s force, 
while artillery and air strikes pounded the remnants of Kawaguchi’s shattered battalions, 
effectively ending the immediate threat to Henderson Field.  The Raiders had lost 135 
men and the Paramarines had lost 128; 59 of these casualties were killed in action, 
including 37 Raiders.323  But they had decimated the Japanese brigade, permanently 
thwarting Kawaguchi’s attempts to recapture the ridge.  Kawaguchi’s brigade suffered 
708 killed and 505 wounded, many of whom would die of their wounds on the arduous 
trek back to the coast.324  Now legendary as Edson’s Ridge in Marine lore, the defense of 
the ridge is certainly one of the high points of Raider history. There the 1st Raiders earned 
their reputation as the “do or die men.”325   
Badly in need of rest and decimated by both casualties and tropical illnesses, the 
Raiders continued to serve in the defense of Henderson Field until mid-October 1942, 
serving in several difficult actions along the Matanikau River and incurring more 
casualties.  When they departed Guadalcanal on October 13, the 1st Raider Battalion 
registered only one quarter effective strength – some 200 Raiders.  Edson praised the 1st 
Raiders as “among the best of the fighting organizations that the Marine Corps ever 
produced,” and claimed that they had “achieved honor and praise throughout the 1st 
Marine Division, the U.S. Marine Corps, the country at large far out of proportion to the 
                                                 
322 Hoffman, Once a Legend, 202. 
323 Hoffman, Makin to Bougainville, 16; Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 110. 
324 Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, 121; Hoffman, Makin to Bougainville, 16.  Besides the danger of 
American air raids, Kawaguchi’s brigade would quickly come to regret the loss of their medical supplies 
and foodstuffs in the Tasimboko Raid as they suffered the march back to the sea under starvation 
conditions. 
325 George Doying, “Red Mike and His ‘Do or Die’ Men,” Leatherneck (March 1944): 15-17.   
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strength of the battalion as compared to the entire Marine Corps.”326  Vandegrift 
commended the Raiders as well, stating that the Raiders “proved themselves to be among 
the best fighting troops that any service could hope to have . . . . [T]he Commanding 
General [Vandegrift] wishes to state that he considers it a privilege and an honor to have 
had troops of this calibre [sic] attached to his command.”327  Though they suffered 
greatly in doing so, the 1st Raiders had unquestionably established their reputation as 
Warrior elites.328 
 
Carlson’s Raiders and the Makin Atoll Raid 
Meanwhile, Carlson’s 2nd Raiders had not been merely observing the war from 
the sidelines.  In an attempt to divert Japanese attention and reinforcements away from 
Guadalcanal, Admiral Nimitz launched the 2nd Raiders on one of the most daring raids of 
World War II. Two companies of the 2nd Raiders, about 220 men, were selected to raid 
the Japanese installation on Makin Atoll in the Central Pacific.  The Raiders would be 
transported by submarine, a first in American history.  Carlson’s goals were to destroy 
the enemy garrison and seaplane refueling facilities on Butaritari Island, the largest island 
of the atoll, and to gather any intelligence possible.  On the strategic level, Nimitz hoped 
that a raid in the hitherto secure Gilbert Island chain would cause the Japanese to divert 
reinforcements to the Central Pacific and away from the battle raging in the Solomons.  
Companies A and B of the 2nd Raiders embarked from Pearl Harbor on August 8 for a 
                                                 
326 Edson, “Battalion Order No. 1,” 21 September 1942, Edson Papers, LOC.   
327 Vandegrift, “Division Bulletin Number 40a-42: Commendation of Raider Battalion, Parachute Battalion, 
and Eleventh Marines . . .” 19 September 1942, Alexander A. Vandegrift Collection, MCUA. 
328 By September 14th, the Raiders had suffered 33 percent casualties, not counting numerous tropical 
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claustrophobic nine-day journey to the target aboard the USS Nautilus and USS 
Argonaut.329 
On August 17, 1942, the submarines surfaced off Butaritari Island, only to find 
themselves in the midst of a rain squall and heavy seas.  Compounding their struggles 
was the fact that the unreliable outboard engines all failed in the surf, leaving the Raiders 
to paddle to shore.  One boat, carrying Lieutenant Oscar Peatross’ platoon, became 
separated from the rest of the force and eventually landed well apart from the main body.  
The rest of the Raiders landed just before dawn and began moving towards their 
objectives, but they lost the element of surprise when one of their own men stumbled and 
accidentally discharged a burst from his BAR (see Appendix G).  The enemy alerted, 
Carlson made a snap decision, ordering A Company to cross the island quickly and begin 
moving southwest towards the enemy positions.330   
Here in the early morning hours Carlson’s plan went awry.  The alerted Japanese 
garrison put forth a defense which belied their small numbers, based on machine gun 
nests well-concealed in the underbrush, supported by numerous snipers in the tops of 
coconut trees.  The crucial factors to victory in a raiding operation – speed and mobility – 
slipped away as the Raiders proceeded to engage the dogged Japanese defenders 
individually and in disjointed small unit actions. Their momentum faded into a firefight 
lasting several hours, ending in two Japanese banzai counterattacks which the Raiders 
easily dispatched.  They also thwarted an attempted landing by several Japanese 
seaplanes in the island’s lagoon, destroying both planes with their Boys .55 caliber rifles, 
and successfully called in indirect fire from the USS Nautilus on two patrol boats in the 
                                                 
329 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 43-50; Wukovits, American Commando, 89-97. 
330 Carlson, “Operations on Makin, August 17-18, 1942,” 21 August 1942, Carlson Collection, MCUA. 
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harbor, destroying both.  Ensuing Japanese air raids succeed only in mistakenly bombing 
the remaining Japanese positions on the island, doing no harm to the Raiders.331   
Meanwhile, Peatross’ platoon had not been idle.  Landing to the southwest of the 
main body, they were practically in the rear of the Japanese force.  Radio failure 
precluded his attempts to coordinate with Carlson, so Peatross took the initiative and led 
his men to harass the enemy rear area, destroying the island’s radio station, capturing the 
enemy headquarters and killing the garrison’s commander, Sgt.Maj. Kanemitsu.  Still 
unable to contact Carlson, Peatross’ platoon departed for the submarines around 1930 
that evening.  Miraculously, of all the boats theirs alone had a working engine, and they 
made it to the Nautilus safely.332 
By early evening, it was increasingly apparent that the Raiders would not be able 
to fulfill their mission before the set rendezvous with the submarines that night.  Carlson 
believed that a sizable contingent of Japanese remained on the island.  Snipers continued 
to fire from the treetops, and the natives reported that the seaplanes and patrol boats had 
unloaded reinforcements (these reports later proved inaccurate).  Unaware that they had 
virtually annihilated the Japanese garrison already, Carlson had his men withdraw to the 
beach for rendezvous with the submarines in accordance with the original timetable.  
Now his plan came completely unraveled, for the surf off of Makin was considerably 
heavier than anyone had anticipated.  Their engines dead, the Raiders were left to row.  
The Raiders made every effort to get to the submarines, only to have their craft 
repeatedly overturned in the surf.  With each capsized boat and return to shore, the 
Raiders grew more exhausted and lost more equipment.  Carlson called the attempt “a 
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struggle so intense and so futile that it will forever remain a ghastly nightmare to those 
who participated.”333  Several boats somehow reached the submarines, their occupants 
looking “like pale shadows of the men I had last seen early that morning…nothing less 
than zombies.”334  The remaining 120 Raiders (including Carlson and James Roosevelt) 
were stranded on shore.   Only a handful of the marooned Raiders even had weapons, for 
almost all of their equipment had been lost in the repeated overturning of their boats.  In 
Carlson’s estimation, “the situation was extremely grave”; he later confessed that “This 
was the spiritual low point of the expedition.”335   
At this “spiritual low point,” the seeds of yet another Carlson controversy were 
sown.  Numerous failed attempts left the majority of Carlson’s men ragged and worn out.  
Many had no weapons and some were even down to just their shorts, having stripped 
their uniforms to avoiding drowning in the surf.  At some point during the night, a note 
offering the surrender of the remaining Raiders was written and delivered by Captain 
Ralph Coyte to one of the few living Japanese soldiers on the island.  This note was later 
recovered by the Japanese and used in propaganda broadcasts.  Who exactly wrote the 
note, and under whose orders?  The signature on the note was rendered illegible by water 
damage, though it seems probable that it was Coyte.  It remains unknown under whose 
authority it was written.336  No reference to the thought of surrender appears in the after-
action reports.  Carlson’s biographer, Michael Blankfort, references a hysterical private 
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muttering about the need to surrender, only to have some sense slapped into him by his 
sergeant; in Blankfort’s account, Carlson remains imperturbable.337  This was the first 
and only reference to any possible talk of surrender, leading George Smith to conclude 
that it “was intentionally hidden from the public for almost half a century.”338  James 
Roosevelt later claimed that the surrender issue came up during a midnight “Gung Ho” 
meeting and was promptly dismissed.339  George Smith finds this account implausible, as 
Carlson appears to have deliberately excluded Roosevelt from the discussion for the 
simple reason that the fate of the President’s son was weighing heavily on his mind; 
Peatross’ account supports this contention.340  Carlson also had numerous wounded 
Raiders to consider, not to mention the lack of ability of his exhausted, mostly unarmed 
Raiders to defend themselves against probable Japanese reinforcements in the morning.  
Carlson overestimated the number of enemy soldiers still on the island, relying largely on 
faulty reports by the natives.  His fears were reinforced by a brief but violent encounter 
by one of the Raider sentries with a small Japanese patrol, leaving Carlson with “the 
worst dilemma of his military career.”341  George Smith contends that “Carlson, the 
consummate egalitarian, deviated from one of his core principles and apparently decided 
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to unilaterally surrender his force without entertaining much, if any, debate at all.”342  Jon 
Hoffman concurs that Carlson made the decision himself, “without much input from the 
others.”343  John Wukovits, on the other hand, admits that “at a minimum, [Carlson] 
contemplated the surrender issue,” but raises the question of why, if Carlson was so 
concerned about Roosevelt, would he entertain the thought of allowing the Japanese to 
capture him alive to be used as a propaganda tool.344  Most Raiders accept Peatross’ 
account of that night:  Carlson, after much discussion with his officers (excluding James 
Roosevelt) decided that surrender was the most humane course of action and sent Coyte 
out to find a Japanese officer to parley with; the rest of the Raiders, meanwhile, were 
understandably upset to hear rumors of surrender.345  Questions abound to this day, and 
as the surviving Raiders pass away, there is little chance that the exact account will ever 
be known.  Charles Lamb probably put it best when he wrote that “The full story of the 
Makin raid probably will never be recorded in its entirety except in the Book of Time for 
the archives of the Great Historian.”346 
By the next morning, the surrender issue became a moot point when the Raiders 
discovered that the Japanese garrison had been virtually eliminated, save a few snipers.  
The Raiders spent the day dodging intermittent but ineffective airstrikes and demolishing 
enemy installations on the island.  On the night of August 18, the submarines moved to 
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the calmer seas on the lagoon side of the island and the Raiders finally succeeded in 
getting aboard, bringing their wounded with them.  Back at Pearl Harbor, the Raiders 
took stock of their losses, officially listed as 18 killed in action and 12 missing in action, 
presumed drowned.347  Tragically, in the confusion surrounding the extraction, 9 Marine 
Raiders were left ashore.  Their exact fate was not known until after the war.  Later 
captured by the Japanese, these Raiders were executed on nearby Kwajalein Island.  The 
Japanese officers involved were convicted of war crimes in 1946; two received life 
imprisonment, and Vice Admiral Koso Abe, who ordered their execution, was hanged.  
In 1999, a team of forensic scientists from the U.S. Army’s Central Identification 
Laboratory traveled to Makin to make positive identification of the remains; they 
discovered a total of 19 Raiders buried on Butaritari, making the final toll 19 Raiders 
killed in action, 9 captured and executed, and 2 missing, presumably lost at sea.348 
Questions abounded as to Carlson’s conduct on the raid.  Even his harshest critics 
admitted that Carlson seemed impervious to enemy fire and completely unconcerned for 
his own safety, yet the apparent breakdown of command and control raised doubts as to 
the practical utility of his methodology.  Charles Lamb, a Raider lieutenant who openly 
disdained Carlson’s Gung Ho style, found it “debatable if there was any command from 
the time of the landing until the return of Carlson to the submarine.”349  In addition to 
conducting a wildly disorganized battle, Lamb charged that the “work together” spirit of 
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Gung Ho proved to be a complete fallacy during the attempt to return to the submarines, 
instead being replaced by an individualistic, every-man-for-himself attitude.  Lamb’s 
comments cast Carlson in the worst possible light, and are colored by their author’s 
“extreme personal dislike for Carlson.”350  However, Carlson did not seem to exercise 
close command of the Raiders during the action of August 17, instead allowing the action 
to devolve into a series of independent small-unit actions in which the Raiders displayed 
great individual courage but little coordination.  Peatross attributed this in large part to 
Carlson’s temporary departure from his normal command philosophy by reflexively 
deploying A Company into the operating area designated for B Company, resulting in the 
intermixing of both companies and diminished control.351  As the attempted departure 
from the island was repeated thwarted by the surf, unit cohesion came unraveled, despite 
Carlson’s presence on the beach with them.  Even the Raiders’ fire-teams began 
dissolving as groups of men began piling in boats confusedly, attempting to brave the 
surf paddling with rifle butts or even palm fronds.  In the confusion, Carlson apparently 
forgot about the 20-man covering force still holding the perimeter around the beach.  The 
confusion surrounding the extraction and the discussion of surrender in the face of a 
much-reduced enemy tended to raise doubts about the effectiveness of the Gung Ho 
method in actual combat.  Most damningly in the eyes of many was the uncharacteristic 
caution that seized Carlson on August 17, when he “persisted in overestimating the 
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enemy’s strength or, even worse, underrating his own.”352   
Carlson realized that the raid had not gone as planned and acknowledged as much 
in his after-action report.  The exact reasons for his temporary bout of hesitancy remain a 
mystery.  It is probable that, given Carlson’s prior experience working with indigenous 
populations in China, he took the exaggerated reports of the native islanders at full value, 
causing him to believe that he was greatly outnumbered.  Reports by natives figure 
prominently in his after-action report.  Based on their information, which was hindered 
by the significant language barrier, Carlson both over-estimated the original number of 
Japanese troops on the island and credited them with landing additional troops throughout 
the day.  Peatross, though critical of the conduct of the battle, points out that on the first 
day, Carlson had to assume that Peatross’ own platoon was lost and quite possibly killed 
or captured; therefore, as far as Carlson knew he had suffered over 18 percent casualties 
in his small force.353  Carlson’s most recent biographer defends his actions as being 
prompted by an excessive concern, perhaps even subconsciously, for the safety of James 
Roosevelt.354  Carlson himself confessed to having reached a “spiritual low point” in the 
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evening of August 17.355  Carlson did ruefully confess that he had made a poor estimate 
of the situation on the first night, concluding:  “Finally, I would invite the attention of all 
military leaders to the illustration provided by our situation at Makin on the night of 
August 17th which emphasizes a truth that is as old as the military profession: no matter 
how bad your own situation may appear to be, there is always the possibility that the 
situation of the enemy is much worse.”356 
Carlson felt that the Makin Raid was a worthwhile venture if only for the 
experience and lessons learned.  His report makes no mention that surrender was even 
considered.  Interestingly enough, Carlson decided to forego the Gung Ho self-critiquing 
that was a hallmark of his program after the Makin Raid.  Some Raiders later insisted that 
this was a deliberate cover-up of Carlson’s own instigation.  Peatross believed that Coyte 
and Private William McCall (the couriers with the surrender note), were ordered to keep 
quiet about it by Carlson, who was himself acting on orders from Nimitz.357  According 
to Omar Pfeiffer, the Marine officer on Nimitz’ staff who passed the report to Nimitz, 
Carlson’s original report included the words, “If I had heard a Japanese voice say, 
‘Surrender,’ I would have surrendered.”358  Pfeiffer relates that after reading it, Nimitz 
angrily exclaimed: 
“Pfeiffer, have you read this? . . . I’ve never heard of anything like 
this in all my life.  There is not so much iron in that man [Carlson] as I 
thought.  You take this report back and get a hold of that young man and 
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tell him that no report from my command will have any word, or even 
idea, of surrender in it!” 
I took the report, returned to my office, and sent for Carlson. When 
he came, I told him that he would have to delete any ideas of surrender or 
any statement of surrender from his report.  Carlson said, “It’s true, and it 
will stay in the report.”  I said, “Oh, no it won’t.  It comes out or you go 
out.” Whereupon Carlson took the report with him and in time it was 
returned to me with the objectionable content removed.359 
 
Thus, evidence suggests that the cover-up of the surrender discussion occurred at Nimitz’ 
behest; in eliminating it from his own reports, and ordering Coyte and McCall to do so as 
well, Carlson was acting under high authority.  Nimitz, an erstwhile supporter of the 
Raider concept, was clearly displeased with Carlson.  In his own report of the action to 
Admiral King, Nimitz took Carlson to task on several points.  He pointed out that on the 
evening of the 17th, there were “only a few Japanese soldiers left alive, yet such is the 
effect of boldness in a few resolute men that it seemed to the Raider commander at this 
time that he was still opposed by a large force.” In his conclusions, Nimitz noted that 
offensive momentum must be maintained if the raid is to be successful, yet “After the 
first part of the engagement, the Raider force did not strike aggressively.”  He further 
suggested that henceforth “Native reports should be considered with suspicion.”360 
 
Nimitz’ personal disappointment with Carlson did not prevent him from lauding 
the raid as one of the high points of the war to date.  He informed King that the raid had 
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“succeeded in all its purposes,” and further claimed that a sizable number of Japanese 
ships had been diverted to the Gilberts from the Solomons because of the raid.361  Nimitz 
arranged a hero’s welcome for the Raiders and submariners at Pearl Harbor and 
personally visited with several Raiders to congratulate them on their achievements.  
Official Navy press releases in the days following the raid glorified the Raiders as 
warriors without peer.  In the “first official mention of the Raiders,” they were billed as 
almost superhuman fighters: 
The men of the Raider Battalions are hand-picked from a flood of 
volunteers for these doubly hazardous assignments. As fully trained 
Marines, they constitute from the beginning a powerful force adept at 
close-range fighting and schooled in amphibious warfare…In rigorous 
training these men become specialists in rubber boat operations…they 
learn every technique of gouging, strangling, knifing, bayoneting and 
otherwise putting an enemy out of action . . . . The Raider Battalions carry 
a relatively large number of automatic rifles and sub-machine guns, in 
addition to the semi-automatic Garand rifles and pistols. Every Raider is 
taught to shoot from the hip with whatever weapon he carries . . . . He also 
carries a knife . . . . Besides its obvious use as a dagger, the Raider learns 
to throw it accurately and with force enough to kill or disable an enemy at 
close range.”362 
  
Clearly, this was not a force to be trifled with.  America now had both an answer to the 
Japanese and an equivalent to the British Commandos.363 
Carlson’s Raiders became instant celebrities as the exaggerated language used in 
the Navy Department’s press release was echoed nationwide.364  They occupied front-
page columns across the country, including several front-page spreads in the New York 
Times, and were celebrated in the many of the periodicals of the day, including Time 
                                                 
361 Nimitz to King, “Makin Island Diversion,” 20 October 1942, Carlson Collection, MCUA. 
362 Navy Department Press Release, “Marines’ Special Raider Battalions Go Into Action at Makin and 
Solomons,” Carlson Collection, MCUA. 
363 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 83, 122; Roosevelt and Libby, My Parents, 272-273. 
364 As a representative example, consider the article, “Marine Corps ‘Raider’ Battalions Employed in 
Solomons Offensive,” New York Times, August 26, 1942, which essentially reprints the majority of the 
aforementioned Navy Department press release verbatim.   
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magazine.365  Early reports of the battle made much of the raid as being “our own brand” 
of commando-style attack, and claimed “at least eighty enemy killed” in exchange for 
“moderate” losses to the Marines.366  Subsequent reports added to the aura of Raider 
invincibility, inflating the number of casualties inflicted to “about 200 Japanese 
marines.”367  A later story inflated this figure even more, claiming that 350 Japanese 
soldiers had been killed on Makin.368  The media reveled in tales of Carlson’s Raiders, 
whom they labelled “The Roughest and Toughest.”369  W.S. LeFrancois wrote a gripping 
first-hand account in two parts of the action on Butaritari Island for the Saturday Evening 
Post.370  Much was made of James Roosevelt’s presence on the raid, and of the gifting of 
a Japanese battle flag captured on Makin to the President himself.371  The raid was even 
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August 7, 1942; Meyer Berger, “U.S. Rangers in Dieppe Raid Were Pupils of Commandos,” New York 
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367 Robert Trumbull, “Marines Wiped Out Japanese on Makin Isle in Hot Fighting,” New York Times, 
August 28, 1942.   
368 “Tokyo’s Version of Makin,” New York Times, September 7, 1942. 
369 F. Tillman Durdin, “The Roughest and Toughest,” New York Times Magazine, November 8, 1942. 
370 LeFrancois, “We Mopped Up Makin Island,” Saturday Evening Post, 2 pts., December 4 and 11, 1943. 
371 “White House Hails Raid,” New York Times, August 22, 1942; “President Rejects Japanese Gift Flag,” 
New York Times, September 18, 1942; “Jimmy Roosevelt’s part in Makin Attack Comes as Complete 
Surprise to President,” Cincinnati Post, August 22, 1942, held in Roosevelt File, HDRB; “Carlson’s 
Heroes,” Time, January 25, 1943. 
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featured in Yank, the weekly Army paper.372  
With so much publicity for the heroes of Makin, it was little surprise that a film 
was soon made about their raid.  LeFrancois’ Saturday Evening Post account provided 
the inspiration for a script by Lucien Hubbard.  With Commandant Holcomb’s 
permission, Carlson himself served as an advisor to the film and approved of the final 
release.  Starring popular leading man Randolph Scott as “Colonel Thorwald,” the movie, 
Gung Ho!, served as an excellent wartime “morale booster.”373  Certainly not one of the 
better films to come out of wartime Hollywood, it was favorably received at the time.  
One critic wrote that “the settings are true and the fighting on the island is as hot and 
lurid as any that we’ve seen.”374  Not surprisingly, though it was a hit with the public, 
veterans of the raid found it overly exaggerated and generally disliked it.375 
As recognized in the official Marine Corps history of the war, the Makin Raid’s 
“greatest asset was to home-front morale.”376  It gave fuel to the assertion that America 
was no longer on the defensive and had “jarred Tokyo’s propagandists out of their smug 
complacency.”377  It has been compared, both in the days following and years later, to the 
famed Doolittle Raid in terms of its boosting power on the home front, possibly even 
greater.  Raider Oscar Peatross felt that, “to the man in the street, the picture of a handful 
of Marines landing from submarines to engage the enemy in a face-to-face shootout on 
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1994), 192. 
374 Bosley Crowther, “‘Gung Ho!’ a Lurid Action Film About the Makin Island Raid . . . Opens at the 
Criterion Theatre,” New York Times, January 22, 1944. 
375 Holcomb to Carlson, 3 July 1943, Carlson Collection, MCUA; Bernstein, Walter Wanger, 192; Smith, 
Carlson’s Raid, 212-214. 
376 Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in 
World War II, vol. 1, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine 
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his own turf was somehow more heroic, more in the American tradition, than 
bushwhacking him from a high flying bomber.”378  As Carlson put it, “The public was 
tired of hearing bad news, and our little raids gave them the sort of news they wanted to 
hear.”379  In the summer of 1942, with victory in the Pacific still very much up for grabs, 
the public was desperate for heroes.  Carlson’s Raiders gave them just that.380   
Notwithstanding its boost to public morale, the Makin Raid had mixed results in a 
strategic sense.  Officially, the raid is remembered as only “partially successful” in its 
military aims, for it “attracted much attention in the stateside press but its military 
significance was negligible.”381  Ironically, the survivors of the raid themselves generally 
were incredulous at their treatment as heroes, believing that the operation had “been one 
big foul up.”382 Supporters of Carlson point to Nimitz’ claim of the “formation of a 
Makin relief force” as proof that despite proportionately high losses, Carlson’s Raiders 
prevented that many more Japanese troops from besieging the 1st Marine Division on 
Guadalcanal.  This view is shared by the standard Navy history of the war.383   
However, it is doubtful that the Japanese actually redirected any troops designated 
for the Guadalcanal campaign solely on the basis of the raid.  Marine historian Jon 
Hoffman corroborates this claim, noting that the Japanese “immediately guessed the size 
                                                 
378 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 86 
379 Quoted in “Col. Roosevelt, He See Eye-to-Eye, Says Carlson,” Waterbury (CT) Republican, 9 June 
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381 Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, History of Marine Corps Operations, vol. 1, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, 
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 135 
 
and purpose of the operation and had not let it alter their plans for the Solomons.”384  
Charles Updegraph takes a slightly more optimistic view of the raid’s utility, arguing that 
some elements of a force from Truk Island did actually head towards Makin following 
the raid, but that “the Makin Island raid might best be viewed as a testing ground for the 
Raider concept, inconclusive in itself, but of marked value in later operations.”385   
The harshest criticism of the raid came the following year after the 2nd Marine 
Division stormed Tarawa Atoll, some 90 miles from Makin in the Gilberts chain.  The 
raid had alerted the Japanese to the inherent weaknesses of their defenses in the far 
reaches of their Pacific empire, resulting in considerable fortification of previously 
lightly-defended Tarawa.  In 76 hours of the most ferocious fighting yet seen in the 
Pacific, the Marines took the island at a cost of 3,407 casualties, including over 1,000 
dead.386  General Holland M. Smith penned in his memoir that “Carlson’s raid on Makin 
in August, 1942, was a spectacular performance . . . but it was also a piece of folly. The 
raid had no useful military purpose and served only to alert the Japanese to our intentions 
in the Gilberts.  The massive fortification of Tarawa dates from that raid.”387  Smith’s 
claim about Tarawa is generally accepted by the leading figures in Marine history.388   
Thus, the first – and as events would prove, the only – attempt to use the Raiders 
for their intended purpose failed to live up to the promises of early war commando 
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aficionados.  On one hand, with the outcome in the Solomons in doubt, one can hardly 
fault Nimitz’ attempt to aggressively employ the Raiders to possibly take some of the 
pressure off of the defenders of Henderson Field.  In summer of 1942, planners could 
hardly have foreseen what the Japanese reaction would be or the future course of the 
Central Pacific campaign in 1943.  The Raiders thus were hampered by the law of 
unintended consequences, and by a lack of willingness of top-level commanders to utilize 
the Raiders in long-range missions again in the face of the mixed results of the first 
attempt. The utility of special operations units is often determined by the ability of high-
level leadership to conceive of strategic missions for them, and by willingness to employ 
them on such missions. After the failure of the Makin Raid, few strategic missions for the 
Raiders were even devised.389 
 
Carlson’s Raiders and the Long Patrol 
Carlson knew that Makin had not provided a true test of the efficiency of his 
Gung Ho methodology.  His Raiders had their chance for redemption on Guadalcanal in 
November 1942.  Carlson pressed his superiors throughout the fall of 1942 for a chance 
to get back into action.  The 2nd Raiders finally got to Guadalcanal, albeit in a roundabout 
way, when R. Adm. Turner selected the Raiders to assist in one of his ventures on 
Guadalcanal.  Though Turner’s involvement with the Raiders was very brief, he had an 
outsized impact on their trajectory.   
Turner was notorious among Marines for his interference in Marine affairs and 
frequent dabbling in novelties.  Turner was aggressively dedicated the Marines on 
Guadalcanal and made great efforts on their behalf even when his superiors despaired of 
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success; however, he also sought to micromanage Marine actions well beyond the scope 
of landing operations.390  Vandegrift privately held that Turner was prone to having “half-
baked” ideas about the conduct of landing operations.391  The Guadalcanal campaign 
revealed some of the deficiencies of the prewar arrangements for command relations 
between Navy and Marine officers once the amphibious force was ashore.  Turner sought 
to determine the deployment of Marine units on Guadalcanal according to his own ideas, 
ideas which frustrated Vandegrift as unwelcome distractions from the main task.  As 
former Raider-turned-historian Samuel Griffith wryly noted, “Vandegrift’s constant 
problem in dealing with his nominal superior in the chain of command was to keep the 
sailor in his nautical place.”392  The situation finally reached a point critical enough that 
Commandant Holcomb himself visited Guadalcanal in October 1942 to help formally sort 
out the command relationships once the landing force was ashore.393 
Turner was convinced that the most effective way to beat the Japanese was to land 
small contingents of Marines all over the north shores of Guadalcanal, thereby denying 
the Japanese anywhere to land reinforcements.  He was intrigued by the possibility of 
using Marines to execute numerous, small-scale landings in Japanese rear areas – 
precisely the sort of mission the Raiders were designed to fulfill.  With the 1st Raiders 
spent in the defense of Henderson Field and the 2nd Raiders employed by Nimitz in the 
Central Pacific, Turner peremptorily ordered the 2nd Marines in Samoa to collect 
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volunteers to form a “2nd Provisional Raider Battalion” – and further stated his intention 
to have the 7th and 8th Marines do the same once they arrived.  As one can imagine, such 
external interference did not sit well with Marine officers.  Admiral Nimitz, on 
Commandant Holcomb’s advice and hearty approval, vetoed Turner’s scheme, and the 
2nd Provisional Raider Battalion was dissolved before it even got started.394 
Though foiled in his idea of a Raider battalion in every Marine regiment, Turner 
held doggedly to his concept of landings elsewhere on Guadalcanal.  When the actual 2nd 
Raider Battalion arrived in his area, Turner soon found a use for them.  He planned the 
construction of a second airstrip east of Henderson Field, and accordingly designated an 
Army infantry regiment, a Marine Defense Battalion, and a Navy Construction Battalion 
to land at Aola Bay on November 4.  The landing beaches were to be secured by two 
companies of Carlson’s Raiders, who would land in advance of the main force.395   
Thus, the 2nd Raiders finally came to Guadalcanal in early November 1942.  Two 
companies went ashore under Carlson’s command at Aola Bay as the spearhead for the 
airfield construction force.  Carlson hoped to secure a mission more suitable for his 
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Raiders once ashore, and had briefed his remaining companies to be ready to come to 
Guadalcanal on a moment’s notice.  Admiral Turner’s vision of an Aola Bay airfield 
proved to be misguided – one historian later termed it “one of the silliest actions of the 
entire Pacific war.”396  All construction efforts were thwarted by the dense jungle and 
swampy terrain in the area, and construction was eventually halted.397   
Carlson, however, was more successful:  he finally got the mission his Raiders 
were built for.  By November the tide of the battle was beginning to favor the Americans 
and Vandegrift sought to launch an offensive to the west past the Matanikau River.  
However, Japanese Colonel Toshinaro Shoji’s regiment threatened the perimeter from the 
east.  Vandegrift here found a way to use the unique skills of the Raiders to perform 
valuable service for the upcoming offensive.  Vandegrift delayed his western offensive 
and dispatched the 7th Marines and the 164th Infantry (Army) to destroy Shoji’s 
detachment.  Shoji managed to escape the Americans’ double envelopment.  Cut off from 
the coast, he was forced to circumnavigate the American perimeter to rejoin Japanese 
forces west of the Matanikau.  Shoji’s force, though battle-weary, still numbered 
approximately 3,000 troops, a force Vandegrift could not afford to let wander to his east 
while simultaneously trying to mount his own offensive to the west.  On November 5, 
Vandegrift sent a message via airdrop to Carlson: the 2nd Raiders were tasked with 
harrying the Shoji detachment, reporting on its movements and engaging the Japanese in 
guerrilla warfare while also providing Vandegrift with vital intelligence as to remaining 
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Japanese strength east of Henderson Field.398 
Carlson leapt at the chance provided here.  He proceeded to lead his Raiders on a 
month-long patrol behind enemy lines, engaging the Japanese in true guerrilla fashion 
(see Appendix H).  They operated almost completely independently, just as Carlson had 
envisioned when he fashioned the battalion.  As Richard Frank put it, “For all practical 
purposes, Shoji and Carlson disappeared into the deep jungle to fight their own campaign 
for a month.”399  They survived mostly by living off the land, supplemented  by rations 
carried inland by their native guides or by airdrop and whatever they could glean from 
dead Japanese, making do with a subsistence diet of mostly “rice-and-whatever” – that is, 
whatever they could find.400   
On the Long Patrol, the Raiders received valuable assistance from native guides 
throughout their patrol, giving them a tangible advantage over the Japanese.  Besides 
providing information on the local geography, the native scouts kept the Raiders well-
informed of Japanese movements and provided the only link that the Raiders had with 
friendly forces on the coast.  It is interesting to note that Carlson’s trust in the intelligence 
provided by the natives on Guadalcanal served him far better than it had previously on 
Makin.  This is not to say that the Gilbertese were inherently untrustworthy or 
sympathetic to the Japanese.  However, the natives on Guadalcanal not only had training 
and organization provided by the Australian coastwatcher system, they also had had 
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several months’ worth of experience in campaigning on their home island.  They were led 
by the indomitable Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Vouza, a hero in his own right who had 
already cheated death at the hands of the Japanese.  Vouza did yeoman’s work for the 
Allies throughout the Guadalcanal campaign.  Furthermore, the native scouts reported 
directly to Major John Mather of the Australian Army, who worked with Carlson to 
assign daily missions and communicate orders to the scouts.  This system proved much 
more effective than the makeshift communication Carlson attempted with the Makin 
islanders, and Carlson’s Raiders benefited greatly from the assistance of Mather’s corps 
of scouts. Carlson’s high regard for native intelligence and assistance was vindicated on 
Guadalcanal, and more in line with his experiences in China.401 
Carlson set out into the jungle with his two companies as soon as he received 
Vandegrift’s instructions; the other three companies of the 2nd Raiders came ashore at 
Tasimboko on November 10 and marched to join him.  He would lead his Raiders on a 
patrol all the way around the perimeter, from Tasimboko to Mount Austen on the 
southwest point of the Henderson Field perimeter, engaging the Japanese where possible 
and gathering intelligence.  The Raider companies operated largely independently: 
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Carlson’s plan was “to fan out strong combat patrols to search for the enemy . . . . Once 
contact is made, I will concentrate the patrols as needed to destroy the enemy.”402  
Throughout November, the Raiders harassed the Japanese force, exploiting the element 
of surprise to inflict much larger numbers of casualties on the enemy then they suffered 
themselves.  They engaged the enemy in numerous small-unit actions, as well as a larger, 
battalion-sized action near Asamama village.  Carlson’s Raiders proved their prowess as 
jungle warriors: courage and resourcefulness were the norm during the Long Patrol.   
In mid-November, Vandegrift tasked the Raiders with locating and destroying a 
Japanese heavy artillery piece, nicknamed “Pistol Pete” by the Marines, which had been 
shelling them from the slopes of Mount Austen for some time.  Carlson’s Raiders spent 
the remainder of the month patrolling towards Mount Austen and the headwaters of the 
Lunga and Tenaru Rivers.  The Raiders made their way to the top of Mount Austen, 
destroying several untended artillery pieces along the way, on December 3.  They 
occupied the vacant enemy positions there, from which they promptly ambushed a patrol 
of Japanese troops ascending the mountain.  The next day, Carlson led his exhausted 
Raiders down the slope of Mount Austen into Vandegrift’s perimeter.403 
Carlson’s Long Patrol has been remembered as “one of the great combat patrols 
in the history of the Corps.”404  They trekked some 150 miles through inhospitable, 
enemy-occupied jungle. They were isolated in the deep jungle for nearly a month, from 
November 6 to December 4, and they killed 488 Japanese at a cost of 16 Raiders killed in 
action and another 18 wounded in action.  These figures do not tell the true story, for the 
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jungle proved to be just as much the Raiders’ foe as the Japanese were.  Of the surviving 
Raiders, 225 men had to be evacuated for medical treatment due to a myriad of jungle 
conditions, from malaria and dysentery to ringworm and jungle rot.405  When Raider 
historian Jon Hoffman examined the effects of illness and poor conditions, he found that 
“Carlson’s men became disabled at an astonishing rate due to inadequate rations and the 
rough conditions”; he further emphasizes that the in two companies (C and E Companies) 
that had been on Guadalcanal for the duration of the entire patrol, sickness casualties 
were so high that only 57 of their original 133 Raiders were able to endure the entire 
campaign without being evacuated for illness.406  A Marine who observed them shortly 
after their emergence from the jungle noted, “They were definitely a seedy looking lot. 
Virtually all the survivors of that solid month in the jungle had malaria, many were a 
bright yellow with jaundice, all were haggard and worn from what they had been through, 
but in spirit they were still a cocky and self-confident outfit.”407  However, their efforts 
were not in vain.408   
Though Shoji’s force eluded complete destruction, his troops suffered far worse 
than the Raiders: by the time he rejoined the main Japanese contingent, he had only 700 
to 800 survivors of his 3,000-man force, “of whom but twenty to thirty retained the 
ability to fight.”409  The Raiders had provided Vandegrift with the intelligence he needed 
for the offensive to the west.  Vandegrift gratefully recognized Carlson’s Raiders with an 
official unit citation for “the consummate skill displayed in the conduct of operations, for 
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the training, stamina and fortitude displayed by all members of the battalion and for its 
commendably aggressive spirit and high morale.”410   
In retrospect, the Guadalcanal campaign represents the high point of the Raiders’ 
service history.  It was on Guadalcanal and nearby Tulagi that the Raiders earned their 
distinction as Warrior elites, men capable of fighting in any circumstances against 
seemingly impossible odds – and winning.  The Raider experience from August to 
December 1942 mirrors the process suggested by Showalter almost exactly:  though they 
were already distinguished by their all-volunteer status and specialized training, they 
earned their role of Warrior elites of a particularly distinguished caliber.  The one attempt 
to utilize the Raiders as more of a strategic force, the Makin Raid, did not return the 
results Nimitz had anticipated.  However, the Raiders had proven their worth as a special 
operations force on the operational and tactical levels.  Their most impressive successes 
as a raiding force – the Tasimboko Raid and the Long Patrol – hinged on highly mobile 
campaigns that struck the enemy where he was not prepared, inflicting damage, gathering 
intelligence, and moving on before allowing a concentrated counter-attack.  In many 
ways, the lower Solomons campaign vindicated the vision of the Raiders as originally put 
forth by H.M. Smith and Edson in late 1941, as a specialized force, supplementary to the 
main amphibious landing force, capable of operational-level raids to assist with the main 
amphibious landing in a variety of ways.  As the Long Patrol indicated, there was a place 
for Carlson’s vision of a deep-penetration, guerrilla force as well – under the right 
circumstances.  Unfortunately for Carlson’s Raiders, the high attrition rates seemed to 
indicate that the Pacific islands were not the right environment for such guerrilla 
                                                 
410 Vandegrift, “Division Circular Number 38a-42, Citation of 2d Raider Battalion for outstanding service,” 
7 December 1942, Carlson Collection, MCUA; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 370. 
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campaigns.411   
However, their recognition as elite Warriors brought new challenges for the 
Raiders.  Showalter states that “because of the quality of their personnel, warrior elites 
frequently tend to lose their specific mission orientation and become general-purpose 
shock troops.”412  This transformation is starkly illustrated on Edson’s Ridge, where the 
out-gunned Raiders fought off a numerically superior enemy, making up for their lack of 
heavy armament and small numbers with their tenacity and fighting spirit.  The transition 
from Technician specialists to Warrior shock troops was subtle, occasioned by necessity 
in the desperate situation Vandegrift was in throughout much of the WATCHTOWER 
campaign.  Subsequent events would speed this transformation and make it permanent – 
thereby sealing the fate of the Raider battalions.413 
 
Changes to the Raiders  
The Guadalcanal campaign brought not only accolades but concurrent changes in 
the command and structure of the Raider battalions, including the expansion of the Raider 
program.  The addition of more Raiders was precipitated at least in part by Turner’s 
audacious proposal to create numerous “provisional Raider battalions.”  Commandant 
Holcomb, with Admiral Nimitz’ support, diffused this idea with aplomb, but he did 
concede that additional Raider battalions appeared desirable for the circumstances in the 
Solomons campaign.  Accordingly, the 3rd Raider Battalion was activated on Samoa on 
September 20, 1942, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Harry “the Horse” 
Liversedge.  The 3rd Raiders were composed mainly of volunteers from Marine units 
                                                 
411 Showalter, “Evolution of the Marine Corps,” 46. 
412 Showalter, “Evolution of the Marine Corps,” 46. 
413 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 96.   
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garrisoning Samoa, plus small contingents of veterans from the 1st and 2nd Raider 
Battalions.  An additional battalion, the 4th Raider Battalion, was created on October 23, 
1942, in California under the command of Major James Roosevelt.  In February 1943, the 
4th Raiders were granted extra personnel allotments in order to form a permanent Raider 
Training Camp at Camp Pendleton. Finally, in March 1943, all four Raider battalions 
were placed under the umbrella of the new 1st Raider Regiment, with Liversedge 
commanding. 414 
In addition to gaining new sister battalions, the original two Raider battalions 
underwent significant command changes.  Shortly after the battle of Edson’s Ridge, 
Vandegrift tapped Edson to command the 5th Marines.  Command of the 1st Raiders 
passed to S. B. Griffith, Edson’s executive officer.   Though wounded in the Raiders’ 
actions along the Matanikau in late September, Griffith returned to command the 1st 
Raiders and proved to be an able commander in his own right.  The promotion of Griffith 
ensured a large degree of continuity for the 1st Raiders, though he did introduce a slightly 
modified version of Carlson’s fire-team, with good results.415 
For the 2nd Raiders the command changes brought wholesale changes to their 
battalion.  Carlson led his weary Raiders back to Espiritu Santo on December 18, 1942, to 
recover and re-train after their ordeal on Guadalcanal.  In keeping with his guerrilla 
philosophy, Carlson kept his Raiders in an austere camp to build toughness. Isolation and 
rugged living had been an important part of his training methods at Jacques Farm earlier; 
however, in this context, it seems to have backfired on him.  The ever-present tropical 
                                                 
414 Hoffman, Makin to Bougainville, 23-25; Updegraph, Special Marine Corps Units, 16-17, 24; “4th 
Marine Raider Battalion,” unpub. manuscript, Historical Section, HQMC, 16 May 1949, Raiders: 4 th 
Marine Raider Battalion File, HDRB. 
415 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 201-203, 237; Hoffman, Once a Legend, 212-214.   
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illnesses – malaria, dengue fever, jaundice, dysentery – continued to persist.  “As the sick 
list grew, morale slumped, and for all practical purposes the battalion was 
noneffective.”416  Carlson’s attempts to re-energize the men by appealing to the Gung Ho 
spirit – “Lack of adequate faith is the real cause for our failure to bring the Gung Ho 
spirit to its highest perfection” – were not as effective as he hoped.417  Defenders of 
Carlson have pointedly accused Marine high command of setting up Carlson to fail by 
denying his battalion needed services and liberty in Wellington, New Zealand, but other 
officers within the 2nd Raider also noted the rumblings of a discipline and morale problem 
in the weary Raider ranks.  When the 1st Raider Regiment was formed, Carlson was 
promoted to executive officer of the regiment.  This came as a “double blow” to Carlson 
– he not only lost his battalion, but was passed over for command of the Raider 
Regiment.418 
Carlson was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapely, a tough and 
thoroughly orthodox veteran.  He had not been impressed with Carlson’s Gung Ho pitch 
in February 1942, and what he saw in Espiritu Santo did little to change his mind.  The 
Gung Ho experiment in the Marine Corps came to a sudden and abrupt halt with 
Shapley’s accession.  (The last bastion of Gung Ho in the Corps ended when Carlson’s 
protégé, James Roosevelt, had to be sent stateside because of malaria in April 1943).  
Shapely “lined up the battalion and told them I was going to change practically 
                                                 
416 Peatross recalls that the number of sick eventually resulted in 2nd Raiders being informally designated 
medically unfit for combat duty. Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 171-173.   
417 Carlson, “Address of the Commanding Officer . . .”  Carlson Collection, MCUA. 
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everything . . . I just changed things completely, and made it into a regular battalion.”419  
Military courtesy, such as saluting of officers and addressing one another by rank, were 
reinstated.  Those who protested were granted transfers, though surprisingly few took 
Shapely up on this offer.  Carlson and his methods had been extremely popular with 
many of the enlisted men, and many of Shapely’s changes were received only grudgingly 
at first.  By some accounts – notably Blankfort’s unabashed apology for Carlson – the 
men hated Shapely for killing the spirit of Gung Ho.  Charles Banks, who served with the 
4th Raiders and later commanded the 1st Raiders, believed that  
Shapely was a good leader.  The Raiders had gotten a little cocky . . . . 
Shapely was the Edson type of guy, the typical Marine type of guy.  
Carlson was a maverick . . . some of these people that he had trained and 
selected had lost the Marine Corps way of doing things, and one of the 
first thing[s] Shapely said when he took over as regimental commander [of 
the 4th Marines] was, ‘This is going to be a Marine regiment.’  I think 
Shapely did a hell of a good job in organizing the regiment, and the results 
showed later . . . . Some of those guys [the 2nd Raiders] I guess were 
spoiled, and it was tough to go back to conform to the rules.420   
 
Shapely himself does not remember too much trouble with the 2nd Raider Battalion.  He 
recalled that “Initially I found some [opposition], but then I had a tremendous amount of 
support, particularly from the noncommissioned officers.”421  Raider officers and senior 
NCOs welcomed the changes as much needed improvements.  Gone were the days of 
Carlson’s reveling in his men’s ability to subsist on “rice-and-whatever,” as Shapely 
immediately set his Raiders to work improving their camp, which was moved to the 
island of New Caledonia.  Peatross recalls that after a brief period of training under 
Shapely, “our training program was moving along quite smoothly, and progress through 
                                                 
419 Shapely transcript, MCUA, 77. Shapely later bragged to Pfeiffer that the change in heart was so 
complete among the 2nd Raiders that, “‘If you want to get killed, go out into that company street and shout, 
“Gung Ho.”’” Pfeiffer transcript, MCUA, 228.  
420 Banks transcript, MCUA, 22. 
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each phase was marked by significant improvement in the physical well-being and 
morale of the troops.”422  Reinforcements arrived, creating a good balance of combat-
proven troops and eager new Raiders.  Significantly, the training regime Shapely 
instituted shifted dramatically.  Rather than guerrilla warfare, the Raiders began training 
in attacking fortified positions.  This proved to be an accurate assessment of the Raiders 
missions in the upcoming months.423 
With Guadalcanal secured in January 1943, high command began planning for the 
seizure of the next rung on the long ladder to Rabaul.  Throughout 1943, the four Raider 
battalions would serve in a number of ways to help the Allies reach the top. 
The new 3rd Raiders got their feet wet during Operation CLEANSLATE, the 
seizure of the Russell Islands, when they stormed Pavuvu Island.  They found no enemy 
ashore but the ever-hostile jungle: in the four weeks they occupied Pavuvu, many of the 
3rd Raiders came down with the sundry jungle diseases ubiquitous to the South Pacific.  
As Jon Hoffman bluntly put it, “the hard-hitting capabilities of the Marine battalion were 
wasted on CLEANSLATE,” as the 3rd Raiders served as a garrison force for an 
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unoccupied island – hardly a mission suitable for a mobile striking force.424 
 
New Georgia 
Though uneventful, the seizure of the Russells cleared the way for Admiral 
Halsey’s planned attack on New Georgia.  Dubbed Operation TOENAILS, the offensive 
focused on the recently built airfield at Munda Point (see Appendix I).  Capture of Munda 
itself fell to the Army’s 43rd Infantry Division, but two battalions of the 1st Raider 
Regiment would support this mission by capturing vital harbors on other points of the 
island.  The Eastern Landing Group, consisting of the 4th Raider Battalion and the 103rd 
Infantry (Army), were to land at Segi Point and move to attack Viru Harbor; afterwards, 
the Northern Landing Group, made up of the 1st Raider Battalion and two Army infantry 
battalions, all under the command of Col. Liversedge, would land at Rice Anchorage and 
proceed overland to capture Enogai Inlet and Bairoko Harbor.425 
The immediate goals of the Eastern Landing Group were to seize Viru Harbor and 
nearby Vangunu Island.  Lieutenant Colonel “Mickey” Currin landed with two 
companies of his 4th Raider Battalion at Segi Point on June 20.  (His other two companies 
attacked Vangunu Island across the channel; working in conjunction with an Army 
battalion, they secured the island the following day).  Currin’s goal was the capture of 
Viru Harbor, heavily defended from seaward but vulnerable to overland attack, probably 
because even the native islanders considers the swampy jungles surrounding it to be 
impenetrable.  Moving via rubber boats as close as he dared, Currin led his Raiders on a 
three-day trek through jungles even worse than Carlson’s Raiders had endured on the 
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Long Patrol – thick underbrush, indiscernible trails, steep hills and valleys punctuated by 
rivers swollen by the onset of rainy season (see Appendix J).  Nearing the objective, he 
detached two platoons to attack the lightly defended village of Tombe east of the harbor.  
Meanwhile, he led the main force on a forced march through the night to attack the main 
installation at Tetemara west of the harbor.  In 16 rain-drenched hours stumbling and 
hacking through the jungle in the dark, with only two 20-minute rests, the Raiders 
covered a scant 7 miles – but they were in position to attack by morning on July 1.  A 
fortunate coincidence aided the Raiders, as a squadron of American dive-bombers arrived 
for an unannounced airstrike on Tetemara, driving the Japanese to take cover temporarily 
in the jungle.  The Raiders on the east side of the harbor had little trouble dispatching the 
garrison at Tombe with no losses to themselves.  Currin’s main force surprised and 
overwhelmed the initial line of Japanese defenders.  They pressed on through the 
morning despite increasing resistance and a driving rain squall, destroying enemy 
bunkers individually with hand grenades and TNT.  By evening, the Raiders were in 
possession of the harbor; they had suffered 8 Raider KIA, and 15 WIA, and killed at least 
48 Japanese soldiers.426  The 4th Raiders proved themselves well against both the 
Japanese and the jungle.  They had operated largely as Raiders were intended to, using 
their mobility to advance over terrain considered impassible to launch a surprise attack.   
On the northwest coast of New Georgia, the 1st Raiders, accompanied by 
Liversedge’s regimental HQ, set out on a similar mission as the 4th Raiders had recently 
accomplished.  The Northern Landing Group (the 1st Raiders and the Army’s 3rd 
Battalion, 148th Infantry) executed a night landing at Rice Anchorage on July 4 and set 
                                                 
426 Hoffman, Makin to Bougainville, 30.  The campaign of the Eastern Landing Group against Viru Harbor 
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off across Dragon’s Peninsula towards Enogai Inlet (see Appendix K).  They faced 
similarly terrible conditions as Currin’s Raiders had previously, compounded by the 
flooding that came with rainy season.  S. B. Griffith later recalled that approximately 
1,200 men had to ford the flooded Tamakau River over a single log bridge using toggle 
ropes for handrails – an operation which took the bulk of a day to complete.427 On July 7, 
the procession made contact with the enemy, driving a company of Japanese from Triri 
village.  Liversedge sent the 3rd Battalion, 148th Infantry, south to block the trail to 
Munda, while the 1st Raiders attacked north from Triri to Enogai Inlet.  With their three-
days’ rations exhausted, the Raiders were spurred on by desperation.  Though slowed by 
firefights and false trails, the Raiders were able to find and exploit a small trail unknown 
to the Japanese, enabling them to flank the installation at Enogai.  After a two-hour 
firefight, the Raiders attacked Enogai station on July 10, charging down the hill with 
bayonets fixed and guns blazing –Raider Thomas Pollard explained, “That stunt is just as 
hair raising to them as it first was to us” – driving the Japanese defenders out with heavy 
casualties.428  The Raiders had lost 54 of their ranks killed and 94 wounded, but had 
killed approximately 350 Japanese.429  As Currin’s 4th Raiders had done at Viru, the 1st 
Raiders exploited their light load and mobility to penetrate almost impassable terrain 
obstacles.  They attacked Japanese defenses with tenacity and ingenuity, despite their 
exhaustion and hunger, fully living up to the Warrior reputation they had won at 
Guadalcanal.430 
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After an arduous trek on short rations and the sharp fighting around Enogai inlet, 
Griffith’s 1st Raider Battalion could only field about half of its combat strength.  
Liversedge accordingly dispatched a messenger to Turner on July 11, requesting that 
Currin’s 4th Raiders be transported to Enogai.  It was July 18 by the time they arrived, 
and they were only about two-thirds strength themselves.  In the two weeks that had 
elapsed since the landing at Rice Anchorage, the situation had changed considerably.  
The Japanese garrison at Bairoko Harbor was fully aware of American intentions and had 
received reinforcements.  Further, they had constructed a formidable defense, composed 
of log-and-coral bunkers set along the four parallel ridges between Bairoko and Enogai; 
the bunkers were positioned to have interlocking fields of fire, and the ground was 
preregistered so their heavy 90mm mortars would have deadly accuracy.  The Raiders 
here faced their toughest target yet. 
The Raiders moved out early on July 20 to attack Bairoko (see Appendix L).  In 
absence of any artillery or naval gunfire support, Liversedge had requested air support 
several times in the previous days, but radio failure prevented his message from getting 
through.  The Raiders attacked armed with their M1 rifles, BARs, and grenades, with 
light 60mm mortars providing their only supporting fire.  Lacking the firepower to 
damage bunkers, the Raiders had to rely on maneuvering close enough to destroy each 
bunker by hand using grenades or TNT charges.  Many Raiders died in the attempt.  
Their casualties grew extensive as the Japanese machine guns and heavy mortars took 
their toll, but they pressed on.  By late afternoon, the Raiders had managed to penetrate 
two of the four lines of bunkers and could see the harbor.  In the words of historian Brian 
Altobello, “This was the classic moment where the commander was supposed to commit 
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his reserve.  But Liversedge had none to commit.”431  With casualties already over 25 
percent and nightfall rapidly approaching, Liversedge ordered the Raiders to withdraw.  
Liversedge can hardly be criticized for his decision.  The Raiders were low on ammo, out 
of water, outgunned, and had suffered nearly 30 percent casualties by the end of the day: 
47 killed and 200 wounded.432   
Bairoko thus became the only time in the Raiders’ history that they had failed to 
take an objective.  With the bloodletting at Tarawa still some months in the future, 
Bairoko “may have been the bloodiest combat and hottest fire fight of the war up to that 
time.”433  It would be a blatant mischaracterization of the Raiders’ Warrior spirit to claim 
that they failed for any lack of courage.  On the contrary, the failure of Bairoko was a 
symptom of both the changing nature of the Pacific War and of the inherent limitations of 
special purpose troops.  This was evident to those in the Raider ranks and those in high 
command.  Peatross bitterly wrote years later that the failures of Bairoko were “in 
conception and support, which was the business of higher headquarters, and the failure of 
Bairoko must be on their conscience.”434  Of more significance to the future of the Raider 
program was the official view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  “Such lightly armed troops 
cannot be expected to attack fixed positions defended by heavy automatic weapons, 
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mortars, and heavy artillery . . . . Failure to relieve the Marine Raiders by regular infantry 
units supported with artillery after the Marines had accomplished the task of seizing the 
beachhead is on a parallel with the failure to relieve the first [sic] Marine Division at 
Guadalcanal.”435 
At the same time the Raiders were laying claim to their status as a subset of 
Warrior elites, they were drifting ever further afield from their original role as lightly-
armed, highly-mobile troops.  Misallocation as line troops was a common downfall of 
special operations units in World War II as “hard-pressed generals desperate for 
manpower saw elite troops as super-infantry rather than as specialists.”436  The New 
Georgia campaign showcased both the strengths and weaknesses of the Raider battalions.  
At Viru and Enogai, the Raiders had defied the odds, moving across seemingly 
impassible terrain, achieving victory in both places despite being outnumbered by 
utilizing stealth and surprise to the fullest.  But at Bairoko, the Raiders encountered an 
alerted, well-armed enemy behind prepared defenses, against which even the Raider spirit 
could not make up for the lack of the heavy weaponry and supporting fire needed to 
reduce bunkers.  The Raiders in 1943 found themselves being employed in one of the 
most common misuses of special operations troops, as their Warrior virtues were 
exploited by pressing them into service as general purpose shock troops. 
 
Bougainville: Beginning of the End  
In November 1943, the Allies climbed the next rung of the ladder towards Rabaul 
– the island of Bougainville.  The Raiders saw their share of the fighting there, though 
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Bougainville spelled the “beginning of the end for the Raider organization.”437  Operation 
CHERRY BLOSSOM witnessed the complete transition of the Raiders from a special 
operations role to that of a standard infantry battalion.  The 2nd and 3rd Raider Battalions 
– temporarily designated the 2nd Provisional Raider Regiment under Shapely’s command 
– were attached to the 3rd Marine Division for the landings at Empress Augusta Bay (see 
Appendix M).  They went ashore on D-Day, November 1, in conjunction with the 3rd and 
8th Marines.  The 3rd Raiders assaulted the Japanese machine gun nests on Pururata Island 
in the bay then moved ashore on D+1.  The 2nd Raiders landed on the left flank of the 1st 
Battalion, 3rd Marines, as they moved to secure Cape Torokina.  Both battalions moved 
inland to establish roadblocks on the Piva Trail.  They fought intermittently against 
Japanese patrols and turned back several attacks on their position for the next several 
days, before moving to division reserve on November 10.  The Raiders spent the next two 
months on Bougainville largely waiting in reserve, punctuated by occasional patrols or 
stints on the line.  They remained in reserve, busied by carrying supplies to the front or 
helping off-load ships on the beaches, until they returned to Guadalcanal on January 11, 
1944. 438 
 
“Put Away Your Boots and Knives” 
The Marine Corps’ experiment in military elitism came to an end not long after 
the 2nd and 3rd Raider Battalions left Bougainville.  Once the elements of the 1st Raider 
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Regiment were assembled again on Guadalcanal, the regiment was formally disbanded.  
The decision to end the Raider program in early 1944 was occasioned by the top-level 
command changes in the Corps, as Alexander A. Vandegrift succeeded his mentor 
Thomas Holcomb as Commandant on January 1, 1944, bringing with him his trusted 
assistant Colonel Gerald C. Thomas to serve as the new Director of Plans and Policies at 
HQMC. It was no secret that Vandegrift and Thomas were not in favor of the 
proliferation of specialist units within the Marine Corps, but the choice to end the Raider 
experiment did not originate with Vandegrift.  Holcomb’s previous Director of Plans and 
Policies had initiated a study of the desirability of specialized units in the Marine Corps 
the previous fall.  The results of the study, put forth by the War Plans Division, Office of 
the Chief Naval Operations in December 1943, laid out the intention to transform the 
Raiders into a more standardized infantry regiment.  Vandegrift thus had only to act upon 
decisions that had been arrived upon previously.439   
Though disbanded, the Raiders did not merely fade away.  Instead, on February 1, 
1944, the former Raiders were chosen to reconstitute one of the Marine Corps’ most 
storied regiments, the 4th Marines.  Known as the “China Marines” for their long service 
in Shanghai, the 4th Marines had fought gallantly in defense of the Philippines and held 
out on Corregidor until the bitter end.  Rather than establishing a completely new 
regiment, Vandegrift recommended that the Raiders be used as the cadre for re-
establishing the 4th Marines.  By assuming the traditions and honors of the 4th Marines, 
the Raiders “would symbolize the turning of the tide of the war from defeat into victory,” 
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thereby ensuring that the legacy of the famed 4th Marines would survive.440 
Shapely, who assumed command of the new 4th Marines, fully recognized the 
significance of the new chapter in the Raiders’ history, adopting the slogan “hold high the 
torch” for his new regiment.  The 4th Marines seized Emirau Island in March 1944, 
thereby completing the isolation of Rabaul that the Raiders had helped to begin in August 
1942.  Later they added the names of Guam and Okinawa to the roll of battle honors of 
the 4th Marines, serving with distinction in both those campaigns.  After Japan’s 
surrender, the 4th Marines were among the first wave of American troops to land in 
occupation of Japan, and later had the moving experience of liberating the surviving 
members of the original 4th Marines from a POW camp.441 
Reactions to the news of the loss of their Raider status varied from sad resignation 
to anger at the departure of a valued and hard-earned identity as members of an elite 
subset of Marines.  Oscar Peatross recalls that “The initial reaction was sheer disbelief, 
then came indignant resentment at what was felt to be betrayal, and finally bitter 
resignation.”442  The main consolation was their designation as the 4th Marines, which 
Commandant Holcomb had promised would be remade out of particularly distinguished 
units.  Some Raiders appear to have rationalized that this explanation was enough.  Lee 
Minier wrote home that even though the Raiders were now “a regular line regiment,” he 
could at least be confident that “The 4th Marines were the most famous regiment in the 
                                                 
440 Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Hold High the Torch: A History of the 4th Marines 
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1960), 242.  On the 4th Marines, see James S. 
Santelli, A Brief History of the 4th Marines (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 
1970), and Condit and Turnbladh, Hold High the Torch. 
441 Condit and Turnbladh, Hold High the Torch, 241-360; Santelli, Brief History of the 4th Marines, 26-35. 
442 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 293.  He further notes that the “bitterness was especially strong among the 2nd 
Raiders, for they were losing their battalion as well as their elite status.” 
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corp [sic] . . . . Now it is organized again and is really going to be a crack outfit.”443  For 
many Raiders, the end of the Raider Battalions came as a violent shock, representing the 
collapse of a close-knit subculture and unique identity as select members of the Marine 
Corps’ elite battalions.  Gone were their specialized units, shared elite subculture, and the 
trappings of elitism such as their famed Raider patch – that “proud symbol of 
uniqueness.”444  Captain Arthur Haake, veteran of the 1st and 3rd Raider Battalions, 
composed a eulogy poem, one which was considered “Perhaps the most eloquent 
expression of our resentment at the loss of identity.”445  Haake’s lyrics poignantly capture 
the feeling that accompanied the sudden end of the Raider experiment. 
Here’s some news to make you hot: 
They’re doing away with the best they got, 
And throwing us in with the common lot, 
For we’re the last of the Raiders. 
 
So put away your boots and knives, 
As souvenirs of your Raider lives, 
And do your fighting with your wives, 
For we’re the last of the Raiders . . . .  
 
First we’re Jekyll, then we’re Hyde, 
As four battalions get shanghaied, 
But in this deal our hands are tied, 
For we’re the last of the Raiders.446 
  
                                                 
443 Minier to Jolette Minier, 20 February 1944, Minier Collection, MCUA. But in a separate letter, Minier 
noted that many of the original Edson’s Raiders had requested transfers to other units. Minier to Jolette 
Minier, 4 February 1944, Minier Collection, MCUA.  See also Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 293-294. 
444 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 294. 
445 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 293. 
446 Arthur A. Haake, “Last of the Raiders,” reproduced in Rosenquist, Sexton, and Buerlein, Our Kind of 
War, 237.   
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CHAPTER 5: THE LAST OF THE RAIDERS 
 
The experience of the Marine Raider battalions, from their rise to prominence to 
their eventual misuse as shock troops, largely parallels that of many other special 
operations units of World War II.  However, the Raiders’ situation as a special operations 
elite within an existing corps d’elite added some unique elements to their service history 
and untimely end.  “Forces of this sort,” John Gordon aptly notes, “have never been easy 
to evaluate [for] they tend to generate more emotion than rationale analysis.”447  The 
downfall of the Raiders has been explained as everything from a matter of pure 
pragmatism to suspicion of personal vendetta.  There admittedly were practical reasons 
for ending the Raider battalions which alone would likely have been sufficient to spell the 
end of the Raiders as a special operations force.  However, underlying the overtly 
military rationales offered are several more subjective motivations.  These subjective 
rationales are usually referenced only indirectly in “official” sources, but can often be 
detected in more candid source material such as oral history interviews and memoirs.  In 
an examination of the decision to transform the Raiders into a regular infantry battalion, 
subjective factors frequently emerge, such as resentment of undue publicity, perceptions 
of favoritism, and implicit competition with the larger Marine Corps culture.  These are 
intertwined with the more quantifiable causes, making full discussion of them difficult.  
However, the subjective aspects of the reaction to the Marine Raiders offer an interesting 
glimpse of the operation of elite military cultures and presents a unique opportunity to 
consider the dynamic of establishing an elite subculture within a prior elite body with its 
                                                 
447 Gordon, “An Experiment in Military Elitism,” 363. 
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own distinctive group identity.448 
 
Operational Necessity: The Pragmatic Approach 
The operational rationale in favor of disbanding the Raider battalions in favor of 
reinforced infantry battalions was straightforward and highly pragmatic.  The war in the 
Pacific had changed almost completely in character.  The early days of the war were 
characterized by Allied weakness on almost every front in the Pacific, faced off against a 
seemingly invincible enemy whose only apparent weakness was hubris.  By January 1944 
the tables had turned.  The Allies no longer operated in fear of Japanese naval and air 
superiority.  Though the Japanese remained a deadly foe and were far from beaten, it was 
clear that the U.S. Navy virtually commanded the sea and sky and could project massive 
force almost at will.  The war was by no means over – indeed, the hardest fighting 
remained ahead in both Europe and the Pacific – but momentum had clearly shifted.  On 
the home front, American morale had rebounded from the post-Pearl Harbor low, buoyed 
by Allied offensives in every theater of operations, lessening the apparent need for small-
scale raids to boost morale.    It has been said that special operations are often forces of 
desperation, turned to in hope of compensating for weakness and restoring confidence.  
Once the weakness has been remedied, the need for special operations for morale 
boosting purposes is considerably lessened.  This was certainly true of the Raiders.449   
The Raiders had been created with a view towards a prolonged campaign of 
strikes and counter-strikes (attacks met with enemy counter-attacks), where their speed 
and small size could be used to hit the enemy and withdraw.  The Solomons campaign 
                                                 
448 Much of the following analysis applies to the other specialist units within the Marine Corps, as 
discussed by Updegraph, Special Marine Corps Units; the present effort will focus on the Raiders. 
449 Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 143. 
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roughly followed this pattern, most notably at Guadalcanal.  By the time the Marines’ 
role in the Bougainville campaign and the isolation of Rabaul came to an end in early 
1944, the attention of the Marine Corps was drawn to the Central Pacific where Admiral 
Nimitz was initiating a new phase of the war characterized by “island hopping” across the 
Central Pacific to isolate Japan.  The battles the Marines fought for the remainder of the 
war would not be characterized by the desperate, makeshift measures of “Operation 
Shoestring” in August 1942, but by amassing the full weight of American sea, air, and 
land power, bringing America’s industrial capabilities to bear to pound enemy 
fortifications into rubble.  In light of the massive armadas assembled, landing fully-
equipped Marine divisions, complete with organic artillery and armor elements, supplied 
by Marine logistics and supported by air strikes from Marine aviation, raids by small, 
elite units did not seem as necessary or useful as they had in 1942.450   
Also significant were the changes in Japanese strategy after their defeats in the 
Solomons.  With their offensive capability melting away, Japanese high command turned 
to a defense of attrition.  On each successive amphibious assault, the Marines faced ever 
more complex fortifications manned by increasingly fanatical defenders who preferred 
death to surrender.  Neutralizing such fortified islands was a costly undertaking, one 
                                                 
450 Allan Millett suggests that, “Essentially, the Corps fought four different ground wars against the 
Japanese:  the jungle warfare of the South Pacific, the atoll warfare of the Gilberts and Marshalls, the 
mobile warfare of the Marianas, and the cave warfare of Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.  Each war made 
its special demands, and the Corps met them.”  Semper Fidelis, 440.  According to Vandegrift, in the 
Central Pacific, “that type of organization [Raiders] was not necessary.”  Alexander A. Vandegrift Oral 
History Transcript (hereinafter referenced as Vandegrift transcript), OVHS, 968.  Though many have 
pointed out the changing nature of the Pacific War, I am indebted to Lieutenant Commander Russell Evans 
(USN) for his Marine Corps Command and Staff College lecture on the evolving nature of the “strike” and 
“counter-strike” nature of the early Solomons and the fundamental shift occasioned by American 
superiority in arms.  Seen in these terms, the Raiders provide a “strike” capability, while the defense 
battalions provided the capability to resist the enemy’s “counter-strike.”  As Evans stressed in his lecture, 
however, the overwhelming American air, naval, and ground superiority of 1944-1945 was unique to that 
specific point in time – warfare on an unprecedented scale, with the nation on a total-war footing – and 
should not be considered a normal operating scenario. 
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which required heavy firepower and coordination of supporting arms (air strikes, naval 
gunfire, and artillery), plus the “uncommon valor” of the individual Marines tasked with 
taking the next island.451  The Raiders were designed around almost exactly the opposite 
type of mission:  they came lightly armed, utilizing only what they could carry, to 
surprise and overwhelm the enemy in vulnerable areas, with a view towards withdraw or 
relief by conventional forces in relatively short order.  It was not a matter of their lack of 
ability to adapt to the brutal, cave-busting tactics of the late-war years – consider the 
success of the 4th Marines at Guam and Okinawa – but merely that, outfitted as Raider 
battalions, they were not designed for such missions.  Bairoko was ample demonstration 
of this fact; the Raiders there met their only defeat.  The very fact that the Raiders 
advanced as far as they did at Bairoko bears testimony to their resourcefulness, team-
work, and courage.   Hand grenades and small arms and 60mm mortars could only go so 
far against the “jungle Maginot lines” the Marines began encountering from 1943 
onward.452  Marine tactics began calling for automatic weapons to provide covering fire 
for a heavily-armed assault or demolition platoon to advance on bunkers with high 
explosives and flamethrowers, supplemented by artillery or tank support whenever 
possible – tactics the exact opposite of what the Raiders were trained and equipped to 
do.453   
                                                 
451 Excerpt from Nimitz’ famous remark that, “Among the Americans who served on Iwo [Jima] Island 
uncommon valor was a common virtue.”  Quoted in George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, History 
of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 4, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1971), 712. 
452 “How to Take a Pillbox,” Leatherneck 27, no. 7 (June 1944): 25. 
453 The Raiders are given due tribute in the official Marine Corps history of the war:  “the seven-hour attack 
by men armed with only grenades, rifles, and light machine guns against an enemy of near equal strength 
barricaded in heavily fortified bunkers stands as one of the fines examples of personal courage in Marine 
annals.  It is to the raiders’ credit that victory over these overwhelming odds was at one point very nearly in 
their grasp.” Shaw and Kane, History of Marine Corps Operations, vol. 2, Isolation of Rabaul, 147. “How 
to Take a Pillbox,” 24-27. 
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Marine historian Joseph Alexander suggests that the root cause of the Raiders’ 
demise was the rapid technological advancement during the war, identifying the 
commissioning of the Navy’s first fast carrier, the USS Essex, on December 31, 1942, as 
the beginning of obsolescence for the Raiders.454  His point is compelling: the significant 
changes in technology and tactics simply outran the need for special operations 
battalions.  Similarly, Oscar Peatross used the different but complementary positions on a 
football team as a fitting analogy:  “To me, it seemed nothing less than foolhardy to 
downgrade the Raiders; to misapply us as regular infantry, to use wide receivers as 
linemen just because a moment had arrived in the war when finesse was not needed.”455  
By early 1944, the Raiders found themselves specialists without a mission. 
In addition to adapting to its changing missions, the Corps was also short of 
experienced personnel.  One of Commandant Vandegrift’s most pressing needs was to 
secure enough Marines to fill out the divisions of the burgeoning Corps, a task which fell 
to Gerald Thomas, Director of Plans and Policies.  With the addition of so many young, 
green Marines, the Corps was also faced with a serious lack of seasoned leaders, a fact 
Vandegrift well recognized.  The Raiders provided not only a source of personnel, 
consisting of some of the best personnel in the Corps, but a ready-made unit from which 
a new infantry regiment could quickly be fielded.  Both Vandegrift and Thomas, long-
time veterans of the 1st Marine Division, certainly recalled Edson’s aggressive recruiting 
of the best and brightest from the ranks of the fledgling division at the war’s outset.  
Later, during Thomas’ tenure as Vandegrift’s Chief of Staff at I Marine Amphibious 
Corps (IMAC) in 1943, Thomas came to the conclusion that IMAC simply lacked enough 
                                                 
454 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 236; Hoffman, Makin to Bougainville, 39-40. 
455 “If we were to be employed in the assault [on Bougainville], then we should be armed accordingly and 
not expected to use manpower to compensate for our lack of firepower.” Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 237. 
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suitable missions for specialists, resulting in a misapplication of the considerable talent in 
those battalions.456  Vandegrift quickly came to share Thomas’ position, finding that the 
Marine rosters in the Southwest Pacific were “a little over stock [sic] with specialists and 
would be glad if our replacements . . . could be only plain, ordinary Marines – no 
specialists included.”457 
After assuming the office of Commandant in January 1944, Vandegrift “had to 
find the people to bring our veteran units up to strength and to provide replacements for 
the anticipated casualties.  We also had to activate new units if we were to fulfill our 
tasks—and this was very difficult in view of our personnel ceiling.”458  The Marine Corps 
of 1944 was rapidly approaching peak strength; four divisions were operating in early 
1944, with a fifth and even sixth in the offing.  The unprecedented growth of the Corps 
had been met with ever-increasing suspicion by the U.S Army.  Though the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff did approve some increases to the manpower ceiling of the Corps, the new 
Commandant would mostly have to make do with the parameters he had.  Vandegrift 
faced the reality that “to fulfill such obligations luxuries had to go.”459  With personnel at 
                                                 
456 I Marine Amphibious Corps, a direct result of Holcomb’s visit to Guadalcanal, was created specifically 
to remedy the problems in Navy and Marine Corps command relations in the South Pacific by 
incorporating all Marine ground units, logistics, and administration under a single command.  Millett, 
Semper Fidelis, 371.  
457 Vandegrift to Holcomb, 14 April 1943, Holcomb Collection, MCUA.  Vandegrift lamented that “we do 
have to spread the few experienced officers that we have rather thinly.  It appalls me when I think that we 
have expanded from 1360 officers in 1939 to the 28,000 odd officers we now have.  That is very little 
leaven to lift the whole mass.”  Vandegrift to H.M. Smith, 28 February 1944, Vandegrift Collection, 
MCUA.  Vandegrift wrote in his memoir that “Edson’s levy against our division, coming at such a critical 
time, annoyed the devil out of me, but there wasn’t one earthly thing I could do about it.” Vandegrift and 
Asprey, Once a Marine, 100. Thomas believed that the 1st Raiders were “a sharp outfit, there wasn’t any 
doubt about it.  But they robbed the division.” Thomas transcript, MCUA, 235.  Millett, In Many a Strife, 
219. 
458 Vandegrift and Asprey, Once a Marine, 240. 
459 Vandegrift and Asprey, Once a Marine, 240-241.   
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a premium, the Marine Corps began to have less room for specialized units in general.460 
Thus, the rationale put forth by the higher echelons of Marine Corps leadership 
was firmly couched in a pragmatic view of the reality of Marine Corps’ needs in the 
Pacific War in late 1943.  It is difficult to argue with their logic.  Though nothing in war 
is inevitable, the dissolution of the Raiders is not extraordinarily surprising in light of the 
changing nature of the Pacific War.  The cold, hard logic behind the end of the Raiders is 
perhaps the most commonly cited reason for their short existence.  Though some 
accounts of the Raiders do discuss various aspects of what can be loosely termed cultural 
reasons contributing to the end of the Raiders, few do so in the context of the conflict of 
interests inherent in overlapping elite cultures.  Those observers who do delve into the 
cultural conflict that is intertwined throughout Raider history tend to focus heavily on the 
lightning rod figure of Evans Carlson and the reactionary impulses he generated.461 While 
this is admittedly vital to the story, it is not the full story for it does not take into 
consideration the implicit and fundamental challenge that the Raiders had inadvertently 
created for the culture of the U.S. Marine Corps.  The lack of exploration and discussion 
is unfortunate, as the Raider experience offers a case study in both the nature of elites 
within military organizations generally and in the nature of cultural boundaries in the 
Marine Corps.462 
                                                 
460 The limit imposed on the Corps by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942 was 307,661; in 1944 it was raised 
to 478,000.  Millett, Semper Fidelis, 371-372, 390, 404. 
461 Smith, Carlson’s Raid, 210, 215; and Wukovits, American Commando, 266-269. 
462 The official History of Marine Corps Operations relies heavily on the pragmatic line of analysis, as does 
the definitive institutional history of the Corps, Allan Millett’s Semper Fidelis. “By the summer of 1943, 
the siphoning off of trained men both individually and in battalion-sized organizations, as raider and 
paramarine battalions were activated, proved to be a severe drain on the Marine Corps as a whole and a 
luxury which it could not afford . . . additional manpower was needed for regular Marine Corps ground 
formations.  The center of the argument here is that the weapons and tactics with which they fought were 
no different from those employed by regular Marine ground troops.”  Frank and Shaw, History of Marine 
Corps Operations, vol. 5, Victory and Occupation, 711.  See also Millett, Semper Fidelis, 406.  Jon 
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The Raiders and Cultural Conflict 
The Raiders were admittedly in “the vortex of controversy” throughout their 
relatively brief service life.463  The enduring controversy is attributable to the cultural 
tensions introduced by the Raiders as a special operations unit with a distinctly elitist 
subculture within the larger culture of the elite Marine Corps.  By crafting an identity as 
the elite fighters of the Corps, an identity which they superimposed over their erstwhile 
most important identity as U.S. Marines, the Raiders – explicitly and implicitly – created 
a group identity that was not only enduring and powerful, but was also perceived as a 
potential threat by the leadership of the Marine Corps.  The Raiders upset the cohesive 
narrative of Marine identity in two general ways.  First, the Raider program was tainted 
in the eyes of many Marines by excessive external interference in the workings of the 
Corps.  The Raider battalions threatened to give traction to efforts from outside the Corps 
to reduce the size and scale of the post-war Marine Corps to little more than small-scale 
detachments for garrison and raiding duties, thereby undoing all the gains towards 
becoming a full-fledged service branch that the Corps had made at such high cost in the 
Pacific.  Secondly, by injecting a new, sub-identity as elites of the elites, the Raiders 
provoked fears of dividing loyalties, threatening to disturb the cohesion of the Corps.  
These cultural threats and divisions arguably played just as much a role in the end of the 
Raider project as the operational reasons, if not more so. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hoffman briefly mentions the Raiders’ elitism in his discussion of their disbandment, but focuses more on 
operation reasons.  Makin to Bougainville, 40.  Possibly the best explanation of the end of the Raiders is 
found in Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 301-310; however, he puts most of his emphasis on the operational 
rationales and does not fully explore some of the cultural issues he raises. 
463 Moskin, Marine Corps Story, 276. 
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External Interference: A Threat to the Marine Corps 
The Raiders faced an uphill battle for acceptance within Marine Corps culture 
from their origins.  They were born amidst a swirl of outside influences.  So many and so 
diverse were the sources of inspiration and motivation for the foundation of the Raider 
experiment that most Marine officers were not exactly sure from what quarters the 
concept originated.  Of course, Edson and H.M. Smith laid much of the foundation of 
what the Raiders eventually became with their APD battalion experiments.  But any 
number of individuals can be cited, with some justification, as the primary source of the 
Raider concept:  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Frank Knox, William 
Donovan, Evans Carlson, James Roosevelt – not to mention the example set by the 
British Commandos and Carlson’s desire to mimic the Chinese 8th Route Army.  The 
high-level interest by powerful individuals created the distinct impression in Marine 
ranks that the Raiders were forced upon the Marine Corps from the outside.  Judging by 
the staunch resistance put up by Holcomb, backed by his ranking generals, this 
impression was not too far from the truth.464   
The Raiders continued to attract unwanted interference from outside the Corps 
during the Solomons campaign, as seen in Turner’s attempt to unilaterally form 
“provisional raider battalions” from Marine units.  Though Turner denied it, many 
                                                 
464 For example, Benis Frank mentioned to Gerald Thomas that many other senior Marine officers “felt that 
the Marine Corps had been pushed into this Raider business, in spite of itself, and that Carlson had been the 
influencing factor.”  Benis Frank (interviewer), in Thomas transcript, MCUA, 233.  Thomas himself 
thought that “it may be that [James] Roosevelt influenced it a little bit.” Thomas transcript, MCUA, 232.  
Victor Krulak, who was serving in the 1st Marine Division when the Raiders were originally formed, said, 
“I know that Carlson was keen on the matter of lightly armed troops of this sort…But, just where the 
Raider idea had its first origin in the Marine Corps, I can’t say.”  Krulak transcript, MCUA, 70.  Omar 
Pfeiffer, on the other hand, said, “It is my understanding that Prime Minister Churchill was probably the 
real instigator of the formation of Raider Battalions in the Marine Corps…at one of the meetings with 
President Roosevelt, he sold him the idea and the Marine Corps had to suffer for it.”  Pfeiffer transcript, 
MCUA, 195.  Alan Shapley laid the blame on William Donovan.  Shapely, transcript, MCUA, 82.  Clearly, 
there was much confusion regarding the origins of the Raiders, even among those who served with them. 
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Marines felt that this was part and parcel of the on-going efforts to curtail the growth of 
fully independent Marine divisions by limiting the Corps to regimental or smaller units.  
The desire to prevent outside forces from pigeonholing the Marine Corps as a force of 
small, commando-style units, completely dependent on other services for support, was 
the primary motive for Holcomb’s resistance to the Raider program from the outset.  
Vandegrift likewise recognized the need to fight for the preservation of the Corps’ status 
as an independent service in the face of threats of postwar reduction back to their 1920s 
status as a small force of colonial infantry.  Such fears were not unfounded; numerous 
efforts were made during the postwar reorganization of the defense establishment to 
reduce the size and strength of the Marine Corps.465   
In the eyes of Marine leadership, the threat of external entanglements went 
beyond mere injury to the pride of the Corps, though that would be impermissible on by 
its own right.  Rather, it was perceived that the Raiders were an existential threat to the 
evolution of the Marine Corps itself.  This is ironic, for the men and officers who served 
in the Raider battalions most likely were completely unaware of the quandary their small, 
special operations battalions created in high places.  In his trenchant analysis of the 
Raider experiment, John Gordon stresses the hidden existential threat to the growth of the 
Marine Corps as perhaps the most important motive for opposition from HQMC.  The 
“most potent criticism of all,” Gordon writes, “involved the very essence of amphibious 
                                                 
465 Such limitation of the Corps was indeed considered after the war’s end, including proposals by the 
Army that the Marine Corps be limited to regiment-sized units only.  Millett, Semper Fidelis, 404, 452, 
456-457.In Marine Corps historiography, the years immediately following WWII are usually termed the 
“unification crisis,” and are seen as a political battle as intense and life-threatening as any fought during the 
war.  For the Marine Corps’ perspective, see Millett, Semper Fidelis, 445-474; for the Army’s perspective, 
see Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 485-495.  Aaron 
O’Connell covers the unification crisis in terms of how it affected the Marine Corps narrative and how 





Signified by the creation of the Fleet Marine Force in 1933, the Marine 
Corps had transformed itself into a task-organized, seaborne land army 
able to assault a hostile shore.  Having at last acquired its own mission and 
role, relegated to the past was the old light infantry, police-force-for-the-
Navy arrangement . . . . Rather than an adjunct to their carefully-evolved 
doctrine, it [the Raider concept] was seen as its very antithesis . . . in their 
eyes, the raiders represented a very dangerous departure indeed.467 
 
In the minds of many Marines, always wary of attempts by outsiders to marginalize their 
Corps, the Raiders were fruit of a poisoned tree from the very beginning.468  
 
Division of Loyalties 
Opposition to Evans Carlson.  One commonly recognized example of the 
Raiders going against the Marine Corps grain is the suspicion aroused by Evans 
Carlson’s outspoken views and radical methods.  Carlson is certainly one of the most 
enigmatic Marines in the annals of the Corps.  He was seen as an eccentric by all, 
borderline traitorous by some.  This “idealistic, romantic military adventurer,” with his 
overt questioning and restructuring of authority and tradition, and his advocacy of his 
own radical, unique brand of egalitarianism raised the ire of many fellow Marines.469  
Later Raider officers respected Carlson for his achievements, but found that 
“unfortunately a lot of the ideas he had were not in consonance with Marine Corps 
philosophy.”470  Shapely, Carlson’s successor in the 2nd Raiders, certainly found his 
                                                 
466 Gordon, “An Experiment with Military Elitism,” 368-369. 
467 Gordon, “An Experiment with Military Elitism,” 369. 
468 This belief is illustrated in an exchange between Alan Shapely and the interviewer (Thomas Donnelly), 
in which the interviewer states that the Raider concept as advanced by Donovan and Franklin Roosevelt 
was “Another threat to the survival of the Marine Corps.”  Shapely is quick to affirm, “Yes, it was.”  
Shapely transcript, MCUA, 82. 
469 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 234.   
470 Banks transcript, MCUA, 20. 
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methods disagreeable and abandoned most of them immediately.471   
Of course, Carlson was not without friends among Marine officers.  Early in his 
career, famed Marine Smedley D. Butler had developed a high opinion of Carlson, and 
the equally legendary Lewis “Chesty” Puller allegedly counted Carlson as an old friend.  
Merrill Twining (Vandegrift’s Assistant Operations Officer at Guadalcanal) thought 
Carlson a “most remarkable man” and found “little reason to believe that Carlson carried 
out his radical leadership philosophy to any extreme degree.”472    Vandegrift had known 
Carlson for many years and appears to have had a cordial relationship with him.  James 
Roosevelt remained dedicated to him, frequently arguing in later years that, “The man 
had been a patriot, regardless of his politics.”473  Then-Colonel (later Commandant) 
David Shoup based his assessment on Carlson’s proven courage rather than any alleged 
political views, bluntly stating, “He [Carlson] may have been ‘Red,’ but he wasn’t 
yellow.”474 
By war’s end, however, Carlson’s detractors outnumbered his friends.  Most 
damning in the eyes of the majority of Marines was his outspoken support of Mao’s 
                                                 
471 F.D. Beans said that “there is no doubt he had different ideas, a different concept than any Marine I 
know.”  F.D. Beans, Oral History Interview Transcript (hereinafter Beans transcript), MCUA, 70; while 
Charles Banks characterized him as “a nonconformist.”  Banks transcript, MCUA, 21. 
472 Twining, No Bended Knee, 140-141. Like Thomas, Twining continued to hold influential staff positions 
under Vandegrift, including at IMAC and HQMC.  See Karl Schuon, U.S. Marine Corps Biographical 
Dictionary: The Corps’ Fighting Men, What They Did, Where They Served (New York: Franklin Watts, 
1963), 223-224. 
473 Roosevelt and Libby, My Parents, 277; Roosevelt also gives a passionate defense against charges of 
Carlson’s supposed Communist sympathies in “Evans Carlson: A Personal Memoir,” 386-392. 
474 Quoted in Frank, Guadalcanal, 424.  Smedley Butler wrote to Carlson in 1926, “You always do the 
right thing . . . I want to congratulate you again and thank you for your fine work.  You are a ‘hell’ of a fine 
officer.”  Excerpt quoted in Blankfort, Big Yankee, 134.  Author Hans Schmidt credits Butler with being the 
direct predecessor to Carlson’s Gung Ho style.  Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the 
Contradictions of American Military History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 132.  
According to Peatross, Chesty Puller made a visit to the Raider camp at one point during their Long Patrol 
on Guadalcanal specifically to catch up with Carlson.  Bless 'Em All, 157.  It seems that Carlson had been 
generally well-thought of throughout the Corps prior to his sojourn with the 8th Route Army.  Frank, 
“Comment,” 395. Blankfort, Big Yankee, 134. George Smith cites Vandegrift as writing to Carlson after the 
war, in regard to his planned run for Senate, “I imagine you will have rather stiff competition in California, 
but personally I wish you all the luck in the world.”  Carlson’s Raid, 217. 
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Chinese Communists, which placed him publically at odds with the stated policy of the 
U.S. government.  Carlson gladly acknowledged receiving inspiration for his Gung Ho 
method from Mao’s Communists during his trek with the 8th Route Army.  As Benis 
Frank, former chief historian of the Marine Corps History & Museums Division, put it 
once, many Marines “believed that, if Carlson was not a card-carrying Communist, he 
had many Communist or leftish leanings.”475  Before he ever joined the Raiders as a 
young lieutenant, Oscar Peatross recalls being advised “‘Don’t touch him [Carlson] with 
a 10-foot pole.’”476  Even those otherwise sympathetic to Carlson admitted that “He was 
pretty much a communist.”477  Herbert Merillat, a combat correspondent on Guadalcanal, 
wrote that “Within the Corps he was widely regarded as an able officer but also a 
romantic or a ‘pinko,’ or both.  At the very least he was seen as a friend of President 
Roosevelt (as indeed he was) in an officer corps not noted for New Deal tendencies.”478  
Ultimately, Carlson’s unorthodox methods, political dalliances with the far left, and 
almost quixotic fixation with ethical indoctrination, set him at odds with many in the 
Corps. 
Others found as much fault with his conduct as CO of the 2nd Raider Battalion as 
they did with his political advocacy.  Merritt Edson, for one, had little use for Carlson 
and did not care to hide it.  He viewed Carlson’s resignation and subsequent re-joining of 
the Corps in the pre-war years as no less than traitorous to the Corps and apparently never 
forgave Carlson for his rude treatment of the men of Able Company, 1st Raider Battalion, 
in February 1942.  His few interactions with Carlson during the war ranged from cool 
                                                 
475 Frank, “Comment,” 395.  With tongue-in-cheek, Frank adds, “Besides, he thought a lot, and that’s bad; 
and he wrote books that were actually published, and that’s even worse!” 
476 Peatross transcript, MCUA, 76. 
477 Beans transcript, MCUA, 70. 
478 Herbert Christian Merillat, Guadalcanal Remembered (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1982), 247. 
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receptions to outright anger at Carlson’s tendency to steal the media spotlight.  The 
Makin Raid, for all its heralding in the popular press, was a black mark on Carlson for the 
remainder of his career.  Nimitz’ opinion of Carlson was certainly diminished after 
Makin, and his report on the raid, complete with deliberate censure of Carlson, was 
copied directly to the Commandant.  R.D. Heinl of the Marine Corps’ History Division 
asserted that “among the few who learned the full story, the operation served to place a 
chill on the raider program . . . the raider concept, perhaps unfairly, never quite lived 
down Makin.”479  Benis Frank, founder of the oral history program of the History 
Division, found over the course of his numerous interviews that Makin “raised some real 
questions and doubts about Carlson’s leadership abilities.”480   
More importantly, those in positions of great influence in the Marine Corps did 
not care much for Carlson or his Gung Ho Raider schemes.  Commandant Holcomb was 
among those who distrusted the Gung Ho method.  According to historian David Ulbrich, 
“The raider concept rankled Holcomb even after the units were formed, and the maverick 
Carlson particularly irritated him.”481  Another influential officer who distrusted Carlson 
                                                 
479 Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, 357-358.   
480 Frank, “Comments,” 395.  When the 2nd Raiders returned from the Long Patrol, Edson “gave Carlson a 
cool reception but provided a hearty welcome to those men who had served in his original Company A 
before their transfer.”  Hoffman, Once a Legend, 230.  Twining relates a “bizarre occurrence” in which he 
was to orchestrate a meeting between Edson and Carlson on Guadalcanal to get their opinions on the fire-
team concept.  Though both Raider leaders were present, they apparently did not even acknowledge each 
other’s presence at the three-man meeting, leaving Twining “in the middle in more ways than one.” No 
Bended Knee, 145.  Edson later wrote an angry letter to the editor of the Marine Corps Gazette after it had 
run a photo of Edson, Carlson, and Shoup with the heading “leaders of the assault,” objecting in strong 
terms that Carlson was only an observer and should not have been credited with more than that.  Hoffman, 
Once a Legend, 267.  See discussion of Nimitz’ reaction to the Makin raid, and the effects of Nimitz’ 
report, in Chapter 4. 
481 Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 125.  Holcomb apparently had distrusted Carlson for some years, dating 
back to their service in China.  Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 51-52.  Ulbrich notes that this observation is 
based on notes Heinl took during a post-war interview with Holcomb, and that “both interviewer and 
interviewee shared biases against Evans Carlson.”  Preparing for Victory, 125.  This raises an interesting 
point, for Heinl was very influential in writing Marine Corps history, and thus his sentiments had potential 
to warp post-war impressions of Carlson.  Consider, for example, Benis Frank’s oral history interview with 
Oscar Peatross in 1973, in which Frank states that during the writing of History of Marine Corps 
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immensely was Col. Omar Pfeiffer.  Though not one of the better-known Marines of 
World War II, he served in positions of great influence: from April 1941 to June 1943, he 
was the Assistant War Plans officer on Nimitz’ (CINCPAC) staff, and served the 
remainder of the war on King’s (COMINCH – CNO) staff in the planning section.  As 
the Marine representative on the staffs of Nimitz and later King, Pfeiffer was certainly in 
position to know what was going on, and he had little hesitation about lending his input 
on matters related to the Raiders.  Pfeiffer made no pretense about his feelings on Carlson 
and his methods:  “his organization [the 2nd Raiders] was imbued with purely and simply 
communist doctrine and procedure . . . . Whenever I hear those words [Gung Ho], I am 
almost nauseated.  It is a Chinese communist slogan.”482  Pfeiffer was adamant in his 
opposition to Carlson and his Raiders, and recommended to Commandant Holcomb 
directly that the Raider concept be abandoned.483 
Carlson’s Post-War Career.  Carlson most enduring legacy is for his time in 
command of the 2nd Raider Battalion – Carlson’s Raiders.  When he was passed up for 
command of the new 1st Raider Regiment in spring 1943, he “suffered deep 
disappointment.”484  Promotion to executive officer of the regiment was in truth a 
“double blow” to Carlson, as he lost his own battalion but was denied command of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Operations, “Bob Heinl as historical officer was the one who sequestered the story [Makin Raid] and said it 
shouldn’t be put in and now he’s taken the other view that the Marine Corps had nothing to hide and should 
tell it.”  Peatross transcript, MCUA, 77.  
482 Pfeiffer transcript, MCUA, 198-199. 
483 Pfeiffer transcript, MCUA, 199.  Pfeiffer often served as “more-or-less a go-between” for Vandegrift 
and Holcomb and Navy Admirals, especially R.K. Turner.  George B. Clark, United States Marine Corps 
Generals of World War II: A Biographical Dictionary (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2008), 110.  
Pfeiffer also played a key role in diffusing Admiral Turner’s scheme to form provision raider battalions, 
personally preparing Nimitz’ forwarding of the message with disapproval. Pfeiffer transcript, MCUA, 193; 
Updegraph, Special Marine Corps Units, 14-17.  Vandegrift, for one, held him in high regard, saying with 
approval that Pfeiffer “knew his subjects and practically lived and ate the job.”  Vandegrift to Holcomb, 26 
June 1943, Holcomb Collection, MCUA. 
484 Roosevelt, My Parents, 276. 
 175 
 
regiment.485  Not long after his promotion, Carlson had to be evacuated to the states 
because of acute malaria.  He never again served in independent command.  He spent the 
summer of 1943 attached to the 4th Marine Division in California as a staff officer while 
he recovered; during which time he also, with Commandant Holcomb’s approval, served 
as military advisor on the production set of the movie Gung Ho.  True to form, Carlson 
chafed at being stateside while the war continued unabated, and wrote Holcomb 
volunteering for combat duty again; he was assigned to the new 4th Marine Division.  
Still feeling “like a duck out of water” to be in the U.S. while the Raiders fought on New 
Georgia, Carlson volunteered to go along with the 2nd Marine Division to Tarawa in 
November 1943 as an observer.486  He served admirably there, occasionally acting as a 
messenger for Col. Shoup.  He served as an assistant planning officer with the 4th Marine 
Division during their assault on Saipan.  Carlson suffered severe injuries from enemy 
machine gun fire there while attempting to rescue a wounded Marine.  His wounds and 
the forthcoming end of the war led Carlson to retire officially on July 1, 1946, with 
promotion to Brigadier General.  Even before formally retiring he began actively 
participating in groups, notably the American Veterans Committee, dedicated to “create a 
postwar America that lived up to the ideals men had fought and died for.”487  His 
intention of a run for U.S. Senator in California was halted prematurely by a heart attack 
in December 1945.  Limited to a more restful routine while recovering, Carlson still 
granted numerous interviews to Michael Blankfort for what eventually became his 
“authorized” biography, The Big Yankee.  Sadly, this proved to be the final battle for the 
rugged China Marine.  Carlson never regained his health, and died in June 1947 of 
                                                 
485 Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 174. 
486 Carlson to H. Merillat, 5 August 1943, Carlson Collection, MCUA. 
487 Zimmerman, “Military Missionary,” 261. 
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complications from cerebral thrombosis.488 
As in life, so in his death Carlson remained controversial.  The government 
apparently denied his widow, Peggy, the funds necessary to transport his body to 
Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, D.C.  James Roosevelt intervened to 
prevent this indignity by personally raising the funds to pay for transportation.  Carlson 
received a funeral with full military honors at Arlington.  Notably absent from the 
ceremony was Merritt Edson, who declined a request to chair a memorial service in 
Carlson’s honor.  However, Commandant Vandegrift attended the service and was 
“greatly moved at the funeral,” according to Carlson’s son and fellow Marine Raider, 
Evans Jr.489  But even before his death, Carlson’s prior association with the Chinese 
Communists, combined with his postwar advocacy of ending U.S. support for Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government in favor of Mao’s Communist movement, had 
aroused opposition even for such a favored war hero as Carlson of the Raiders.  As early 
as September 1946, Time magazine leveled the accusation that Carlson had “long been an 
apostle of Communistic causes and Communist-fringe groups.”490  This drew Carlson’s 
protest:  “I am not a member of the Communist Party, nor am I an apostle for Communist 
causes . . . I am a free American citizen who has spent over 30 years in the armed 
services fighting in defense of the right of American citizens to enjoy life, liberty, and the 
                                                 
488 Smith, Carlson’s Raid, 210-215; Holcomb to Carlson, 3 July 1943, Carlson Collection, MCUA; Carlson 
to Holcomb, 7 July 1943, and Holcomb’s reply of 14 July 1943, Carlson Collection, MCUA; Alexander, 
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489 Smith, Carlson’s Raid, 219.  On Evans Carlson, Jr., joining the 2nd Raider Battalion over his father’s 
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pursuit of happiness and the four freedoms [as set forth by Franklin D. Roosevelt].”491  
During the anti-Communist craze of the postwar years, Carlson’s name appeared on 
publicized lists of Communist sympathizers and Senator Joseph McCarthy even accused 
him posthumously of being a disciple of Mao. Sadly, had he survived to continue his 
political activism, it is quite possible that his reputation as Carlson the Raider Marine 
may very well have been tarnished by the outcry against Carlson the Chinese Communist 
sympathizer.492 
On the matter of Carlson’s political beliefs, Kenneth Shewmaker argues quite 
persuasively that “to accuse a man like Evans Carlson of being a Communist is 
presumptuous. He was anything but a Marxist.”493  Carlson possessed no commitment to 
the political ideology or philosophy of Marx, Lenin, or even Mao for that matter.  
Instead, he projected his own beliefs, shaped by his upbringing as the son of a 
Congregationalist minister in New England, onto the Chinese, seeing in them only what 
he wanted to and naively ignoring the rest – “a misjudgment that was especially 
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commonplace in the era of the New Deal.”494  Carlson lacked a formal education and had 
never been much interested in abstract political philosophies at all.  He merely believed 
that he had found, at long last, a physical manifestation of the ideals that he had long 
nurtured.  Carlson’s ideals represented a strange collusion of New England puritanism, 
egalitarianism, and the hopeful optimism represented by his hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
and the New Deal – generously seasoned with transcendental poets like Whitman, 
Thoreau, and Emerson.  An odd mixture, to be sure, but hardly the makings of a Marxist 
or Maoist.  Even his rival Omar Pfeiffer conceded that Carlson was unique: after 
observing Carlson’s powerful eulogy to the Raiders who fell on Makin, Pfeiffer could 
only remark that, “the memorial service presided over by Colonel Carlson, was a most 
solemn and impressive affair.  My opinion, which may be called for or uncalled for, is 
that he missed his calling; he should have been a chaplain.”495 
Carlson and the Cult of Personality.  Part of the distrust of Carlson stemmed 
from fear of a growing cult of personality within the 2nd Raiders.  Carlson’s magnetism 
and charisma endeared him to his Raiders in a highly personal manner.  His egalitarian 
emphasis on the enlisted man, even to the point of allowing open discussion of the merits 
of an officer’s orders or plan of battle, caused many young Raider Marines to personally 
“buy in” to the battalion.  Marine combat correspondent Jim Lucas, who himself fell 
rapidly under Carlson’s charm to become “a rabid Carlson fan,” closely observed the 
                                                 
494 “Americans tend to view other societies in terms of their own self-image . . . . Carlson projected onto an 
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“esteem in which Carlson was held by his men.”496  During training after Guadalcanal, 
Carlson was swept off his feet on a slippery submarine deck by a large wave.  Grabbing 
him, a Raider yelled out “God-damn it, colonel, stand clear. What would become of us if 
anything happened to you?”497  Many of his Raiders took Carlson’s promotion to 
regimental executive officer as a personal loss:  “On shore, we learned that Colonel 
Carlson had been promoted . . . I stumbled with them [the Raiders] up the beach, tears in 
their eyes, and heard them curse the fate that had robbed them of their old man.  I sat in 
their tents and heard them cry like babies.”498  Lucas put it even more bluntly in a press 
release he prepared about his time with the 2nd Raiders:  “The men literally worship ‘the 
old man.’”499  Oscar Peatross, an officer in the 2nd Raiders, wrote that Carlson “was a 
charismatic leader with a strong following, especially among the younger enlisted men, 
many of whom adored him.  This broad base of enthusiastic, even zealous supporters 
enable him to achieve his objectives . . . in spite of the rejection of his egalitarian 
philosophy by many of his officers and noncommissioned officers.”500  In this manner 
Carlson garnered a great deal of personal loyalty and affection from his Raiders – and 
they truly were his Raiders. 
While his practices endeared him to younger Marines, more experienced NCOs 
and officers often did not share that consensus.  From their perspective, Carlson’s Gung 
Ho meetings had the net result of undermining authority and corroding discipline.  
Opponents of Carlson claimed that Carlson undermined the authority of his leaders so 
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badly that “There could be no discipline and no moral[e], in such an organization.”501  
Even Peatross, one of Carlson’s supporters, admitted later that the Gung Ho method was 
frequently exploited by enlisted men:  “Once it became common knowledge in the 
battalion that he deemed it a mortal sin for an officer to give an order that was 
misunderstood, the men naturally sought to turn this to their advantage.  It became not at 
all uncommon for a malefactor, brought on the carpet for some sin of omission or 
commission, to offer in extenuation ‘Sir, I didn’t understand the order,’ and thereby 
divert the colonel’s wrath onto the officer accuser.”502  Charles Lamb, a career Marine 
and Sergeant Major (later Lieutenant) in the 2nd Raiders, attended only the first Gung Ho 
meeting and left in disgust.  He later wrote that,  
I was at that time, and will always be, proud of being a Marine and could 
not understand or digest Carlson’s double talk and ridicule of the Marine 
Corps and its methods.  To the majority of the men, this was the start of 
the hero worship they developed for him.  He told them that they were 
pioneers, that they were heroes, and that they were the best fighters in the 
world.  They believed him.503   
 
Other Marine officers outside the Raiders fostered the suspicion that Carlson was 
building a personality cult as well, a suspicion that grew stronger with each additional 
media glorification of Carlson and his Raiders.  Omar Pfeiffer, for example, in postwar 
discussion of his opposition to the Raider idea put strong emphasis on his belief that a 
personality cult was building up around Carlson.  Carlson was, in Pfeiffer’s vocal 
opinion, “building a personal organization that only he could command and, and my first 
                                                 
501 “When a man was put on report by an officer, and there was no other witnesses, as Colonel Carlson 
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 181 
 
opportunity, I so informed the Commandant.”504  Even friends of Carlson had to admit 
that “Carlson’s system would never be effective on a service-wide scale for the simple 
reason that there are not enough Carlsons.”505   
The anti-Carlson sentiments are commonly reflected in writings on the Raiders, 
especially given the fact that the entire Raider concept, fairly or not, is so closely 
associated with Carlson.  This illustrates the reactions of men dedicated to continuing the 
Marine Corps culture to an individual who introduced ideas and practices that were out of 
step with that culture.  In this sense, Carlson can justly be considered a “military 
missionary” – or perhaps more aptly, a military heretic. One recent study suggests that 
the Marine Corps culture can be best understood as a civil religion.  If the Marine Corps 
culture is viewed in terms of civil religion, Carlson was indeed akin to a heretic:  he 
introduced non-canonical “doctrines” into the religion of the Corps, only to find that the 
orthodoxy effectively resisted his endeavors.  Yet merely identifying Carlson’s ill-favor 
with some in powerful circles does not fully explain the predicament that the Raiders 
inadvertently created for the Marine Corps.  If Carlson himself were the only problem, 
why did the anti-Raider sentiment continue to gather momentum throughout 1943, well 
after Carlson’s evacuation?  Other factors were at work as well, causing the Raiders to be 
seen as a liability to attempts to foster the Marine Corps image.506 
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The favored treatment accorded to the Raiders in matters of personnel and 
equipment did not endear them to the rest of the Corps.  This had been true from the 
initial organization of Raider battalions.  By forming a special operations force based on 
double-volunteers, the Raiders ensured they would be going into battle with the cream of 
the crop.  This opened them up to the legitimate charge that they were concentrating the 
best talent in small organizations at the expense of the Corps.  One of the foremost 
complaints leveled against the Raiders was their coopting of prime personnel at a time 
when they were desperately needed.  This criticism was not unique to the Raiders.  The 
view that special units drain the best and brightest personnel away from the general 
service branches of a military organization was common throughout both the American 
and British militaries of the day.  Overconcentration of the ablest men in select units 
prompted British Field Marshal Sir William Slim’s warning that can “lower the quality of 
the rest of the army, especially of the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but 
by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that 
only specially equipped corps d’elite could be expected to undertake them.”507  The 
accusation that special operations and military elite units are “skimming the cream of the 
crop,” thereby lowering the quality of the remainder of the military establishment, was 
commonly leveled at the special operations units, from World War II to the present 
day.508   
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The perception of the Raiders as favored sons did not get better over time.  
Charles Banks found that “there was a lot of criticism of the Raiders because a lot of 
people were jealous,” especially after he got first pick of replacement officers for his 1st 
Raiders after New Georgia.509  The Raiders fueled their perception as favored sons with 
their continued first priority on the newest equipment.  Joseph Alexander relates that 
when the Corps adopted camouflaged uniforms and helmet covers (the famous “duck 
hunter” pattern), “The Raiders and parachutists received the first shipments of these 
distinctive field uniforms and wore them with an arrogance that grated on the regular 
units.”510  Raider Oscar Peatross corroborates this sentiment; he noticed that there was a 
“rising level of resentment” among the officers of IMAC staff before the Bougainville 
landings.511  Resentment over special treatment became particularly acute through 1943 
as the Raiders were employed almost exclusively as light infantry rather than special 
operations troops.  With the Raiders frequently performing the same missions and 
fighting alongside Marine infantry battalions, notably at Bougainville, there seemed to be 
scant justification for their continued favored status.   
Another area where the Raiders certainly seemed to receive preferential treatment 
was in publicity. The Raiders, similar to the British Commandos early in the war, served 
to bolster morale on the home front.  Stories of their combat exploits were eagerly 
consumed by Americans desperate for any break from the dismal news of 1941-1942, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
we were skimming the cream off the Marine Corps by double volunteers.  I’ve never seen such wonderful 
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Raiders were superfluous and should be disbanded.” Peatross, Bless 'Em All, 236-237. 
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they continued to hold the public’s attention.  The desperate actions of Edson’s 1st 
Raiders made for their share of good copy as well, particularly their seizure of Tulagi and 
defense of Edson’s Ridge.  The service of the President’s son in “the most lethal, self-
sufficient, swift-striking force in military history” garnered plenty of attention.512 
Even more pronounced was the emphasis on Carlson himself, whose 
gregariousness and colorful personality made him a much more interesting subject than 
the more reserved Edson.  Carlson boasted that “The news of Makin spread our doctrines 
around the world, inspiring others to follow our example.”513  This was facilitated by the 
media’s fascination with him, and his reciprocal amenability towards the media’s 
attention.  Carlson made the pitch for the Gung Ho method every time he had a chance.514  
The magazine PM featured Carlson on its cover, as did the Chicago Sunday Tribune.515  
He was featured prominently in articles for such widely-read magazines as Reader’s 
Digest and Life.516  Wartime books by correspondents Robert Sherrod and Jim Lucas 
covered Carlson and his Gung Ho philosophy in glowing terms.517  And of course, he was 
portrayed by popular leading man Randolph Scott in the movie Gung Ho.  Carlson 
became, in the words of Jim Lucas, “almost a legend . . . stories about him were told in 
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every port and printed in every newspaper.”518  Media attention – and the resultant 
controversy – continued even after his death with the publication of Michael Blankfort’s 
The Big Yankee.  R.W. Swing used his review of that book as an opportunity to lionize 
Carlson.  Both Blankfort’s book and Swing’s article drew irate responses from Marines, 
but the fact remains that Carlson continued to receive the hero’s treatment throughout the 
war and for the first few years following.519 
The common theme of elitism is readily apparent throughout the media coverage 
of the Raiders.  Overly exaggerated, colorful language is employed in an attempt to make 
the Raiders out to be almost super-human fighters, the best of the best.  The tone struck in 
a press release during the fighting on Guadalcanal is typical: 
[T]he roots of the answer [as to why the Marines were prevailing on 
Guadalcanal] are to be found in a heritage handed down through 
generations of fighting men serving in the oldest and proudest branch of 
America’s armed forces . . . This heritage is a flaming esprit de corps no 
foe ever has extinguished . . . . Armed with this heritage . . . the United 
States Marine today proudly feels that his service is the fist of the Nation’s 
striking arm. But if this is true, then the Marine Raiders are the brass 
knuckles on that might fist.  For the Raiders stand apart as fighting men.520 
 
The author of this press release inadvertently highlights the underlying tension between 
the elitism of being a Marine and the extra helping of elitism that came with belonging to 
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the Raiders.  The tension between competing claims to elite status was exacerbated as the 
war continued. 
The volume of attention focused on four small battalions only added to the 
emerging cultural conflict between the Raiders and other Marine battalions in the South 
Pacific.  As Joseph Alexander aptly notes, the exaltation of the Raiders to human legends 
may have had a morale-boosting effect early in the war when fears of Japanese 
invincibility in jungle warfare were rampant, but as the Marines continued to successfully 
engage and defeat the Japanese, it began to grate on them.  “Those Marines who had 
fought for Bougainville’s Hellzapoppin’ Ridge, or Cape Gloucester’s Aogiri Ridge (with 
Lew Walt), or crossed the reef under fire at Betio [Tarawa] were no longer inclined to 
suffer the condescending cockiness of the Raiders, nor anyone else.”521  Legendary 
Marine officer Lewis “Chesty” Puller, who certainly had seen his share of the hard 
fighting in the Pacific, raised this point with the Commandant.  When asked by Holcomb 
to weigh in on the Raider battalions, Puller replied: “Nothing special about them, sir.  
They’re just ordinary Marines, when they’re good.  No better than our good men in the 
ranks.  There’s too much guff about them, I mean too much Hollywood stuff.  It isn’t 
good for the Raiders, and it’s mighty bad for the regular Marines . . . . The Raider idea 
should be abandoned.”522   
Overwhelming publicity for special operations units brings attendant pitfalls, as 
several special operations units discovered during World War II.  It tends to come at the 
expense of the morale of line units, a fact which seems particularly unjust when placed in 
perspective relative to the totality of the war effort.  A war as massive as World War II is 
                                                 
521 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, 307. 




certainly not decided by only a few small bands of commandos, paratroopers, or raiders, 
but by the consistently high quality of the total military effort.  Field Marshal Slim 
recognized as much, claiming that, “Armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of 
super-soldiers but by the average quality of their standard units.  Anything, whatever 
short cuts to victory it may promise, which thus weakens the army spirit, is 
dangerous.”523  The overly-hyped publicity heaped upon Allied special operations units in 
the early war ultimately backfired.  Other military units, the men doing the difficult, day-
to-day work and fighting necessary to permanently defeat the Axis powers, quickly came 
to resent the glamourized image of their special operations brethren; even public opinion, 
originally so amenable to romanticized heroes and their feats, eventually became cynical 
about special operations raids.524 
The Marine Corps recognized the potentially detrimental effects of undue 
publicity for the Raiders.  This can be seen by tracking the progression of the press 
releases about the Raiders.  The Navy Department press release after the Makin Raid 
portrayed the Raiders as America’s supermen, specially selected, trained for the most 
impossible missions, and armed to the teeth with lethal weapons.525  Marine Corps press 
releases after the battle for Guadalcanal furthered this image, claiming that “Raiders and 
Parachutists are regarded nothing short of ‘Supermen’ in the Marine Corps.  To be either 
is, therefore, an accomplishment.”526  By 1944, however, the official tone had changed 
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as “routine troops engaged in routine operations,” as the public had grown weary of constant hype about 
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Politicians, 61. 
525 Navy Department Press Release, “Marines’ Special Raider Battalions,” August 25, 1942, Carlson 
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drastically, with talk of the Raiders’ superior status being deliberately downplayed.  The 
press release announcing the recreation of the 4th Marines claimed that “the Raiders were 
never beaten . . . but they are not supermen.  They merely have learned self-
sufficiency.”527  A press release issued after Guadalcanal was secure made this point even 
more explicitly:  “The Raiders are neither supermen, nor arch-killers, nor glamour boys. 
They are Marines . . . the men who comprise the Raiders are drawn from the men who 
comprise the regular Marine ranks, and are in no sense super-Marines. The Raiders differ 
only by virtue of their specialized training.”528  Even some Raiders themselves realized 
that so much publicity was potentially unhealthy for the cohesion of the Marine Corps.  
Raider Lee Minier reasoned that “There was too much publicity and false and 
exaggerated stories and movies being published about the Raiders . . . the Marine Corps 
doesn’t like that sort of thing.”529  Though Minier had no way of knowing it, his analysis 
mirrored the Commandant’s own thoughts on the Raiders. 
During World War II, the Marine Corps cultivated their image as America’s 
amphibious gladiators wresting control of the Pacific from Japan.  However, the coverage 
of the Marine Raiders tended to elevate their status as Raiders at the expense of the 
Corps.  The idea of the press exalting select groups of Marines over the rest of the Corps 
did not sit well with Corps leadership.  Even before the Raiders had proven themselves in 
combat they had been publically equated with the British Commandos.530  Such elevation 
of the Raiders as the proverbial cream of the crop in the public eye persisted in spite of 
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Commandant Holcomb’s repeated insistence that “The United States already has a large 
and growing Commando force—the United States Marine Corps.”531  Holcomb was 
sincerely concerned that the glamour of the Raiders, with their special equipment and 
methods and abundance of flamboyant personalities would come at the cost of the good 
image of the Marine Corps as an entirety. 
His fears were not unfounded.  In December 1943, Fortune magazine featured a 
thirteen-page article, “The Psychiatric Toll of Warfare,” exploring the mental breakdown 
of troops in prolonged combat.  The author asserts that “Psychiatrically, the American 
Dunkerque [sic] was Guadalcanal.”532  The tone and language employed in the article 
leaves a distinct impression of the Marines of Vandegrift’s 1st Division as generally 
hapless, tired, and beyond hope of victory.  They were prone to such psychological 
symptoms as “headaches, lower thresholds to sharp noises, periods of amnesia, of panic, 
psychosomatic complaints, generalized or limited tremors, functional palsies.”533  The 
weary, neurosis-prone Marine infantry contrasted rather unfavorably with Carlson’s 
Raiders, who “were sent into battle psychologically prepared,” and only suffered “one 
case of traumatic war neurosis” during their month-long trek behind enemy lines on 
Guadalcanal.534  After praising Carlson and his methodology in glowing terms, the author 
upbraids the Marine Corps’ leadership:  “Despite the successes of Carlson’s methods, no 
steps have since been taken to use them elsewhere in the Marine Corps, or in any other 
unit of the armed forces for that matter.”535  Taken as a whole, the article reflected badly 
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on Marine Corps, as it diminished the capability of the battle-tested veterans of 
Guadalcanal in order to extol the merits of the Raiders’ psychological training.  This of 
course did not sit well at all with the Commandant, who questioned the validity of the 
sources listed in an initial draft of the article.  Holcomb’s complaints did elicit a response 
from the Executive Editor of Fortune, Albert L. Furth, but the final copy of the article 
appeared in the December issue without substantially incorporating Holcomb’s 
objections.  It is impossible to escape the article’s generally negative impression of 
Vandegrift’s Marines when such phrases as “group neurosis,” “lost hope,” “expendable—
doomed…tired—bone tired,” were employed to describe them.536  Meanwhile, Carlson 
comes across as a modern George Washington, benevolent and wise, able to inspire his 
Raiders against overwhelming odds with his “proven qualities of leadership and with his 
respect for the dignity of man.”537 
 
“An Elite of the Elite” 
The Fortune magazine incident serves as an example of the potential for discord 
that came along with the establishment of small, elite bands within a corps d’elite.  In the 
Raider battalions, shaped as they were by their special operations designation, the ideal of 
elitism flourished as they rapidly moved along the path from Guardsmen to Technicians 
and finally to Warrior elites.  However, the evolution of the Raiders into a de facto elite 
of the elite threatened the unity of spirit that was essential to the Marine Corps’ culture.  
The emergence of a small but powerful subculture within the Marine Corps that asserted 
its own exceptionalism threatened to divide loyalties within an organization that 
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depended on the power of its own culture far more than did the larger military branches.   
As Marine historian Aaron O’Connell pertinently notes, Marine Corps culture 
was defined largely by a combination of potent narratives of Marine exceptionalism and 
rigorous policing of the boundaries between those who were and were not Marines.  
Marines, says O’Connell, “imagined themselves as a small and loyal tribe of warriors 
who were outnumbered, disrespected, and persecuted . . . [and they] drew regularly on 
the language of religion, practices of extreme discipline, and intricately scripted rituals to 
mark themselves as different, separate, and superior to every other organization around 
them.”538  The Raiders, however, may have posed a tacit threat to the unity of Marine 
Corps culture by injecting the possibility of divided loyalties.  To have a small group 
hand-picked and groomed to be the best Warriors within the organization of proud 
Warriors was perceived as implicit questioning of Marine exceptionalism.   
The Marine Corps has long been known to have a distinctive subculture, one 
marked by what historian Aaron O’Connell terms “narratives of Marine 
exceptionalism.”539  As he explains, “Being a Marine meant elitism, an intimate 
community, and access to a set of stories granted only to a few.  But those benefits were 
not free . . . . More so than in the other services, membership in the Marine Corps 
required an ideological commitment, the abandonment of previous civilian identities, and 
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the adoption of a new set of stories and priorities.”540  This culture was powerful, and left 
an indelible imprint on the thousands of Americans who wore the eagle, globe, and 
anchor during World War II.  The Marine Corps’ relatively small size, and the uniformity 
and effectiveness of its recruit training, resulted in a very high cohesion and seamless 
transmission of the pre-war culture of the Corps to a new generation of recruits on a 
larger scale than ever before.  Crucial to maintaining the sense of Marine exceptionalism 
was the dedication of each Marine to the Corps; it became one’s identity.541   
The wholehearted devotion to the Corps felt by the majority of Marines contrasts 
with the other service branches.  With their much larger size, combined with the influx of 
draftees later in the war, group identity in the Army and Navy was tied more strongly to 
individual units or ships – it was much easier to identify with the 3rd Infantry Division or 
the USS Yorktown than with the Army or Navy as a whole.  “The division, the basic 
American fighting unit, fulfills the soldier’s need for identity,” wrote Army Major 
Thomas Farnsworth.542  For the soldier, “The division is the most vital unit.  It transcends 
all claims or prerogatives of branch, arm, service. It is the basic fighting unit—the center 
of accomplishment, esprit, and morale.”543  While extolling the merits of the division as a 
source of group identity and cohesion, Farnsworth unwittingly strikes a difference 
between the smaller Marine Corps and the Army:  “What ships are to sailors, divisions 
are to soldiers.  The Marine Corps, smaller, more compact, and less burdened with 
necessary housekeeping duties, is more fortunate: it can maintain its pride in the whole 
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Corps.”544   
In this, Farnsworth may have unwittingly identified the crux of the tension 
between the Raiders and the Marine Corps at large.  By virtue of their special operations 
missions, their self-selection as the Guardsmen taken from the ranks of the Guards, their 
Technician elite mastery of a particularly hazardous kind of amphibious warfare, and 
their Warrior status earned in blood, the Raiders had crafted a distinctly separate identity 
as elites of the elite.  The strong esprit and unit cohesion that infused the Raider 
battalions was both their greatest asset and their Achilles heel.  Elite, special operations 
units frequently develop extremely high unit cohesion, so much so that their loyalty to 
their individual units may become a threat to the cohesion of the service at large.  Perhaps 
the best exposition of this potential pitfall of special operations elites is given by Horn 
and Balasevicius in their analysis of special operations forces: 
This element of self-selection, combined with the feeling of 
accomplishment, as one of the few who has successfully passed selection; 
and the self-confidence born from challenging, difficult, and hazardous 
training, creates an aura of invincibility and an intense loyalty to what is 
perceived as a very exclusive group.  An intimate bond is deepened further 
through shared hardship and danger.  Members of these “special” groups 
frequently develop an outlook that treats those outside the “club” as 
inferior and unworthy of respect.545 
 
This description dovetails almost perfectly with O’Connell’s description of the ideals of 
Marine Corps culture.  The Marine Corps prided itself on its high standards and 
encouraged feelings of elitism, with all of its connotations of exceptionalism.  The same 
can be said, however, of the Raiders – and such was the major point of contention.  
Elitism by definition is based on perceptions of superiority and inferiority.  By fostering a 
                                                 
544 Farnsworth, “The Division,” 19. 
545 Horn and Balasevicius, Casting Light on the Shadows, 125; their comments on 123 are also relevant. 
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subculture of the elites among the elites, the Raiders inferred that all Marines who were 
not Raiders were inherently inferior.  Furthermore, the potential that any Marine would 
find more meaning and purpose as a member of a particular subset, rather than as a 
Marine, ran contrary to the entire thrust of the Corps’ efforts to foster a uniquely Marine 
identity as America’s amphibious assault elites.546 
The division of loyalties concomitant with the Raiders’ special operations 
designation became a refrain of the critics of the Raider experiment, as evidenced by the 
opinions of many senior Marine officers.  Omar Pfeiffer gave voice to the concerns felt 
by many in Corps leadership: “My thoughts were that we wanted to train every Marine to 
believe that he was an elite; and to have an elite of the elite was carrying things too far.  
To have [created more Raider battalions] would have emasculated orthodox fighting 
units.”547  Gerald Thomas further emphasized the effect that the Raiders had on the 
Marine Corps spirit:  “I don’t believe that an outfit as good as the Marine Corps needs to 
build special organizations [i.e. Raiders].  Shock troops and special organizations are the 
device of declining power.  When they can’t build real formations, they start in and grab 
all the good men and put them in one outfit so they got somebody they know can fight.  
It’s a losing game.”548  The criticism most commonly leveled against the Raiders was that 
“a well-trained [Marine] infantry battalion could do anything that these other specialists 
[i.e. Raiders] could do.”549  Alan Shapely likewise felt that “a [Marine infantry] battalion 
or a regiment could do anything that a Raider battalion or Raider regiment could do,” but 
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he expounded on the thought, basing this objection in the potential diversion of loyalty 
away from the Corps: “And further, you don’t have a Marine Corps within the Marine 
Corps.  The Marine Corps is too small for this.”550  Singling out a group of Warriors that 
was more elite and exalted than the remainder of the group undermined the efforts of the 
Marine Corps to instill the pride and esprit de corps throughout the Corps. 
Ultimately, it is impossible to single out any one reason driving the decision-
making process that ended the Marine Corps’ first Raider experiment.  The situation of 
the Marine Corps and the evolving nature of the Pacific War in late 1943 presented 
significant operational reasons for discontinuing battalion-sized raiding, especially 
considering that few such raids had even been undertaken.  The end of the Raiders may 
therefore be seen as merely the result of hard-nosed pragmatism.  But as has been 
demonstrated, the Raiders introduced a measure of dissonance within Marine Corps 
culture, in some ways deliberately, but in many ways unwittingly.  This cultural tension 
between the emerging and solidifying culture of the Marine Corps as Warrior elites and 
the subculture of the Raiders as “elites of the elite” manifested itself in diverse ways.  It 
can be sensed in the jealously over the preferential treatment of the Raider battalions, and 
it animated the resentment over excessive exaltation of the Raiders in the public eye.  The 
desire to preserve the stability of the Corps’ culture is also what lay behind the 
widespread suspicion that Carlson and his methods were tainted with Bolshevism.  No 
single one of these complaints, or others like them, can be clearly held forth as the single 
most important rationale for transforming the Raiders into the 4th Marines.  Rather, it 
appears that legitimate, operational necessities converged with the on-going cultural 
unrest within the elitist culture of the Corps to spell the end of the Raiders. 
                                                 




The Raider Legacy  
It would be a gross misstatement to claim that the Raiders were irrelevant to the 
Marine Corps’ effort in the Second World War.  The Marine Raider battalions were an 
experiment, a part of on-going efforts by the Marine Corps to prepare for the on-coming 
war.  Events unfolded differently than anticipated, but the attempt remains laudable as an 
effort to gain mastery of the amphibious assault in all phases situations.  Thought their 
operational lifespan was short and tumultuous, the Raiders did make several valuable 
contributions to the Corps at large.  They played a part in raising morale on the home 
front in 1942, an intangible asset that was desperately needed in the early-war gloom.  
The flexible and unorthodox nature of the Raiders gave them room to experiment.  They 
were the first to test the fire-team concept in combat, an innovation that has benefited the 
Corps ever since.  After the end of the Raider battalions, the experience and expertise of 
the former Raiders leavened numerous green Marine units for the terrible ordeals of 
1944-1945.  Wherever they served, with the 4th Marines or with other units, the Raider 
Marines continued to exemplify the courage, resourcefulness, and leadership that made 
them Raiders.551  Former Raiders were frequently sought out as instructors for young 
Marines, giving them the chance to pass on their expertise; their influence was felt in 
many battalions in the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions.  One battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 25th 
Marines, soon adopted the unsanctioned title of “Chambers Raiders,” after their 
commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Justice Chambers, one of Edson’s original 
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company commanders.552  In the larger picture, the Raiders played a role, small but 
significant, in the Corps’ metamorphosis into the nation’s recognized Warrior elites. At 
faraway places like Tulagi, Makin, and Edson’s Ridge, the Raiders’ victories helped 
establish the Marines as Warriors.  General Alexander A. Vandegrift paid the Raiders a 
fitting tribute in a division bulletin commending the Raiders to all hands.  Though he was 
speaking specifically of the 1st Raiders and their assault on Tulagi, his comments are a 
fitting summary of the Marines who served in all four Raider battalions in the South 
Pacific: 
The Commanding General desires to transmit to all hands here on 
Guadalcanal the good news that has reached us from Tulagi.  Our 
comrades there have added the name of a splendid victory to the long roll 
of battle honor of the Corps.  Striking from the sea they assaulted and 
conquered a series of organized positions defended in great strength by a 
wily and determined opponent.  The fight was carried to the enemy at all 
times and in all places and he was driven from every place he held by the 
resolute attack of men who were not afraid to die.  God favors the bold 
and the strong of heart . . . . We salute the officers and men of our 
Division who carried through the Tulagi operations to so brilliant a 
conclusion.553 
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Appendix A.  The Pacific Theater of Operations.554 
 
 
The Raiders served with distinction in the Solomon Islands campaigns of 1942-1943, and in the raid on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert 
Islands.  
                                                 
554 George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge.  History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 4, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, 






Appendix B.  “Up the Ladder.”555 
 
 
Starting with Guadalcanal, the Allies advanced up the Solomon Islands chain with the intention of seizing the key Japanese base at 
Rabaul on the east coast of New Britain.  The Raiders served in operations on Tulagi, Guadalcanal, the Russell Islands, New Georgia, 
and Bougainville.  
                                                 
555 Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Douglas T. Kane, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 2, The Isolation of Rabaul (Washington, D.C.: 












Appendix C.  Guadalcanal and Tulagi.556   
 
 
An overview of the 1st Raider Battalion’s area of operations. 
  
                                                 






Appendix D.  Tulagi.557 
 
 
The 1st Raiders landed on Blue Beach on August 7 and advanced  
southwest towards Hill 281.  They began to meet significant resistance in the 
vicinity of Phase Line A; Tulagi was declared secure on August 8.  
                                                 






Appendix E.  Henderson Field and Edson’s Ridge.558 
 
 
Also known as “Bloody Ridge” or simply “The Ridge,” Edson’s Ridge was a strategic location for the defense of Henderson Field.  
                                                 






Appendix F.  The Battle of Edson’s Ridge.559   
 
          
The Raiders defended the Ridge against attacks by General Kawaguchi’s brigade on the night of September 12-13, and made a 
desperate last stand on the night of September 13-14; the Raiders held the ridge both times.  
                                                 
559 Both figures are from Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 1, Pearl 






Appendix G.  The Makin Atoll Raid.560 
 
 
Carlson’s 2nd Raider Battalion made one of the most daring special operations raids of the war on Butaritari Island of Makin Atoll on 
August 17-18.  Note that Lt. Oscar Peatross’ platoon became separated and landed to the west of the main body. 
                                                 
560 Hoffman, Makin to Bougainville. 
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Appendix H.  Carlson’s Long Patrol.561   
 
  
The route of Carlson’s Raiders on their 
famed Long Patrol behind enemy lines on Guadalcanal. 
                                                 






Appendix I.  The New Georgia Islands.562   
 
 
The scene of Operation TOENAILS.  The 4th Raiders landed at Wickham Anchorage on Vangunu Island and at Segi Point on New 
Georgia’s southeast point in late June; the 1st Raiders landed at Rice Anchorage on New Georgia’s west coast in July.  
                                                 






Appendix J.  Viru Harbor Operations.563   
 
 
The route of the 4th Raiders grueling march to seize Viru Harbor.  
                                                 






Appendix K.  Enogai Inlet Operations.564 
 
 
The 1st Raiders and the Northern Landing Group advanced from Rice Anchorage to seize Enogai Inlet and destroy the Japanese 
garrison at Triri village.  
                                                 






Appendix L.  The Attack on Bairoko.565   
 
 
In the face of prepared defenses and without the element of surprise, the Raiders suffered heavy casualties in their attempt to capture 
Bairoko.  It was the Raiders’ only repulse.  
                                                 






Appendix M.  Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville.566   
 
 
The Raiders’ landing at Cape Torokina on Bougainville was their last combat operation.  The 2nd Raiders landed west of Cape 
Torokina, while the 3rd Raiders secured Puruata Island in the bay. 
                                                 
566 Shaw and Kane, History of Marine Corps Operations, vol. 2, Isolation of Rabaul. 
